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Abstract 
Motivated by the disconnection between dealer-level (DL) and market-level (ML) 
models, and the inadequacy of theoretical macro models in explaining the behaviour 
of the exchange rate, this thesis first studies the microstructure of the foreign 
exchange market and links the behaviour of dealers to exchange rate determination. 
We develop a model incorporating both information effect and inventory effect in an 
environment that is closer to reality.  
Secondly, the order flow model explains around 13% of exchange rate movement per 
transaction for CNY/USD. In addition, we adopt the probability of information-based 
trading (PIN) model and the autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model to 
directly study the information content of trading duration in the Chinese foreign 
exchange market. The estimated results provide some evidence that both the expected 
component and the unexpected component of trading duration are relevant to the 
arrival rate of informed traders. Signed expected and unexpected trading durations of 
order flow are proven to contain information in addition to order flow. The final effect 
of trading duration is a composite result between uninformed and informed traders. 
Therefore, the impact of trading duration differs according to different market 
situations.  
Thirdly, using the Logit model and Ordered Logit model in the estimation, we find 
that the Chinese government prefers a gradual achievement of its target exchange rate, 
and ‘leans-against-the-wind’ with a 150-day moving average and target appreciation 
rate. The driving force of intervention is asymmetric and dynamic. In addition, the 
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Chinese government is found to show more tolerance toward USD appreciation (CNY 
depreciation) than to USD depreciation (CNY appreciation), except during periods 
when it actively accelerates the appreciation of CNY to counter a high rate of inflation. 
Our model is proved to perform better than OLS estimation and to improve prediction 
ability. 
  
V 
 
Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT ...............................................................................................................III 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... V 
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................... IX 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................... XI 
DECLARATION ..................................................................................................... XII 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................... XIII 
CHAPTER 1    INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1 
1.1 MOTIVATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS .......................................... 1 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MAIN FINDINGS OF THE STUDY .............................. 8 
1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS ......................................................................... 13 
CHAPTER 2    LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................. 15 
2.1 LITERATURE ON DL AND ML MODELS ............................................................. 15 
2.1.1 Dealer-level models ................................................................................. 15 
2.1.1.1 Lyons’ model ....................................................................................... 16 
2.1.1.2 Huang and Stoll’s model ..................................................................... 17 
2.1.1.3 Ding’s model ....................................................................................... 20 
2.1.2 Market-level models ................................................................................ 23 
2.1.2.1 Evans and Lyons’ model ..................................................................... 23 
2.1.2.2 Cao, Evans and Lyons’ model ............................................................. 26 
2.2 LITERATURE ON MICROSTRUCTURE STUDIES AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT 
OF TRADING DURATION ............................................................................................ 28 
VI 
 
2.3 LITERATURE ON INTERVENTION REACTION FUNCTION ..................................... 35 
2.3.1 Binary choice approach .......................................................................... 36 
2.3.2 Tobit approach ........................................................................................ 39 
2.3.3 Friction/Threshold approach .................................................................. 42 
CHAPTER 3    ORDER FLOW AND PRICE DISCOVERY IN THE FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE MARKET:  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ............................. 47 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 47 
3.2 STRUCTURE OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET .......................................... 52 
3.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE MODEL .................................................... 54 
3.4 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 80 
CHAPTER 4    TRADING INTENSITY, INFORMATION-BASED TRADING 
AND PRICE IMPACT IN THE CHINESE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET
 ..................................................................................................................................... 84 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 84 
4.2 INTRODUCTION TO THE CHINESE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET ....................... 89 
4.2.1 Trading System ........................................................................................ 90 
4.2.2 Trading Mechanism ................................................................................. 90 
4.3 DATA DESCRIPTION .......................................................................................... 92 
4.4 INTRADAY PATTERN OF INFORMED TRADING ................................................... 95 
4.4.1 The PIN model ......................................................................................... 96 
4.4.2 Estimation results .................................................................................... 99 
4.5 INTRADAY PATTERN OF TRADING INTENSITY ................................................. 106 
4.5.1 The Box-Cox ACD model ...................................................................... 107 
4.5.2 Estimation results .................................................................................. 108 
VII 
 
4.6 INFORMATION CONTENT OF TRADING DURATION .......................................... 115 
4.7 PRICE IMPACT OF TRADING DURATION .......................................................... 124 
4.7.1 The estimated model .............................................................................. 124 
4.7.2 A simple OLS estimation ....................................................................... 125 
4.7.3 A Markov regime-switching estimation ................................................. 128 
4.8 RELATIONS BETWEEN TRADING DURATION AND VOLATILITY........................ 136 
4.8.1 BC-ACD-EGARCH model ..................................................................... 137 
4.8.2 Estimation results .................................................................................. 138 
4.9 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................ 142 
CHAPTER 5    DRIVING FORCES BEHIND OFFICIAL INTERVENTION IN 
THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET ............................................................ 146 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 146 
5.2 DRIVING FORCES OF INTERVENTION: THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING ............. 149 
5.2.1 Deviation from target exchange rate ..................................................... 152 
5.2.2 Excess volatility ..................................................................................... 153 
5.2.3 Interest rate differential ......................................................................... 155 
5.2.4 National economy .................................................................................. 155 
5.2.5 Intervention persistence ......................................................................... 156 
5.2.6 Deviation from the target appreciation rate ......................................... 157 
5.2.7 Market liquidity ..................................................................................... 158 
5.2.7.1 Price impact and return reversal ........................................................ 159 
5.2.7.2 Trading cost ....................................................................................... 160 
5.3 DATA DESCRIPTION ........................................................................................ 160 
5.3.1 The central parity rate ........................................................................... 163 
5.3.2 Intervention data ................................................................................... 163 
VIII 
 
5.3.3 Statistics of dataset ................................................................................ 166 
5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS .................................................................................... 171 
5.4.1 Estimation model for intervention reaction function ............................. 171 
5.4.2 Structural break ..................................................................................... 174 
5.4.3 Asymmetric reaction function of intervention ....................................... 178 
5.4.3.1 Estimation results .............................................................................. 178 
5.4.3.2 In-sample fitting performance ........................................................... 188 
5.4.3.3 Out-of-sample forecasting performance ............................................ 191 
5.4.4 Ordered Logit model ............................................................................. 195 
5.4.4.1 Estimation results .............................................................................. 196 
5.4.4.2 Prediction performance of intervention reaction function ................. 203 
5.4.4.3 Minimization of surprise and false alarm .......................................... 209 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................ 213 
CHAPTER 6    CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................... 216 
6.1 MAIN FINDINGS .............................................................................................. 216 
6.2 IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ......................................................... 221 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 225 
 
  
IX 
 
List of Tables 
 
TABLE 4.1 THE CALCULATION METHOD OF THE CENTRAL PARITY RATE ..................... 92 
TABLE 4.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (09/12/2009–13/12/2012) ................................... 94 
TABLE 4.3 INTRADAY PATTERN OF PARAMETERS AND PIN (09/12/2009–10/12/2010)
 ........................................................................................................................... 101 
TABLE 4.4 INTRADAY PATTERN OF PARAMETERS AND PIN (13/12/2010–13/12/2012)
 ........................................................................................................................... 103 
TABLE 4.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF TRADING DURATION ..................................... 111 
TABLE 4.6 ESTIMATION RESULTS OF W-BC-ACD(1,1) MODEL .................................. 113 
TABLE 4.7 INFORMATION CONTENT OF TRADING DURATION (09/12/2009–10/12/2010)
 ........................................................................................................................... 117 
TABLE 4.8 INFORMATION CONTENT OF TRADING DURATION (13/12/2010–13/12/2012)
 ........................................................................................................................... 121 
TABLE 4.9 OLS ESTIMATION RESULTS OF PRICE IMPACT ............................................ 126 
TABLE 4.10 ESTIMATION RESULTS OF MARKOV REGIME-SWITCHING MODEL ............. 135 
TABLE 4.11 ESTIMATION RESULTS OF BC-ACD-EGARCH(1,1) MODEL ................... 139 
TABLE 5.1 EXAMPLES OF INTERVENTION .................................................................... 165 
TABLE 5.2 NUMBER OF INTERVENTIONS DEFINED (04/01/2011 –13/12/2012) ............ 167 
TABLE 5.3 DESCRIPTIONS OF DRIVING FORCE VARIABLES (04/01/2011 –13/12/2012) 168 
TABLE 5.4 CORRELATION OF THREE TRADING COST MEASURES ................................. 170 
TABLE 5.5 COEFFICIENT VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION OF CBT INTERVENTION ............ 172 
TABLE 5.6 COEFFICIENT VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION OF CPR INTERVENTION ............ 173 
TABLE 5.7 LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR CBT INTERVENTION ............................. 180 
X 
 
TABLE 5.8 LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR CPR INTERVENTION .............................. 185 
TABLE 5.9 IN-SAMPLE FITTING PERFORMANCE OF CBT INTERVENTION ..................... 189 
TABLE 5.10 IN-SAMPLE FITTING PERFORMANCE OF CPR INTERVENTION .................... 190 
TABLE 5.11 OUT-OF-SAMPLE PERFORMANCE OF CBT INTERVENTION ........................ 192 
TABLE 5.12 OUT-OF-SAMPLE PERFORMANCE OF CPR INTERVENTION ........................ 194 
TABLE 5.13 ORDERED LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR CBT INTERVENTION ........... 197 
TABLE 5.14 ORDERED LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR CPR INTERVENTION ........... 200 
TABLE 5.15 PREDICTION EVALUATION OF CBT INTERVENTION .................................. 204 
TABLE 5.16 PREDICTION EVALUATION OF CPR INTERVENTION .................................. 207 
TABLE 5.17 THE FRAMEWORK OF SURPRISE AND FALSE ALARM ................................. 210 
TABLE 5.18 OPTIMAL RESULTS OF NOISE-TO-SIGNAL RATIO FOR INTERVENTION ........ 211 
 
  
XI 
 
List of Figures 
 
FIGURE 1.1 CHINA'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE (01/1993-03/2015) ......................... 5 
FIGURE 2.1 PROCESS OF EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION IN DING’S MODEL ............. 22 
FIGURE 2.2 MICROSTRUCTURE OF THE PORTFOLIO SHIFT MODEL ................................. 24 
FIGURE 3.1 DEPTH OF BID AND ASK QUOTES AT A TIME POINT IN REUTERS D2000-2 
(RIME 2003) ......................................................................................................... 69 
FIGURE 4.1 TRADING PROCESS OF THE PIN MODEL ...................................................... 96 
FIGURE 4.2 INTRADAY PATTERN OF PIN (09/12/2009-10/12/2010) ........................... 102 
FIGURE 4.3 INTRADAY PATTERN OF PIN (13/12/2010-13/12/2012) ........................... 104 
FIGURE 4.4 AVERAGE TRADING DURATIONS IN A DAY FOR TWO SUB-PERIODS ........... 108 
FIGURE 4.5 PERIODIC COMPONENT OF TRADING DURATIONS IN A DAY FOR TWO SUB-
PERIODS .............................................................................................................. 110 
FIGURE 4.6 EXCHANGE RATE RETURNS IN REGIME 1 (09/12/2009-10/12/2010) ......... 129 
FIGURE 4.7 EXCHANGE RATE RETURNS IN REGIME 2 (13/12/2010-13/12/2012) ......... 130 
FIGURE 5.1  CNY/USD EXCHANGE RATE, JANUARY 2011 - DECEMBER 2012 (DATA 
SOURCE: WIND INFO) .......................................................................................... 162 
FIGURE 5.2 LIQUIDITY IN THE CHINESE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET ....................... 169 
FIGURE 5.3 F-STATISTICS TEST FOR BREAKPOINTS OF CBT INTERVENTION AND CPR 
INTERVENTION .................................................................................................... 175 
FIGURE 5.4 FILTERED REGIME 2 PROBABILITIES OF CBT INTERVENTION AND CPR 
INTERVENTION .................................................................................................... 176 
 
  
XII 
 
Declaration 
The content of this doctoral dissertation is based on research work carried out at 
Durham University Business School, UK. No content of this thesis has previously 
been submitted for any other degree or qualification in this or any other institution. 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2015 by MINGJIAN HUANG, All Rights Reserved. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without the author's prior written consent, and information derived from it 
should be acknowledged. 
 
  
XIII 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First of all, I would like to express my great gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Zhichao 
Zhang. His wisdom and knowledge have introduced me to this amazing research area, 
and helped me overcome one problem after another. His constructive advice has 
continuously broadened my horizon and guided my research to the present 
achievement. I also owe sincere thanks to my current co-supervisor Dr Danny Chow, 
and ex-co-supervisor Dr Wenxuan Hou, for their helpful suggestions on the writing 
and structure of my research. 
I am especially indebted to one of the most important people in my life, my wife Dr 
Wenting Zhang, who is my soul mate now and for the rest of my life. Without her 
encouragement, I would not have made the decision to pursue study for a PhD degree. 
Thank you for your support at every step along my journey to the doctoral destination. 
I cherish every moment with you in our academic discussions and in our family life. 
Together, we are the world. Thank you also for bringing such a lovely boy into our 
family. Both of you have made our world so happy, spiritually rich and colourful. 
I would like to express my appreciation to Durham city and Durham University. In 
this place, I met my soul mate and got to know so many friends. I am grateful for all 
the support I have received from Durham University staff, especially in the Doctoral 
Office of the Business School, the International Office and the Finance Office. I 
especially enjoyed the time when I worked at the International Office. Durham, you 
are such a beautiful and peaceful place that I will never stop missing you. You have 
given me so many unforgettable memories. 
XIV 
 
I would not have become the person I am without the precepts and examples from my 
parents. I still remember how concerned you were when I was playing games before 
the college entrance examination. You did not blame me, but allowed me freedom to 
learn how to do the right things at the right time. I remember how proud you were 
when I was admitted to Peking University and then Durham University. I remember 
your tears at my wedding even though you turned away to hide them. To both of you, 
and to my brother, thank you for your unconditional love for me all my life. Thank 
you for your unfading support, no matter where I have wanted to go or what I have 
wanted to do. 
My son, you are the best gift God has given me and my family. When I first saw you, 
you were so tiny and fragile that I did not dare even to touch you. Seeing you growing 
up day by day, I am getting to know the weight of responsibility of being a father. 
Thank you for letting me know the sacrifice my parents have made in raising me. 
Thank you also for bringing our family so much happiness. You are so lovely that I 
cannot stop loving you. May you be always healthy and happy.  
  
1 
 
Chapter 1  
Introduction 
With rapid economic growth and increasing economic might, the Chinese foreign 
exchange market has experienced steady development. According to data from Wind 
Info, in 2012 the annual trading volume of the spot business was 2484 billion US 
dollars and the number of transaction deals was 242 thousand. By 2014, these figures 
had increased by 32.69% and 41.69% per year, respectively, with trading volume 
reaching 4108 billion US dollars, and the number of transactions increasing to 444 
thousand. In 2014, the trading volume of China’s foreign exchange market was more 
than 6 times that of the stock market.
1
 Given the growing size and importance of the 
Chinese foreign exchange market, it is important to pursue a better understanding of 
this market, including price discovery, trading patterns and the role of government. 
1.1 Motivations and Contributions of the Thesis 
Differing from the stock market, the foreign exchange market is a global market, and 
measured in terms of relative values of different currencies. In this market, national 
economic conditions, rather than performance of individual companies, are generally 
perceived to be the driving force behind movements of the exchange rate. Reflecting 
this, early studies of the exchange rate are dominated by macroeconomic models. 
                                                 
1 The data is collected from Wind Info and both numbers are in the same currency, i.e. the 
Chinese renminbi. 
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Many macro models, such as the theory of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), have 
become classical themes of economics textbooks. 
However, macroeconomic models fail to capture exchange rate dynamics, and are not 
necessarily better than a simple random walk model in explaining and forecasting 
exchange rate movements (Meese and Rogoff 1983, Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual 
2005). Motivated by the inadequacy of macroeconomic models, researchers have 
sought alternative methods for studying exchange rate dynamics. One prominent line 
of enquiry is the microstructure study of the foreign exchange market. The key 
concept of microstructure research is order flow.
2
  
Under different assumptions of market structure, the microstructure approach to 
foreign exchange markets can be divided into dealer-level (DL) and market-level 
(ML) models. The DL model focuses on the price formation of individual market 
participants. The problems associated with this model lie in its assumptions of a 
simple market structure and of incoming transactions as the unique source of order 
flow. These assumptions are not consistent with the fact that the foreign exchange 
market is in reality both a quote-driven and an order-driven market, with multi-dealers. 
This shortcoming is alleviated in the multi-structure framework of the ML model, 
which focuses on the market-wide price formation. However, the ML model over-
simplifies the individual price formation process and ignores the rich content of 
individual dealers who might enter into the market-wide exchange rate formation. 
Motivation 1: Given that there exists a gap between the DL model and ML model in 
terms of assumptions and model derivation, the first motivation of this thesis is to 
                                                 
2 Order flow is usually defined as the imbalance of buyer-initiated transactions and seller-
initiated transactions. 
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develop a market-wide order flow model for the exchange rate with rich content of 
market participants under a microstructure framework, filling the gap between the DL 
model and ML model. 
Calculation of order flow requires high frequency transaction data on trading 
directions. As such, in academic research, the microstructure framework was first 
applied to equity markets, where trading data were effectively centralized owing to 
the fast development of electronic trading systems. Unlike the stock market, the 
foreign exchange market is decentralized, less transparent and involves multi-dealers. 
In adapting the microstructure model to the foreign exchange market, a main 
difficulty has been the availability of high frequency transaction data. However, 
thanks to the dramatic development of electronic and internet technology in recent 
years, data availability has become less of an issue.  Moreover, a series research 
pioneered by Evans and Lyons (2002) has further advanced the microstructure study 
of exchange rates. Consequently, the application of a microstructure framework to the 
study of the foreign exchange market has become a promising area for research. Its 
success is, however, limited by its strong requirements for high frequency transaction 
data, especially in the emerging markets. 
In contrast to the extensive discussion on main trading currency pairs in the developed 
markets, research on emerging foreign exchange markets has been scant. While in the 
limited literature available order flow is found to play an important role in explaining 
exchange rate dynamics, the order flow model of emerging markets captures a 
relatively smaller part of exchange rate movement than in developed markets. 
Investigations are required to find other forces in addition to order flow in the case of 
emerging foreign exchange markets. 
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Motivation 2: The second motivation of the thesis is to examine the relationship 
between order flow and exchange rate in one of the most important emerging markets, 
the Chinese foreign exchange market. The research also tries to discover some 
variables in addition to order flow that may contribute to explaining exchange rate 
dynamics in China. 
Another research area within a microstructure framework is the investigation of 
official intervention in the foreign exchange market. Not surprisingly, there is an 
extensive body of literature focusing on foreign exchange intervention in the 
developed markets. Many of those studies are focused on the effectiveness of 
intervention. As argued by Menkhoff (2012), over the last decade the major central 
banks in the developed markets have almost ceased engaging in foreign exchange 
intervention. In contrast, in the emerging markets foreign exchange intervention is 
widely used as an important tool for managing the exchange rate. Consequently, the 
emerging markets have attracted more research interest.  
Research into China’s intervention proves to be a challenge. Because the country does 
not disclose any information on official intervention in the foreign exchange market, 
researchers often use changes in China’s foreign exchange reserve as an indicator for 
official intervention operations. This is because the Chinese yuan is undervalued, and 
the Chinese government tends to keep the exchange rate stable and stop appreciation 
of the currency. Therefore, the Chinese government has to buy US dollars, which is 
associated with the increase in the country’s foreign exchange reserves. According to 
the data from Wind Info shown in Figure 1.1, China’s foreign exchange reserve 
increased rapidly during the last decade, from 624 billion US dollars in January 2005 
to a peak level of 3993 billion US dollars in June 2014. The sustained increase in the 
5 
 
country’s foreign exchange reserve has been considered as evidence of continuous 
intervention in the Chinese foreign exchange market. 
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Figure 1.1 China's foreign exchange reserve (01/1993-03/2015) 
 
Motivation 3: Given the importance of foreign exchange intervention in emerging 
markets, and the limited research on the reaction function of the central bank, the final 
motivation of this thesis is to discover the driving forces behind foreign exchange 
intervention in China. 
This thesis intends to contribute to the literature in the following aspects: 
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 Microstructure analysis: This thesis applies microstructure analysis, a 
framework that has emerged from recent foreign exchange market research, to 
study one of the most important emerging foreign exchange markets, that of 
China. The research adopts both theoretical and empirical perspectives. This 
could help improve our understanding of the Chinese foreign exchange market in 
terms of price discovery, thus enriching the microstructure research in the 
Chinese foreign exchange market. 
 A newly developed model: In this thesis, I develop a new exchange 
rate pricing model under the microstructure framework. By studying the price 
setting behaviours of individual dealers in a multi-structure market, the model 
shows how diversified individual quoted prices become the market-wide 
exchange rate. Compared to existing models, this model is more realistic and 
provides richer content on the pricing impact of order flow, filling the gap 
between the DL model and the ML model. 
 High frequency data: We collect tick data for CNY/USD transactions. 
The highest frequency used in this thesis for estimation is tick-by-tick, and the 
lowest frequency is daily. 
 Information content of trading duration: The current literature 
explains the information content of trading duration by analysing the impact of 
trading duration on exchange rate movement and volatility. This thesis adopts the 
probability of information-based trading (PIN) model and the autoregressive 
conditional duration (ACD) model to directly examine the relationship between 
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both components of trading duration and the two components of information-
based trading. 
 Markov regime switching: The information content of trading duration 
varies across trading hours, assets and markets. Therefore, this thesis introduces a 
nonlinear model, the Markov regime-switching model, to study the time-varying 
relationship between exchange rate movement and both components of trading 
duration in different trading regimes. 
 Identification of intervention: Since the intervention data is not 
readily available from official sources, it is difficult to conduct data-driven 
microstructure research into the foreign exchange intervention in China. This 
thesis develops indicators of intervention from news reports and the setting of 
central parity rate (CPR) far away from the market closed price with daily data 
for around two years. Based on the features of the foreign exchange market 
management system, we define another kind of intervention, CPR intervention, in 
addition to the traditional central bank trading (CBT) intervention. 
 New driving force: This thesis takes into consideration many possible 
driving forces discussed in the literature: for example, deviation from the target 
exchange rate, excess volatility, interest rate differential, national economy and 
intervention persistence. In addition, we introduce two new determinants of 
intervention, i.e. deviation from the target appreciation rate and a measure of 
market liquidity. This is in accordance with the characteristics of foreign 
exchange intervention in China. 
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 Dynamics of intervention strategy: Our intervention data cover an 
eventful period, characterized by the high inflation rate, pressure of renminbi 
(CNY) appreciation, announcement of equilibrium of CNY/USD, enlargement of 
market elasticity, reform of intervention strategy, and the implementation of 
Quantitative Easing Ⅲ  (QEⅢ ), among others. Through estimation of the 
Ordered Logit model and examination of its forecasting ability, we study the 
Chinese government’s attitude towards exchange rate movement and, more 
importantly, seek to discover any change in its intervention strategy. 
1.2 Research Questions and Main Findings of the Study 
In view of the growing importance of China’s economy and the acceleration of RMB 
internationalization, this thesis attempts to provide a deeper understanding of the 
Chinese foreign exchange market. For this purpose, we adopt the microstructure 
methodology that has dominated recent research of the foreign exchange market to 
develop an exchange rate pricing model, to study exchange rate determinants 
empirically, and to discover the driving force of foreign exchange market intervention 
in China. More specifically, this thesis aims to answer the following questions: 
Question 1: How is the price of foreign exchange discovered in the alternative model 
within a microstructure framework?   
Starting from the price discovery of individual dealers with a set of past information, 
we define the quoting strategies in a multi-structure market. Our model allows 
heterogeneous price setting, and diversified tools and motivations to make a deal. 
Market-wide exchange rate is determined by market equilibrium in the interdealer 
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market. The features of the model tell us that competition is an important factor in 
determining the quotes of exchange rate. More specifically, when the number of 
dealers increases, the market is more competitive, and the quotes of exchange rate are 
closer to dealers’ expected value. 
Question 2: In the process of price discovery, in what ways or through what channels 
does order flow influence the exchange rate?  
Our model shows that order flow impacts on the exchange rate via the information 
channel and the inventory channel. The information channel is realized through the 
trading of customers with private information and the optimal quoting strategy of 
dealers reacting to incoming information. The inventory channel is valid when dealers 
wish to share overnight risk with the public and stay with no net position at the end of 
the trading day. Therefore, the coefficient on order flow in the exchange rate 
discovery process reflects both information effect and inventory effect. Specifically, 
the impact of order flow on the exchange rate is related to macro variables, overnight 
market risk, the number of dealers, parameters of utility function and risk-bearing 
capacity. 
Question 3: Does order flow have significant impact on the exchange rate, and to 
what extent does order flow explain exchange rate movement? 
Because of the difficulty in collecting tick-by-tick transaction data in the Chinese 
foreign exchange market, there is little evidence to show the price impact of order 
flow on exchange rate. To the best of my knowledge, there is still a gap in the 
empirical research of order flow model on CNY/USD in ultra-high frequency. This 
thesis examines the relationship between order flow and exchange rate movement 
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with high frequency data from the Chinese foreign exchange market. Our results 
confirm the importance of order flow in capturing exchange rate dynamics. Consistent 
with the literature, order flow explains around 12% of exchange rate changes per 
transaction, which is relatively low compared with the developed market. In addition, 
the price impact of order flow is larger when the market is volatile and illiquid than 
when the market is placid and liquid. Our findings help to understand the intraday 
exchange rate dynamics and are meaningful to market participants, especially to those 
interested in ultra-high frequency transaction. 
Question 4: Assuming that trading duration probably contains information in addition 
to order flow, what is the information content of trading duration in the Chinese 
foreign exchange market? 
Because the microstructure approach to foreign exchange markets usually adopts an 
order flow model with fixed time intervals, such as weekly or daily, irregular time 
intervals between two consecutive transactions are ignored, which may lead to the 
loss of information on the behaviours of market participants. By adopting the PIN 
model and ACD model, this thesis examines the relationship between two 
components of trading duration and two components of information-based trading. 
Our results provide evidence that on average both components of trading duration are 
related to the arrival rate of informed traders, but not to the probability of information 
occurring. 
Question 5: Given that the information content of trading duration has been 
confirmed in literature on equity and derivatives markets, it is logical to infer that 
11 
 
trading duration may have a significant impact on exchange rate changes and 
volatility. If so, in what ways? 
Not surprisingly, information content of trading duration is not conclusive in the 
literature. One theory advocates that long trading duration implies low trading 
intensity of informed traders, leading to small exchange rate movement and low 
volatility. However, another theory argues that discretionary uninformed traders will 
choose the time to trade in order to minimize adverse selection costs; therefore, long 
trading duration mirrors the low trading intensity of discretionary uninformed traders 
and high proportion of informed traders, and short trading duration is associated with 
large exchange rate movement and high volatility. According to the literature, the sign 
of price impact of trading duration varies with trading hours, different assets, and 
different markets. This thesis adopts a nonlinear methodology, i.e. the Markov 
regime-switching model, to study information content of both components of trading 
duration on the Chinese foreign exchange market. The model is able to capture 
different relationships between trading duration and exchange rate movement in 
different regimes. It is supposed to provide more information which may be lost in the 
linear model. Our results support both theses, but ultimately the outcome of trading 
duration is a composite result due to both informed and uninformed traders. The sign 
of trading duration depends on the market structure and situation. We also examine 
the relationship between conditional volatility and both components of trading 
duration in the framework of an ACD-GARCH model. Conditional volatility is found 
to be mainly determined by signed expected trading duration. 
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Question 6: What are the driving forces behind central bank intervention in the 
Chinese foreign exchange market? If there are different types of intervention, is there 
any difference in the policy reaction function? 
Based on the features of the Chinese foreign exchange market management system, 
this thesis defines two types of foreign exchange intervention in the country, namely 
CBT intervention and CPR intervention. Since the Chinese government does not 
disclose intervention records, we compose indicators of intervention based on media 
reports and from the information of the CPR as against the market closing price. 
Through estimating both the Logit model and the Ordered Logit model, we find that 
the driving forces behind foreign exchange intervention in China are asymmetric and 
dynamic. In general, the Chinese government follows a ‘lean-against-the-wind’ policy 
when intervening in the market, and prefers a gradual approach in moving towards its 
target appreciation rate. However, following the government announcement that the 
CNY/USD exchange rate has reached equilibrium, the target appreciation rate ceases 
to be a driving force for intervention. CBT intervention is concerned with interest rate 
differential and is launched mainly to protect the Chinese foreign exchange market 
from attacks by international hot money. In contrast, CPR intervention is more 
concerned with the domestic economy. Appreciation-targeted CBT intervention is 
conducted to remove excess volatility and to provide market liquidity when necessary. 
Question 7: Given the general opinion that the Chinese government frequently 
intervenes in the foreign exchange market, what is the attitude of the Chinese 
government toward the direction of exchange rate movement? 
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Our results from estimating the neutral band of non-intervention for both types of 
foreign exchange intervention show that the government’s attitude toward exchange 
rate movement depends on its policy target. In general, the Chinese government is 
more tolerant of USD appreciation (CNY depreciation) than USD depreciation (CNY 
appreciation). When China is facing a high inflation rate, the Chinese government 
actively speeds up the appreciation of CNY in order to offset import inflation. In this 
case, the government would show more tolerance of USD depreciation (CNY 
appreciation) than USD appreciation (CNY depreciation). 
Question 8: With the discovery of the driving forces of intervention in the Chinese 
foreign exchange market, how well will our model perform in predicting China’s 
official foreign exchange intervention? 
In terms of the maximum predicted probability, our model of the intervention 
indicators can correctly predict above 70% of both types of intervention. It proves to 
perform better than a constant probability model. The forecasting ability may change 
depending on the government’s intervention strategy. After the central bank 
announcement of its intention to reduce the intervention frequency, and to improve 
intervention techniques, CBT intervention becomes harder to predict. Instead, CPR 
intervention becomes a more important intervention tool than CBT intervention, and 
the forecasting ability of our model on CPR intervention is improved. 
1.3  Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: 
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 Chapter 2 reviews in depth the related literature of key DL and ML 
models. It also provides a review of the microstructure literature on the foreign 
exchange market, the information content of trading duration, and the research on 
driving forces of foreign exchange intervention. 
 Chapter 3 describes the structure of the foreign exchange market. In 
accordance with this structure, we develop an alternative order flow model, in 
steps, to capture exchange rate dynamics. Our model is set in a more realistic 
environment and provides richer content than the models in the previous literature. 
 Chapter 4 examines the empirical relation between order flow and the 
exchange rate using high frequency data. Inspired by the success of trading 
duration in the equity market and derivative market, we introduce trading 
duration in addition to order flow to capture exchange rate movement. This 
chapter investigates the information content of trading duration directly, and the 
impact of both components of trading duration on exchange rate movement and 
volatility in different market situations. 
 Chapter 5 defines two types of intervention and potential driving forces 
behind intervention in the Chinese foreign exchange market. We study the 
intervention asymmetry and dynamics of the driving forces for intervention. The 
forecasting ability of the model is also examined in light of various criteria. 
 Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.  It summarizes the main findings, 
discusses the research implications and offers suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
Before embarking upon our empirical work, this chapter provides an in-depth review 
of the theoretical framework of different types of order flow model. It also seeks to 
give a picture of the empirical work on exchange rate dynamics in the microstructure 
framework, the information content of trading duration, and intervention reaction 
function in different countries. In other words, this chapter is intended to provide a 
useful background on the research topic, and a thorough overview of the relevant 
microstructure literature. 
2.1 Literature on DL and ML Models 
This section aims to give a general survey of DL and ML models. The DL models 
focus on the factors that influence the behaviour of individual market participants in 
price setting, and thus connect micro variables such as order flow and inventory with 
exchange market quotes. In contrast, the ML model studies market-wide exchange 
rate formation. 
2.1.1  Dealer-level models 
From among the many optimizing models of the foreign exchange market, the 
following section will introduce the DL models of Lyons (1995), Huang and Stoll 
(1997) and Ding (2006) in chronological order. 
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2.1.1.1 Lyons’ model 
Lyons’ structural model is extended from that of Madhavan and Smidt (1991). It is an 
optimizing model with information set, agents and expectations built on the Bayesian 
rule. There are three signals in the informational setting: public signal 𝑆𝑡 , private 
signal 𝐶𝑗𝑡 and additional public signal 𝐺𝑡. All the signals are assumed to reflect the 
value of the exchange rate. Two equations are important in the model. First: 
 𝑄𝑗𝑡 = 𝜃(𝜇𝑗𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝑋𝑗𝑡 (2.1) 
where 𝑄𝑗𝑡  is possible trading volume from dealer j  consistent with the regret-free 
property
3
 at time t. 𝜇𝑗𝑡 denotes dealer j’s expectation of the currency value conditional 
on available information at time t. It is a function of 𝑆𝑡 and 𝐺𝑡. 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is transaction price 
of dealer i and 𝑋𝑗𝑡 means liquidity demand of dealer j at time t. In fact, the realized 
trading volume will reflect private information 𝐶𝑗𝑡. With the Bayesian rule, market 
makers are able to extract private information from dealer j ’s trades. The other 
important equation is an optimal strategy in many inventory models: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼(𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑖
∗) + 𝛾𝐷𝑡 (2.2) 
where 𝐼𝑖𝑡  is dealer i ’s current inventory level at time t . 𝐼𝑖
∗  denotes the desired 
inventory position of dealer i. 𝐷𝑡  is direction indicator at time t, set at 1 in an ask 
                                                 
3 ‘Regret-free’ here means that the dealer will set the price to incorporate all the potential trading 
volume so that he will not regret making the quote. 
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trade and -1 in a bid trade. It can be seen that the dealer will reduce his quotes when 
the current inventory is higher than the desired position, and vice versa. While the 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
is defined as a function of any 𝑄𝑗𝑡, the information effect will enter into the model 
through conditional expectation and co-exists with the inventory effect: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌)𝐺𝑡 + 𝜌𝑆𝑡 +
1 − 𝜙
𝜙𝜃
𝑄𝑗𝑡 −
𝛼
𝜙
(𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑖
∗) +
𝛾
𝜙
𝐷𝑡 
(2.3) 
Using available data to proxy for 𝐺𝑡  and considering 𝑆𝑡  as 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , the empirical 
model to be tested is as follows: 
 
∆𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2.4) 
where 𝐵𝑡  is brokered order flow at time t, which proxies for 𝐺𝑡 . 𝛽1  measures the 
information effect and 𝛽3 measures the inventory effect. 
2.1.1.2 Huang and Stoll’s model 
Huang and Stoll (1997) develop an indicator model, in which direction of transaction 
but not trading volume is important. It provides a flexible model to examine a number 
of variations on microstructure issues. There are two basic equations in the model. 
The first is the relationship between fundamentals and private information: 
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𝑉𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛼
𝑆
2
𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
(2.5) 
where 𝑉𝑡  signifies unobservable fundamentals at time t , which is similar to 
conditional expectation 𝜇𝑖𝑡  in Lyons’ model. S denotes constant spread and 𝑄𝑡−1  is 
the buyer-seller indicator at time t − 1, namely incoming order flow. As can be seen 
from the equation, the unobservable fundamentals element is adjusted by private 
information revealed in the incoming order flow of last trade. Hence, information 
effect enters into the model. The other basic equation is based upon the characteristics 
of inventory theory. That is, the dealer will set the midpoint quote as fundamentals 
with an adjustment of accumulative inventory in order to control inventory position 
within the desired level: 
 𝑀𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑆
2
∑𝑄𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=1
 (2.6) 
where 𝑀𝑡 is midpoint quote and ∑ 𝑄𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=1  denotes the accumulative inventory level at 
time t. Note the assumption that incoming order request is the only resource to control 
inventory position. In that case, current inventory level would equal the quantity of 
cumulative incoming order flow. With the common factor 𝑉𝑡  the general price 
equation is: 
 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡 +
𝑆
2
𝑄𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 
(2.7) 
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where 𝑃𝑡 is dealer’s price at time t. Both the information effect and inventory effect 
enter into the Huang and Stoll model. The final empirical formulation is as follows: 
 
Δ𝑃𝑡 =
𝑆
2
(𝑄𝑡 − 𝑄𝑡−1) + (𝛼 + 𝛽)
𝑆
2
𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡 
(2.8) 
While 𝛼 and 𝛽 measure the information effect and inventory effect respectively, they 
cannot be separately estimated. In order to overcome this drawback, Huang and Stoll 
suggest two methods to separate the information effect and inventory effect: 
 Inventory effect indicates that order flow exhibits negative serial correlation. So 
they assume: 
 E(𝑄𝑡−1|𝑄𝑡−2) = (1 − 2π)𝑄𝑡−2 (2.9) 
where π is the probability that the sign of order flow at time t is opposite to that 
of order flow at time t − 1. Combining the equations (2.5) and (2.6), the final 
empirical formulation would become: 
 
Δ𝑀𝑡 = (α + β)
𝑆𝑡−1
2
𝑄𝑡−1 − 𝛼(1 − 2𝜋)
𝑆𝑡−2
2
𝑄𝑡−2 + 𝑒𝑡 
(2.10) 
The GMM procedure is able to estimate α and β so as to separate the information 
effect and inventory effect. 
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 Inventory effect on quote changes arises from inventory changes in both the stock 
under test and other stocks: 
 
𝑀𝑡
𝑘 = 𝑉𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘
𝑆𝑘
2
∑𝑄𝑖
∗
𝑡−1
𝑖=1
 (2.11) 
𝑄𝑖
∗ is aggregate order flow of market portfolio at time i. Considering the equation 
(2.7), the model then becomes: 
 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑘 =
𝑆𝑘
2
∆𝑄𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛼𝑘
𝑆𝑘
2
𝑄𝑡−1
𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘
𝑆𝑘
2
𝑄𝑡−1
∗ + 𝑒𝑘 (2.12) 
in which the information effect and inventory effect can be separately estimated. 
2.1.1.3 Ding’s model 
Ding’s (2006) model is one of the few optimizing models of the foreign exchange 
market. It describes the price setting behaviour of a typical dealer with incoming order 
request as the unique resource to make a deal. Ding’s paper contains a number of 
assumptions: 
 Dealers (totalling M in number) have identical constant absolute risk-averse 
utility function U(x) = −𝑒−𝐴𝑥. 
 T numbers of orders are divided into T sub-periods. 
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 Dealer i begins with cash 𝐶𝑖 and enters the market with a fixed cost ?̅?𝑖. 
 Public information is released at the beginning of the period and dealers revise 
their quotes immediately, which means p0,i
post
= p0,i
ante + r. Here the superscript 
post means ex post and ante denotes ex ante. 
 Dealers’ inventory levels are uniformly distributed within [-R, R] and the starting 
level for dealer i is 𝜀0,𝑖. 
 When a request arrives, the probabilities of buying and selling behaviour are 
equal. 
 Expected quote movement E(𝑧𝑡|𝑆𝑡,𝑖) in sub-period t is proportional to order size 
𝑄𝑡,𝑖 in the corresponding sub-period. Here 𝑆𝑡,𝑖 is the information set for dealer i in 
sub-period t. 
The market structure in Ding’s model is quite simple. As shown in Figure 2.1 below, 
after the customer sends a transaction request, the dealer will consider his current 
inventory position and decide on the regret-free bid and ask quotes in order to respond 
to the requests. Quote shading requires the dealer to lower his prices when the 
inventory level is higher and raise his prices when the inventory level is lower. The 
dealer’s utility maximization problem is essentially an optimal strategy problem in the 
auction market. The optimal price setting of the dealer is the Nash equilibrium 
incorporating the inventory effect. When the customer receives quotes, he will make a 
decision to buy, to sell or not to trade. Under the assumption mentioned above, private 
information is released by incoming order flow and enters into the price setting via the 
22 
 
utility function in the dealer’s expected wealth. Then the period ends and the next 
trading period begins with the same procedure.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Process of exchange rate determination in Ding’s model 
 
While Ding’s model defines the exchange rate as the middle point of bid-ask quotes, 
both the information effect and inventory effect enter into the exchange rate 
determination. The final equation in a sub-period is as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑡,𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡−1,𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐴𝜎2 (1 −
1
𝑀
) 𝐼𝑡,𝑖
𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖𝑄𝑡,𝑖 
𝐼𝑡+1,𝑖
𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 = 𝐼𝑡,𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡,𝑖
𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 − 𝑄𝑡,𝑖 
(2.13) 
Customer j 
Dealer i 
Quote 
Request 
Decide 
Accept or 
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Here 𝜎2 is conditional volatility of the exchange rate. Exchange rate movement in the 
whole period is the integration of all the sub-periods. 
 
𝑃𝑇,𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑃0,𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑟 + [𝐴𝜎2 (1 −
1
𝑀
+ 𝛽𝑖)]𝑄0−𝑇,𝑖 
+[𝐴𝜎2 (1 −
1
𝑀
)] (∑𝑄0−𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑇𝜀0,𝑖
𝑇−1
𝑡=1
) 
(2.14) 
where 𝑟 is the exchange rate increment after public information is released. 𝑄0−𝑡,𝑖 
denotes accumulated order flow within period [0 – t]. 
2.1.2 Market-level models 
The ML models develop price formation in a multi-structure framework of foreign 
exchange market. This allows diversified ways to make a deal, in contrast to the 
unique source of incoming order in the DL model, and empirical research has shown 
the ML models to be more successful. The following section will introduce the ML 
models of Evans and Lyons (2002) and Cao, Evans, and Lyons (2006), in 
chronological order. 
2.1.2.1 Evans and Lyons’ model 
Evans and Lyons (2002) assume a three-round trading model to describe the 
microstructure of the foreign exchange market (Figure 2.2 below). This is a revision 
of the simultaneous-trade model derived by Lyons (1997). 
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Figure 2.2 Microstructure of the portfolio shift model 
 
In round 1, dealers simultaneously and independently quote scalar prices 𝑃𝑖,1 , at 
which they promise to accept any size of order. Then every dealer observes customer 
order flow 𝐶𝑖,1. In round 2, dealers again simultaneously and independently quote 
scalar prices Pi,2  in the interdealer market. In this round, dealers expect customer 
order flow to be a noise around the value of the exchange rate and thus Pi,2 is the same 
as 𝑃𝑖,1 . However, when dealers trade in the interdealer market they recognize 
customer order flow as portfolio shift and adjust their expectations on the exchange 
rate correspondingly. They have accurate foresight on the price in round 3 and 
conduct speculative orders. In round 3, dealers simultaneously and independently 
Customers 
Dealer
Round 1: Buy 
or sell at P1 
Interdealer 
market 
Round 2: Trade at  
𝑃2 to share risk 
Dealer
Interdealer order flow 
Round 1: Buy 
or sell at  𝑃1 
Simultaneously and independently 
Round 3: Clear net 
positions at 𝑃3 
Interdealer order flow 
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quote scalar prices 𝑃𝑖,2 in order to share overnight risk with the public. Hence, we 
have: 
 ∑𝐶𝑖,1
𝑖
+∑ 𝐶𝑖,3 = 0
𝑖
 (2.15) 
With the assumption of no infinitely elastic relationship between demand and returns, 
it can be seen that:  
 ∑𝐶𝑖,3
𝑖
= 𝛾(𝐸[𝑃3,t+1|Ω3] − 𝑃3,𝑡) (2.16) 
According to Lyons (1996), dealers’ interdealer order flows will be proportional to 
their own customer order flows in equilibrium. Therefore:  
 𝛼−1Δ𝑥𝑡 + 𝛾𝐸[𝑃3,t+1|Ω3] − 𝛾𝑃3,𝑡 = 0 (2.17) 
Solve this equation as:  
 𝑃3,𝑡 = 𝐸[𝑃3,t+1|Ω3 + 𝛼𝛾
−1Δ𝑥𝑡] (2.18) 
Assuming the risky asset (the exchange rate) has payoff ∆r per period while risk-free 
returns are one, while the public holds no private information: 
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 𝐸[𝑃3,t+1|Ω3] = 𝑃𝑖,1 = 𝑃𝑖,2 = 𝑃3,𝑡−1 + Δ𝑟 (2.19) 
Equation (2.18) becomes: 
 
𝑃3,𝑡 =∑Δ𝑟i
t
i=1
+ 𝛼𝛾−1∑Δx𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=1
 (2.20) 
and then: 
 Δ𝑃3,𝑡 = Δ𝑟t + 𝛼𝛾
−1Δx𝑡 (2.21) 
The final equation has been frequently tested and has received much supportive 
evidence. However, while order flow here indicates the compensation of the dealer for 
holding foreign currency, it does not distinguish the information effect from the 
inventory effect. 
2.1.2.2 Cao, Evans and Lyons’ model 
The model proposed by Cao, Evans, and Lyons (2006) adopts a new concept, 
inventory information.  According to the authors, the bond and FX markets have no 
private information about nominal cash flow. Therefore, there is no superior 
information about fundamentals. When participants have been convinced that superior 
information exists, they advocate inventory information, which is a kind of private 
information unrelated to fundamentals. It appears in the transactions and is observed 
27 
 
only by trading parties, mainly market makers. With regard to pricing ability, 
inventory information could predict future price by forecasting future discount factors. 
Consistent with other literature, inventory information influences price transitorily 
when market makers change prices to control inventories. However, inventory 
information impacts on the exchange rate permanently, even after market makers 
share risk economy-wide, because assets are imperfectly substitutable. Most of the 
literature ignores this effect, as authors assume that inventory risk is diversifiable at 
the economy-wide level. Theoretically, the effect of inventory information on the 
exchange rate is based on two factors: less than perfect transparency, and risk 
aversion. Lower transparency implies that inventory information is not instantly 
observable. Risk aversion ensures that inventory information influences the exchange 
rate via the avoidance of inventory risk. 
The model proposes the following four rounds in price discovery:  
Round 1: Dealer i quotes 𝑃𝑖1𝑡, liquidity demand customers trade with dealers, and net 
customer order flow 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is realized as private inventory information for dealer i. 
Round 2: Dealer i quotes 𝑃𝑖2𝑡 and trades with other dealers. Net interdealer order flow 
for the whole market 𝑍𝑡 is then publicly observable. 
Round 3: Dealer i  quotes 𝑃𝑖3𝑡 , then trades with other dealers again to offset 
unexpected incoming flow 𝑇𝑖2𝑡
′ − 𝐸[𝑇𝑖2𝑡
′ |Ω𝑖2𝑡] in round 2 and expected incoming flow 
𝑇𝑖3𝑡
′  in this round. Also, dealers trade because their speculative demands change after 
they observe net interdealer order flow in round 2. At the end of round 3, cash flow 𝑅𝑡 
for risky asset (the exchange rate) is realized. 
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Round 4: Dealer i quotes 𝑃𝑖4𝑡 and trades widely with the public to share risk. Because 
in this round the inventory of liquidity supply customers is not mean-revert, the 
exchange rate moves permanently due to the permanent inventory shift of liquidity 
supply customers. 
The solution to this model is similar to that of Evans and Lyons (2002). However, this 
model adopts a period for cash flow to be realized. In detail, cash flows for both risky 
assets and riskless assets are realized at the end of round 3: 
 
𝑃1𝑡 = 𝑃2𝑡 = 𝑃3𝑡 = 𝐸 [
𝑃4𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)⁄ |Ω3𝑡] + 𝜆𝑍𝑡 (2.22) 
When the information of interdealer order flow is completely shared, dealers set their 
prices the same as in rounds 1 and 2. The influence of order flow is reflected when 
dealers wish to share overnight risk with the public and thus adjust their prices. In fact 
this is the inventory effect; more specifically, information here enters into the model 
via round 4. 
2.2 Literature on Microstructure Studies and the Information Content of 
Trading Duration 
In view of the fact that an extensive body of empirical work  (Meese and Rogoff 1983, 
Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual 2005) points out the failure of macroeconomic models, 
especially in capturing exchange rate dynamics in a short horizon, many studies have 
advocated a new perspective, the microstructure model. The key concern of exchange 
rate microstructure research is the trading process of exchange rate, and this approach 
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allows extraneous information. The most important determinant of microstructure 
models is order flow. Since the seminal work of Evans and Lyons (2002) pointed out 
that order flow models explain more than 60% of DM/USD change and more than 40% 
of Yen/USD change with daily frequency, order flow has frequently been taken into 
account in microstructure research on exchange rate. For example, Berger et al. (2008) 
study the correlation between interdealer order flow and exchange rate with 
EUR/USD and USD/JPY, two of the most liquid currency pairs. Their frequency 
ranges from one minute to three months. They point out that the impact of order flow 
is significant at short horizon, but becomes weaker with the increase of horizon. The 
correlation becomes stronger when the market is less liquid. King, Sarno, and Sojli 
(2010) study the predictive ability of order flow on the CAD/USD exchange rate 
return. They adopt daily data covering 11 years. Order flow is found to have strong 
forecasting power for CAD/USD return by out-of-sample forecasting. In addition, 
Gradojevic (2012) provides evidence that order flow and CAD/USD movement have 
a causal relationship, which is influenced by customer type, regime and frequency. 
However, most studies focus on the main trading currencies or developed markets. 
Very few pay attention to the emerging markets, probably due to the unavailability of 
transaction data. 
According to the findings of Chen, Chien, and Chang (2012), the relationship between 
order flow and exchange rate movement is more significant for high trading intensity 
currency pairs rather than low trading intensity currency pairs. The importance of 
order flow in explaining exchange rate dynamics needs to be tested in emerging 
markets. De Medeiros (2004) examines the same model used by Evans and Lyons 
(2002), in the Brazilian foreign exchange market. The results prove the relationship 
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between order flow and exchange rate, but with lower 𝑅2. He argues that the order 
flow model omits some variables, among them country-risk premium. Wu (2012) 
adopts data containing all customer transactions and interdealer transactions in the 
Brazilian foreign exchange market. The results confirm the importance of order flow 
in capturing exchange rate dynamics. Moreover, because the Brazilian foreign 
exchange market is smaller and less liquid than the DM/USD market, the price impact 
of order flow is around five times larger than the results of Evans and Lyons (2002) 
for DM/USD. This is further confirmed by the results of Duffuor, Marsh, and 
Phylaktis (2012). They study both black and official exchange rate in the Ghanaian 
market at weekly frequency. The impact of order flow is larger during crisis periods 
with an illiquid market than in stable periods with more liquidity. The study by Zhang, 
Chau, and Zhang (2013) is one of very few based on the Chinese foreign exchange 
market in an order flow model framework. Using a vector autoregressive model, the 
authors confirm the long-term cointegrating relationship between order flow and 
exchange rate. Similar to the results for emerging markets, the 𝑅2 is only 0.13, which 
is lower than the results for developed markets. Cheung and Rime (2014) argue that 
the impact of order flow is restricted in the mainland market, due to heavy 
government control and the absence of international participants. Instead, they study 
the offshore RMB exchange rate, named CNH, and the interaction between the 
offshore and onshore markets. They conclude that the offshore market is more 
effective than its onshore counterpart, because their model, augmented with the 
variables emerging market currency volatility index, interest rate differential, CNH 
order flow, limit order imbalance, change of CPR and deviation from CPR, captures 
39 percent of daily CNH changes compared to 29 percent of daily CNY changes. 
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Among these variables, order flow contributes to the explanatory power by 12 to 14 
percent. 
Inspired by the literature, we can conclude that more variables besides order flow are 
necessary in the price discovery of exchange rate with low trading intensity currency 
or in the emerging markets. As has been pointed out by Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1987), Easley and O'Hara (1992), irregular time intervals between consecutive 
transactions contain information on the causation of different types of time interval. 
Therefore, the fixed time intervals frequently used in the microstructure literature 
might lose information on the behaviours of market participants. According to Easley 
and O'Hara (1992), informed traders enter the market when news arrives and liquidity 
traders appear at a constant arrival rate. Therefore, short trading duration implies the 
occurrence of news and high arrival rate of informed traders, associated with high 
volatility. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) argue a completely opposite relationship 
between trading duration and volatility. As well as liquidity traders with constant 
trading intensity, there are discretionary uninformed traders who will choose the time 
to trade in order to minimize adverse selection cost. Therefore, long trading duration 
implies inactivity of discretionary uninformed traders and high proportion of informed 
traders, leading to high volatility. 
In one of the earliest studies on price impact of trading duration, Dufour and Engle 
(2000b) adopt a VAR model with the 18 most traded stocks in the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). Their findings show that short trading duration is associated with 
large price impact and high autocorrelation of signed transaction, which is consistent 
with the theory of Easley and O'Hara (1992) that short trading duration implies news 
arrival, which leads to an increase in the number of informed traders. Similar results 
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are confirmed by Spierdijk (2004), who extends Dufour and Engle (2000b) model to 
incorporate trade size and volatility for 5 frequently traded stocks in the NYSE. She 
also points out that large trade size leads to an increase in trading intensity, but large 
return reduces trading intensity. Manganelli (2005) argues that the conclusion of 
Dufour and Engle (2000b) is only valid for frequently traded stocks. She studies the 
relationship between expected duration, expected volume and variance of return for 
10 stocks in the NYSE, divided into two groups according to trading intensity. Short 
expected trading duration is found to follow large price movement and high trading 
volume in frequently traded stocks. However, the evidence is weak for infrequently 
traded stocks. Holder, Qi, and Sinha (2004) adopt a similar methodology to that of 
Dufour and Engle (2000b) with additional variables, namely the number of active 
traders on the trading floor, and trading volume on ten-year Treasury Note futures 
contracts traded at the Chicago Board of Trade. Contrary to the findings on the equity 
market, trading duration and the number of active traders positively impact on futures 
contract return and the sign of transaction. This is consistent with the theory of 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) that long trading duration denotes a high proportion of 
informed traders. Trading volume, conversely, is negatively related to futures contract 
return. 
Since the introduction of the ACD model, it has frequently been extended: see Pacurar 
(2008) for a comprehensive survey and Leiva et al. (2014) for a recently developed 
version. ACD models divide trading duration into expected component and 
unexpected component. Some studies adopt an ACD model to examine the 
information content of both components of trading duration. Engle (2000) introduces 
the ACD-GARCH model, which is applied to IBM stock in the NYSE. Both expected 
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arrival rate and unexpected trading duration are considered in the variance equation of 
the GARCH model. Consistent with the model of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), 
long trading duration follows falling price, because of short sell restrictions in the 
market. In addition, consistent with Easley and O'Hara (1992), expected arrival rate is 
positively related to volatility, and unexpected trading duration is negatively related to 
volatility. Yang (2011) introduces the ACD-VECM model to examine the asymmetric 
price impact of transactions for seven stocks in the Australian Stock Exchange. Both 
components of trading duration are contained in the equation of bid price change and 
ask price change. Consistent with the findings of Dufour and Engle (2000b), a 
transaction shortly after another one is associated with large price impact, which 
implies high level of information-based trading. In addition, the source of price 
impact is attributed to the unexpected component of trading duration rather than the 
expected trading duration. Inspired by Dufour and Engle (2000b), Sita (2010) extends 
the model of Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) to incorporate two 
components of trading duration, namely expected trading duration and first-order 
covariance of standardized trading duration. The former represents market liquidity 
while the latter mirrors trading behaviours of informed traders. With the GMM 
estimation results of thirty stocks in the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX), he argues 
that trading duration is an important element of trading cost. However, the signs of 
expected trading duration and innovation of trading duration are either positive or 
negative depending upon the stock. Sita and Westerholm (2011) adopt a similar 
GMM methodology and consider trading duration or volume separately as trading 
intensity. Their data contain only one of the most active stocks in HEX, and intraday 
estimated results are shown every two hours. Both components of trading duration 
enhance the price impact of a transaction. However, the impacts can be either positive 
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or negative in different trading hours. Bowe, Hyde, and McFarlane (2013) extend Sita 
and Westerholm (2011) model to incorporate signed trading volume together with 
expected trading duration and covariance of standardized trading duration. They adopt 
tick-by-tick data of 28-day equilibrium interbank interest rate futures contracts in the 
Mexican Derivatives Exchange. Signed trading duration innovation negatively 
impacts on return, but the evidence is weak. The price change is mainly attributed to 
expected trading duration and the correlation is positive. Contrary to the results of 
Dufour and Engle (2000b), this is consistent with Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), who 
find that long trading duration implies high proportion of informed traders. 
To conclude, the fact that order flow explains a relatively smaller part of exchange 
rate in emerging markets than it does in developed markets has motivated many 
studies to find other price-relevant variables. Since the information hidden behind 
trading duration has been frequently confirmed by research in the equity and 
derivatives markets, it could have been expected to apply to the foreign exchange 
market as well. However, the information content of trading duration is not conclusive. 
It can be completely different for different trading hours, different assets or different 
markets. This thesis is motivated by the unsolved question in the microstructure 
research of price discovery. It attempts to fill the gap in the literature with regard to 
the information content of trading duration in emerging foreign exchange markets. 
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2.3 Literature on Intervention Reaction Function 
There is a wide literature on the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention (e.g., 
Fatum, Pedersen, and Sørensen (2013), Vitale (2011), Disyatat and Galati (2007); and 
see Menkhoff (2012) for a comprehensive survey of emerging markets). By contrast, 
the driving force behind the intervention has received much less attention. Because 
foreign exchange intervention is not frequently or regularly implemented, for a given 
period of days the majority of intervention observations are zero. OLS estimation thus 
is no longer consistent, because intervention is nonlinear. One solution is to introduce 
a binary choice model, which could describe the influence of the driving forces on the 
probability of intervention. Different types of model, namely the Probit, Logit and 
Log-log models, may be applied for different distributions. One feature of binary 
choice models is that the value assigned to the dependent variable is either 0 or 1. If 
the intervention amount is available, a censored model, namely the Tobit model, may 
be adopted to incorporate the non-linearity of intervention data. Herrera and Özbay 
(2005) point out that the intervention reaction function is heteroskedastic and non-
normal. They introduce Powell’s censored least absolute deviations estimator to deal 
with these problems. Another method, as advocated by Chen, Chang, and Yu (2012), 
is the incorporation of the Tobit model with a GARCH method. This allows the 
residual of the Tobit model to be estimated by an ARMA process and deals with the 
problem of heteroskedasticity. 
Although the binary choice model and the Tobit model perform well in capturing 
purchase intervention and sale intervention separately, they cannot incorporate both 
types of intervention in a single equation. A popular solution in the literature is the 
friction model, which assumes that intervention is only carried out if the determinant 
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factor is larger than a threshold value. This model is considered to better describe the 
features of intervention data. However, Jun (2008) argues that the friction model is 
not necessarily better than a simple linear model in terms of  Root Mean Square Error 
(RMSE) and Mean Absolute Error (MAE). If we are concerned only with the 
intervention probability, or if the intervention indicator is available, the most suitable 
model will be an ordered dependent variable model. This could be the Ordered Probit 
model, Ordered Logit model or Ordered Log-log model, depending upon the 
distribution. Another model that can incorporate both purchase intervention and sale 
intervention is the regime-switching model. This allows intervention reaction function 
changes according to market conditions, such as deviation from the target exchange 
rate or excess volatility. 
This section will review the literature on the intervention reaction function, classified 
by the estimation techniques adopted. 
2.3.1 Binary choice approach 
OLS estimation is an elementary econometric method, widely used in the literature. 
However, few studies implement OLS estimation to research central bank 
intervention reaction function (Ito 2002). One of the most important features of 
intervention data is that the majority of daily observations are non-intervention. In 
other words, the relationship between intervention and determinants is nonlinear. 
Therefore, OLS estimation of intervention reaction function is inconsistent. One 
solution is to use a binary choice model in the estimation: 
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 𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
(2.23)  
 𝑦𝑡 = {
1    𝑖𝑓    𝑦𝑡
∗ > 0 
0    𝑖𝑓    𝑦𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a dummy variable which describes the state of intervention (valued as 1) 
or non-intervention (valued as 0), 𝑦𝑡
∗ measures the determinant factor of central bank 
intervention and is unknown to the public, 𝑥𝑡 represents explanatory variables in the 
reaction function. If 𝜀𝑡  follows a normal distribution/logistic distribution/extreme 
value distribution, equation (2.23) is named the Probit/Logit/Log-log model.  
Baillie and Osterberg (1997b) consider the net amount of combined intervention of 
USD/DM by both the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank, and the combined 
intervention of USD/Yen by both the Federal Reserve and the Japanese central bank 
from August 6
th
 1985 to March 1
st
 1990. The Probit model is applied to estimate the 
asymmetric reaction of purchase intervention and sale intervention. Deviation from 
the target exchange rate, as documented by Funabashi (1989), is a determinant factor 
in the majority of estimated reaction function. Excess volatility, however, is less 
conclusive. Greater excess volatility increases the probability only of purchase 
intervention of USD/Yen. Baillie and Osterberg (1997a) also point out that volatility 
of exchange rate, but not volatility of forward premium, influences the behaviour of 
central bank intervention. 
Similarly, Dominguez (1998) studies the US, German and Japanese intervention for 
the USD/DM and USD/Yen exchange markets, with an extended dataset from January 
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1977 to December 1994. The variables considered in the reaction function are 
deviation from 10-day moving average of exchange rate and deviation from 10-day 
moving average of volatility. No evidence is found to demonstrate the influence of 
deviation from either target exchange rate or volatility. 
Humpage (1999) estimates a Probit model as a proxy for Federal Reserve intervention 
in the DM/USD and Yen/USD markets from February 1987 to February 1990. 
Contrary to the finding of Dominguez (1998), deviation from 10-day moving average 
and 10-day rolling standard deviation are both significant in the estimation results. 
McKenzie (2004) conducts a Probit analysis on the relationship between the Reserve 
Bank of Australia intervention and conditional volatility of USD/AUD exchange rate 
return. The data covers 14 years from 12
th
 December 1983 to 31
st
 December 1997. 
Conditional volatility is proved to be an important driving force behind central bank 
intervention. However, the prediction ability varies depending upon the features of 
intervention policy. Therefore, sub-period analysis is important in the research of 
intervention reaction function. 
Akinci et al. (2005) estimate the intervention reaction function of the Turkish central 
bank with data spanning the period May 16
th
 2001 to December 31
st
 2003. In the 
Probit estimation results, the percentage deviations from long-run trend (90-day 
moving average), and exchange rate volatility, are found to be significant in the 
reaction function of both purchase intervention and sale intervention. 
Frenkel, Pierdzioch, and Stadtmann (2002) adopt the Logit model in their research. 
The data set covers the period 1991 to 2001. The factors in the intervention reaction 
function include deviation from short-term exchange rate (25-day moving average), 
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deviation from long-term exchange rate (purchasing power parity exchange rate level, 
PPP), exchange rate volatility (absolute exchange rate return, lagged day and previous 
five days), and intervention persistence (lagged intervention). The results indicate that 
deviation from exchange rate plays an important role in the reaction function of the 
Bank of Japan, and that there is persistence of intervention. 
Jackman (2012) argues that the Log-log model is better suited to estimation where 
intervention data is asymmetric and heavily skewed. The distribution is said to follow 
an extreme value distribution. She studies a pegged economy in Barbados where the 
central bank cannot determine the amount and time of intervention, but intervenes 
only to clear the market. Therefore, in investigating the intervention reaction function 
from January 2003 to December 2011, the research considers interest rate differential, 
real estate capital flow, tourism variable (proxy for current account transaction flow), 
conditional volatility of oil price (proxy for current account transaction flow) and the 
lag of intervention. The persistence of intervention and influence of oil price are 
proved in both purchase intervention and sale intervention. In addition, there is 
evidence of asymmetry of purchase intervention and sale intervention. The tourism 
variable and interest rate differential are significant in sale intervention but not in 
purchase intervention. Real estate capital flow influences purchase intervention but 
not sale intervention. 
2.3.2 Tobit approach 
If our concern is with the quantity of intervention rather than the probability, the Tobit 
model will be a better solution to the problem of OLS estimation. 
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 𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , 𝜀𝑡|𝑥𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
(2.24) 
 𝑦𝑡 = {
𝑦𝑡
∗    𝑖𝑓    𝑦𝑡
∗ > 0 
0    𝑖𝑓    𝑦𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
 
where 𝑦𝑡 denotes intervention amount, and residual follows normal distribution. 
Almekinders and Eijffinger (1994) point out that OLS estimation is inappropriate 
when large proportions of intervention data are zero. They adopt the Tobit model to 
estimate the reaction function of DM/USD intervention conducted by both the 
Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve. For the four sample periods of data, 
ranging from September 1987 to October 1989, negative deviation from desired 
exchange rate (7-day moving average) and rise of conditional volatility will increase 
the volume of intervention. 
Rogers and Siklos (2003) focus their research on two small open economies that 
implement an inflation-target regime: Australia and Canada. Since the intervention 
data are not disclosed, the authors take the closing balance of the Canada Exchange 
Fund Account and the account for Australia foreign exchange operation as proxies, 
with data covering the period from January 2
nd
 1989 to September 2
nd
 1998. Due to 
the proxy formation of intervention data, the majority of data for Canada are non-zero, 
but in the case of Australia 1554 days have no activity. Therefore, OLS estimation is 
executed for the Bank of Canada intervention, while for the intervention of the 
Reserve Bank of Australia a Tobit model with Heckman’s two-stage procedure is 
estimated. The results confirm the lean-against-the-wind policy for both countries, but 
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the role of implied volatility and uncertainty (kurtosis of the implied risk-neutral 
probability density functions) varies depending on the choice of sample period.  
Herrera and Özbay (2005) implement a Tobit model in their research of the 
intervention reaction function of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. The data 
set is for the period from November 1
st
 1993 to December 31
st
 2003, which contains 
two different exchange rate regimes – a managed float regime and a free float. The 
authors test the persistence of intervention (the lag of dependent variable), deviation 
from the short-term exchange rate (the previous day exchange rate), deviation from 
the past level of exchange rate (20-day moving average), conditional volatility, and 
interest rate differentials. When the purchase and sale intervention are estimated 
separately, the difference in the estimation results suggests that the intervention 
reaction functions of purchase and sale are asymmetric. The findings confirm the 
existence of intervention persistence and support the determination of conditional 
volatility and interest rate differentials in the intervention reaction function. However, 
deviation from the target exchange rate is quite sensitive to exchange rate regime and 
estimation method. Herrera and Özbay (2005) also point out that the Turkey Central 
Bank intervention reaction function is heteroskedastic and non-normal, which will 
lead to inconsistency in the Tobit estimation. Therefore, they introduce Powell’s 
censored least absolute deviations estimator into the Tobit model. The results show 
that the problems of heteroskedasticity and non-normality will lead to overestimation 
or underestimation of the influence of excess exchange rate volatility in the 
intervention reaction function. 
Another method to deal with heteroskedasticity is to introduce the GARCH process 
into the residual of the Tobit model. Having confirmed the conditional 
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heteroskedasticity through an ARCH test, Chen, Chang, and Yu (2012) adopt a Tobit-
GARCH model to capture both the majority of zero values of dependent variable and 
conditional heteroskedasticity. The dataset contains timestamp and volume of Bank of 
Japan intervention from April 1
st
 1991 to July 2
nd
 2004. The reaction function 
contains a number of variables, including deviation from short-term target exchange 
rate (exchange rate one day before), deviation from medium-term target exchange rate 
(21-day moving average), deviation from long-term target exchange rate (150-day 
moving average), the Federal Reserve intervention on JPY/USD, interest rate 
differential, the first-day business effect, stock market index and the lagged 
intervention. While the Tobit-GARCH model captures conditional heteroskedasticity 
of intervention, it also outperforms the Tobit model, OLS, Probit model and GARCH 
model in terms of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwartz Bayesian 
Criterion (SBC). The Tobit and Probit models incorrectly assume homoskedasticity in 
the estimation, while the GARCH model tends to underestimate the volatility and 
ignores the majority of zero observations, and OLS ignores both of these. The results 
also show that the Bank of Japan follows a policy of leaning-against-the-wind. 
Deviation from long-term target exchange rate, and Federal Reserve intervention, are 
important in the Bank of Japan intervention behaviour. In contrast, persistence of 
intervention is found only in certain periods covered by their data. 
2.3.3 Friction/Threshold approach 
As has been discussed frequently in the literature, the Probability model and Tobit 
model are advocated as superior to OLS estimation. However, both models are only 
able to capture either purchase intervention or sale intervention. Therefore, a friction 
approach is introduced to contain both purchase intervention and sale intervention 
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simultaneously in the same model. The friction approach is in fact a threshold model. 
As the majority of intervention data are zero but the explanatory factors in the 
reaction function are non-zero, it is reasonable to assume that the central bank only 
intervenes if the determinant factor has a value larger than a certain threshold. 
Therefore, a friction model is described as below: 
 𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,   𝜀𝑡|𝑥𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
(2.25) 
 𝑦𝑡 = {
𝑦𝑡
∗ − 𝑢1    𝑖𝑓    𝑦𝑡
∗ > 𝑢1 > 0 
      0          𝑖𝑓    𝑢2 ≤ 𝑦𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝑢1
𝑦𝑡
∗ − 𝑢2    𝑖𝑓     𝑦𝑡
∗ < 𝑢2 < 0 
 
where 𝑦𝑡 indicates observed quantity of intervention, 𝑢1 and 𝑢2  denote superior 
threshold and inferior threshold respectively. As can be seen from the model, the 
central bank intervenes only if  𝑦𝑡
∗ is outside the threshold interval [𝑢2, 𝑢1].  
Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) implement a friction model in their research of 
DM/USD intervention by the Deutsche Bundesbank, and DM/USD, Yen/USD 
intervention by the Federal Reserve over the period from February 23
rd
 1987 to 
October 31
st
 1989. Consistent with the results of Almekinders and Eijffinger (1994), 
both Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve are found to conduct a lean-
against-the-wind policy and to react to the deviation of conditional volatility from the 
Louvre level. In addition, the Federal Reserve prefers depreciation of the USD rather 
than appreciation, according to the estimated value of intervention thresholds. 
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Kim and Sheen (2002) employ a friction model to test the intervention reaction 
function of the Reserve Bank of Australia. Their data covers 14 years, from December 
13
th
 1983 to December 31
st
 1997. They introduce trend deviation (150-day moving 
average of USD/AUD), conditional volatility, interest rate differential, profitability of 
intervention, inventory and lag of intervention into the reaction function. With the 
exception of inventory motivation, where results are mixed due to measurement errors 
to proxy the variable, all other factors are found to influence the exchange rate 
intervention. In addition, consistent with the statement of intervention target, the 
Reserve Bank of Australia is found to intervene only when the volatility is low and 
the trend is clear. Jun (2008) studies the daily intervention of DM/USD by the Federal 
Reserve and German Bundesbank separately from January 5
th
 1987 to January 22
nd 
1993. Percentage deviation from 7-day moving average and volatility are considered 
in the reaction function. The author introduces Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) and 
Mean Absolute Error (MAE) as measurements of model performance. Comparing the 
friction approach with a simple linear model, in general RMSE of the friction model 
is found to be larger, but MAE is smaller in both in-sample fitting and out-of-sample 
forecasting performance. Given that the result could depend on the explanatory 
variables included and the measurement of forecasting performance, the friction 
model is not necessarily better than a simple linear model.  
If we are interested only in the probability rather than the quantity of intervention, or 
if for some reason we can collect only the intervention indicator (1, 0, -1), another 
type of friction model, the Ordered Probit model, would be preferred. The Ordered 
Probit model specification is quite similar to equation (2.25), with the only difference 
being that 𝑦𝑡 is an intervention dummy with the value of (1, 0, -1): 
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 𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,   𝜀𝑡|𝑥𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
(2.26) 
 𝑦𝑡 = {
1            𝑖𝑓     𝑦𝑡
∗ > 𝑢1
      0            𝑖𝑓  𝑢2 ≤ 𝑦𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝑢1
−1       𝑖𝑓     𝑦𝑡
∗ < 𝑢2
 
1 indicates domestic currency appreciation intervention, 0 indicates no intervention 
and -1 indicates domestic currency depreciation intervention. Because intervention 
amount is highly relevant to the success of intervention to move exchange rate, 
intraday information is important to estimate the reaction and thus daily intervention 
amount.  
In order to avoid endogeneity problems, Ito and Yabu (2007) propose an intervention 
indicator in place of intervention amount. They believe the scarcity of intervention 
days is due to the political cost, which could make it difficult to get a permit for 
intervention. Therefore, once a permit is approved, intervention probably takes place 
over the next several days. In addition, Ito and Yabu (2007) adopt heteroskedasticity-
and-autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors in the Ordered Probit model to 
deal with the problem of heteroskedasticity. The Bank of Japan is found to conduct 
lean-against-the-wind intervention in response to deviation from short-term target 
exchange rate (exchange rate one day before), deviation from medium-term target 
exchange rate (21-day moving average), and deviation from long-term target 
exchange rate (5-year moving average) in the period from April 1
st
 1991 to December 
31
st
 2002. In addition, the persistence of intervention is proved and the political costs 
of yen appreciation and yen depreciation are asymmetric.  
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Another type of threshold model applied in the literature is the regime-switching 
model. While the objective of the central bank might change over time, the regime-
switching model allows us to capture the different intervention behaviour of the 
central bank based on different market conditions. ÖzIü and Prokhorov (2008) 
introduce a regime-switching model as below: 
 𝑦𝑡
∗ =
{
 
 
 
 
𝛽0
1 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
1     𝑖𝑓  𝑢1
1 ≤ 𝜂𝑡 ≤ 𝑢2
1
.
.
.
𝛽0
𝑚 + 𝛽𝑚𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑚   𝑖𝑓  𝑢1
𝑚 ≤ 𝜂𝑡 ≤ 𝑢2
𝑚
,   𝜀𝑡
𝑖=1,…,𝑚|𝑥𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) (2.27) 
where 𝑦𝑡
∗ denotes intervention amount, 𝑥𝑡 indicates determinant market conditions of 
intervention, and 𝜂𝑡 is the threshold variable, which could be one of the determinant 
market conditions. As can be seen in equation (2.27), intervention reaction function is 
allowed to change according to the value of the threshold variable. 
ÖzIü and Prokhorov (2008) adopt a two-regime-shift model separately for managed 
float exchange rate regime and free float exchange rate regime in Turkey. The sample 
period is from November 1
st
 1993 to May 15
th
 2006.  During the period of managed 
float regime, the central bank is considered to follow a policy of maintaining the 
currency peg. However, this assumption is contrary to the central bank announcement 
that it intervenes only in order to remove excess volatility. The result is consistent 
with the exchange rate policy target announced by the central bank, while the 
threshold variable in the managed float regime is deviation from 22-day moving 
average, and that in the free float regime is excess volatility. 
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Chapter 3  
Order Flow and Price Discovery in the 
Foreign Exchange Market:  Theoretical 
Perspective 
3.1 Introduction 
Many models have been developed to capture the behaviour of the exchange rate, 
based on different perceptions and approaches. Traditionally, the macroeconomic 
models have been dominant in the research of foreign exchange markets. These have 
included, for example, the early model of PPP (Cassel 1918) and the subsequent 
models, such as the balance of payment flow approach (Kouri 1976), flexible-price 
monetary model (Bilson 1978, Frenkel 1976), sticky-price monetary model 
(Dornbusch 1976, Frankel 1979, 1981) and productivity-based model (Owen 2001). 
However, macroeconomic models have met serious challenges from empirical 
research. Little supportive evidence has been found for them, and more often the 
evidence suggests that macro models are not better than a simple random walk model 
in explaining and forecasting exchange rate variation. Meese and Rogoff (1983) 
compare the flexible-price monetary model, sticky-price monetary model and the 
sticky-price model that incorporates the current account to a random walk model, with 
a view to testing the out-of-sample predictive accuracy for dollar/pound, dollar/mark, 
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dollar/yen and a weighted dollar-based exchange rate. They conclude that the 
forecasting ability of the three models under test cannot outperform that of the 
random walk model. Using a variety of criteria such as mean squared error (MSE), 
direction of change, and consistency, Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual (2005) conduct a 
similar test based on three models – interest rate parity, productivity-based model and 
a composite specification – in addition to PPP and the sticky-price monetary model. 
All the tested models are found to be not necessarily more successful than the random 
walk model, as they might perform well in a currency pair with one criterion but 
poorly in another currency pair with another criterion. 
The failure of the macroeconomic model in explaining the movement of the exchange 
rate, especially the short-run dynamic, has led economists to seek alternative ways to 
consider the behaviour of the exchange rate. A prominent attempt is one that turns its 
attention to the microstructure of the foreign exchange market. Originally developed 
for analysing the equity market, the key concept in the micro perspective is order flow. 
For example, the influential research by Evans and Lyons (2002) proved that the 
micro variable order flow can influence the exchange rate movement. They built a 
hybrid model which includes both macro variable and micro variable – more 
specifically, interest rate differential and order flow -and found that order flow can 
explain more than 60% of USD/DEM and 40% of USD/JPY daily movements. 
Subsequently, many researchers have focused on microstructure analysis, especially 
on the order flow. By considering the effect of market transaction process on 
exchange rate determination, which is lacking in the macro models, this approach has 
achieved promising results in recent years. Its success is, however, limited by its 
strong requirements for high frequency transaction data, especially in the emerging 
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markets. Indeed, so far it has suffered from a number of drawbacks in this regard, 
such as the lack of detailed data on dealers’ transactions. This has been improved 
recently, since the advent of availability of tick-by-tick data thanks to the rapid 
development of internet and related technology. As a result, there has been a great 
deal of progress in the research of the microstructure of foreign exchange markets. 
According to the composition of order flow, the microstructure approach to exchange 
rates can be classified into DL and ML models. DL models focus on the factors that 
influence the behaviour of individual market participants, dealers for example, in 
price setting, and thus connect micro variables such as order flow and inventory with 
exchange market quotes. For the most part, DL models are borrowed from the 
relatively better developed research of equity markets. Madhavan and Smidt (1991) 
model incorporates both asymmetric information (information effect) and inventory 
control (inventory effect). The information effect is reflected by informed dealers’ 
demand, and thus relates to trading volume. Lyons (1995) extends the Madhavan and 
Smidt model by introducing market-wide order flow, and allows dealers to control 
inventory via outgoing and brokered trade. He examines the mark/dollar market and 
tests the null hypothesis while allowing different inventory control methods. Both 
information effect and inventory effect are significant in the data, and the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore, he concludes that in the tested model, 
incoming order flow indicates market-wide order flow.  
Another microstructure model is Huang and Stoll’s (1997) indicator model, so-called 
because the direction of trade but not trading volume influences information cost. 
Ding (2006) develops a microstructure model for the foreign exchange market from a 
different angel. The model relaxes the assumption of identical price, which is derived 
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from the principle of no arbitrage, and combines customer trade and interbank trade as 
the same incoming trading process.  
However, using the incoming transaction request as the unique source of order flow 
has been reported as problematic. Romeu (2005) re-examines Lyons’ (1995) result 
with the same dataset. The test highlights the instability of the DL model and detects 
two structural breaks in the estimate of Lyons’ data. Hence the data are split into three 
sub-samples based on the two breaks and the DL model is found to be misspecified. 
Meanwhile, the inventory effect and information effect are not simultaneously 
supported in the sub-samples. Bjønnes and Rime (2005) collect a new detailed 
transaction dataset for four interbank dealers. The data reflect different trading styles 
by different interbank dealers. The Madhavan and Smidt model and the Huang and 
Stoll model are adopted to examine the relationship between dealer behaviour and 
exchange rate setting. With the Madhavan and Smidt model, there is no evidence to 
support the inventory effect and information effect predicted by Lyons (1995). 
However, the test result of the Huang and Stoll model indicates that incoming order 
flow contains a strong information effect. 
Under the assumption that the dealer only receives incoming orders, the only means to 
control inventory is quote shading. In order to attract more buyer- (seller-) initiated 
orders and reduce (increase) inventory level, the dealer has to make the price more 
attractive and decrease (increase) his market quotes. However, in the multi-structure 
of the foreign exchange market, dealer behaviour is much more diversified and there 
is a wide choice of inventory control tools.  Hence, the basic assumptions of simple 
market structure and limited methods to control inventory represent problems of the 
DL model. 
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In contrast, the ML model, which studies market-wide exchange rate formation, has 
been proved empirically to be more successful. A frequently discussed model derived 
by Evans and Lyons (2002) fills the gap between macrostructure and microstructure 
models, augmenting traditional macro variables with order flow. It develops a multi-
structure of the foreign exchange market, comprising the customer market and the 
interbank market. Dealers are allowed diversified styles in their trading behaviour, 
which includes incoming orders, outgoing orders, customer orders, limit orders and 
market orders. The model is quite successful in capturing the daily movement of 
mark/dollar (over 60%) and yen/dollar (over 40%) exchange rates. Its stability has 
been proved by the robust testing of different currencies and frequencies (see for 
example Payne (2003), Froot and Ramadorai (2005), Berger et al. (2008), Smyth 
(2009), and Breedon and Vitale (2010). 
This study attempts to bridge the disconnection between DL and ML models.  In 
doing so it develops a model with richer contents than those of Evans (2002) or Ding 
(2006). In order to avoid the drawbacks of the DL model and allow diversified dealer 
behaviour, this chapter adopts a multi-structure of the foreign exchange market 
similar to that proposed by Evans and Lyons (2002). Our model starts with the study 
of dealer behaviour, in other words, his price setting strategy according to the 
available information set. It allows heterogeneous market participants to hold 
different private information, which leads to different expectations on the exchange 
rate. While the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in Evans and Lyons’ model is somewhat 
forward looking, our model abandons this kind of perspective and instead defines the 
information set at every step. Then dealer behaviour is consistent with the Nash 
equilibrium, and his price setting is optimal with the available information. 
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The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows: Section 2 describes 
the general structure of the foreign exchange market. Section 3 explains our 
assumptions and provides an overview of the process of model derivation. Section 4 
concludes the chapter, and summarizes the contribution of our model. 
3.2 Structure of the Foreign Exchange Market 
The foreign exchange market comprises the interdealer market and the customer 
market. The interdealer market has direct trades and broker trades, while the customer 
only trades with dealers and has no access to the interdealer market. The customer 
could be a central bank, importer, exporter or financial institution. 
Features of the foreign exchange market are as follows (Rime 2003): 
 Trading is decentralized rather than centralized as for equity markets. 
 Trading is continuous as opposed to a call market. 
 It is a multi-dealer market as opposed to a single-dealer market. 
 Liquidity is both quote-driven (quotes given on request) and order-driven (limit 
orders, auction market). 
 It has lower transparency compared to the stock market. 
In the customer market, the only trading option is direct incoming order request. It is a 
quote-driven market in which dealers give quotes on request and customers trade on 
the quotes. In contrast, the interdealer market is more diversified and transparent. 
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Dealers have the option to conduct direct or indirect trade. The direct option involves 
a similar market making to that in the customer market and the submission of order 
requests to other market makers. With the indirect option, dealers are able to submit 
limit orders to decide the price, volume and direction to trade, or can conduct a 
market order to trade at the best available price immediately in the market. The 
importance of the indirect channel is increasing, especially after the introduction of 
electronic brokers, which makes it more convenient for dealers to share risk and 
aggregate information.  
According to Rime (2003) and Bjønnes, Rime, and Solheim (2005), the behaviour of 
a typical dealer shows the following characteristics: 
 Adverse selection protection: spread will be wider when trading size increases 
because this can prevent huge losses in trades with asymmetric information. 
 Risk management: spread should contain compensation for providing liquidity 
and the risk thereof. 
 Order processing costs and rents: spread should cover the cost to process the 
order, property rent and other necessary costs. 
 A typical dealer replies to the request and will increase the spread with trading 
size to protect himself against informed traders. After observing the direction of 
trades, he will revise the midpoint. For inventory controls, he will reduce both his 
bid and ask quotes when the inventory is higher. 
 Dealers are liquidity providers intraday, while non-financial customers provide 
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overnight liquidity. Therefore, dealers will not stay with the overnight imbalance 
position and will close their net position with non-financial customers. 
3.3 Theoretical Framework of the Model 
Inspired by Evans and Lyons (2002) and taking into consideration the structure of the 
foreign exchange market, this chapter takes three steps to model the process of 
exchange rate movements.  
Step 1: This first step describes the behaviour of customers and dealers in the 
customer market, which is crucially important for exchange rate movement in the 
short run. As shown above, customers initiate the trade and send order requests to 
dealers. Dealers set prices based on available information and respond to the requests. 
Customers receive dealers’ prices and decide whether, and at what volume, to trade. 
Step 2: This step characterizes the behaviour of dealers in the interbank market. It 
plays a key role in the connection between DL and ML models, representing one of 
the main contributions of this chapter. In this step dealers observe their own customer 
order flow and generate different expectations on the value of the exchange rate. Price 
setting is based on expectation; thus, our model allows the existence of heterogeneous 
price and market depth. After risk and information are completely shared through 
interbank transactions, the market is in equilibrium and the behaviour of dealers 
represents the behaviour of the market. 
Step 3: This step illustrates the behaviour of dealers when offsetting the imbalance of 
inventory position. Dealers trade with customers (probably non-financial institutions) 
again in order to share the overnight risk with the public or to meet government 
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regulations.
4
 Payoffs for holding foreign currency (asset) and domestic currency 
(asset) are realized at the very beginning of the next period. 
Step 1 
Our model starts with the behaviour of trade initiators, namely customers, in the 
foreign exchange market. Customers are distributed widely in the economic system. 
They could be, for example, exporters, importers, corporations, financial institutions 
or central banks. Different customers may hold different information about the state 
of the economy. For example, exporters and importers naturally have better 
information on their own business. They are able to get (albeit partial) first-hand 
information on aspects of the macro-economy such as conditions of demand, supply 
and prices (inflation) from their own business perspective. Financial institutions are 
usually better equipped to analyse and predict financial parameters, including possible 
movements of exchange rates or the returns of international portfolio investment, 
which have a bearing on purchase or sale of foreign currencies. The central bank 
embodies the policy intention of the government and thus its interventions in the 
foreign exchange market often reflect the expectation or goal of the government. Here, 
our model assumes that customers hold different private information 𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡  and that 
demand is a linear function of expected returns.  
The story begins, therefore, when customers send their order requests to dealers. 
Dealers have the responsibility to quote on the requests. The key role of price setting 
is to indicate the expected value of the exchange rate, which is closely related to 
available information on fundamentals. Without unexpected shocks, it is reasonable to 
                                                 
4 In some countries, such as China, government regulations restrict the size of overnight 
inventory position of market makers. 
56 
 
say that fundamentals are stationary in dealers’ minds. Thus, fundamentals are 
assumed to follow: 
 𝑓𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 (3.1) 
where 𝑢𝑡 follows N(0, 𝜎𝑢
2). 
According to the theory of Present Value, the exchange rate is determined by 
discounted future values. Following the formation of Evans and Lyons (2006) we 
have: 
 
𝑉1,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛾)𝐸𝑡
𝐷∑𝛾𝑖𝑓𝑡+𝑖
∞
𝑖=0
 (3.2) 
where 𝛾 is the discount factor. Assuming stationarity of fundamentals, equation (3.2) 
becomes: 
 
𝑉1,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛾)∑𝛾
𝑖𝐸𝑡
𝐷(𝑓𝑡+𝑖)
∞
𝑖=0
= (1 − 𝛾)∑𝛾𝑖𝑓𝑡
∞
𝑖=0
= (1 − 𝛾)𝑓𝑡
1 − 𝛾∞
1 − 𝛾
 (3.3) 
while 0 < 𝛾 < 1, equation (3.3) becomes: 
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 𝑉1,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡 (3.4) 
In order to make an optimal decision on the price setting, obtaining information on 
expected value of the exchange rate is not sufficient. It is critical to know in what 
particular way the dealer will react to the expected value. Therefore, utility function 
of dealers is required. Motivated by Evans and Lyons (2002) and Ding (2006), our 
model assumes an identical utility function for all dealers: 
 𝑈(𝑊) = −𝑒−𝐴𝑊 (3.5) 
Equation (3.5) is a constant absolute risk aversion function with a constant parameter 
𝐴. The price setting problem in this step then becomes a utility maximization problem. 
The information available to dealers is common public information on fundamentals 
𝑓𝑡 and their own inventory level 𝐼1𝑖,𝑡. 
Proposition 1: In a competitive market with available information set Ω1𝑖,𝑡 =
{𝑓𝑡 , 𝐼1𝑖,𝑡}, the optimal pricing strategy of dealer i is:  
 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 = 𝑓𝑡 (3.6) 
where 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 is price setting of dealer i in step 1 at time t and Ο denotes other dealers. 
After customers receive quotes from dealers, they decide whether to trade, the volume 
to trade and the direction to trade. 
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Proof: 
After customers send purchase order requests, there are three possible outcomes. If 
dealer i quotes a lower price than others, customers will take all the desired volume on 
his price. If dealer i sets the same price as others, customers will have no preference 
as to with whom to trade. Thus, our model assumes customers will trade with 
corresponding dealers who have received the requests. Dealer i gets a random share of 
trading volume. Third, if dealer i’s price is higher than others, no transaction will be 
conducted with his higher quote. Then the utility of dealer i for unit of desired volume 
with different price levels is shown to be: 
 
𝑈 = {
−𝑒−𝐴[𝑃1𝑖,𝑡+(𝐼1𝑖,𝑡−1)𝑉1𝑖,𝑡]      , 𝑖𝑓 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡
𝑂
−𝑒−𝐴[𝜙𝑃1𝑖,𝑡+(𝐼1𝑖,𝑡−𝜙)𝑉1𝑖,𝑡]   , 𝑖𝑓 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡
𝑂
−𝑒−𝐴𝐼1𝑖,𝑡𝑉1𝑖,𝑡                          , 𝑖𝑓 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡
𝑂
 (3.7) 
where 𝜙 is the possibility of customers sending their order requests to dealer i. It can 
be seen that the Nash-equilibrium is 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 = 𝑉1,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡  as for any δ > 0 , 
𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑉1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿 > 𝑉1𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 + (𝐼1𝑖,𝑡 − 1)𝑉1𝑖,𝑡 = (𝐼1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿)𝑉1𝑖,𝑡 > 𝐼1𝑖,𝑡𝑉1𝑖,𝑡 , while 
𝑈′(𝑥) > 0, dealer i has motivation to reduce his price until 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑉1𝑖,𝑡. The optimal 
prices for dealers equal their own expected value of the exchange rate. While all 
dealers observe the same fundamentals information, dealers share a common expected 
value and thus 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡
O = 𝑉1,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡. 
In the case where customers send sell order requests, the utility will be: 
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𝑈 = {
−𝑒−𝐴[(𝐼1𝑖,𝑡+1)𝑉1𝑖,𝑡−𝑃1𝑖,𝑡]      , 𝑖𝑓 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡
𝑂
−𝑒−𝐴[(𝐼1𝑖,𝑡+𝜙)𝑉1𝑖,𝑡−𝜙𝑃1𝑖,𝑡]   , 𝑖𝑓 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡
𝑂
−𝑒−𝐴𝐼1𝑖,𝑡𝑉1𝑖,𝑡                          , 𝑖𝑓 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡
𝑂
 (3.8) 
Similarly, the Nash-equilibrium is 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡
O = 𝑉1,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡. 
Proposition 2: Customers will trade on the basis of their own private information, 
and the quantity is: 
 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡 (3.9) 
where 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is customer order flow and 𝜆 is risk-bearing capacity of customers.  
Proof: 
Customers hold private information 𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡 but are unable to get accurate information on 
the whole economy. Therefore, 𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡  follows unknown distribution D(𝑓𝑝,𝑡 , 𝜎𝑓,𝑡
2 ) with 
unknown 𝑓𝑝,𝑡. While customers can observe only their own private information, it is 
reasonable that customers believe their information is a reflection of the future 
exchange rate. The expectation becomes: 
 𝐸𝑡
𝑖(𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡|Ω1𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 ) = 𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡 (3.10) 
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where Ω1𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 = {𝑓𝑡 , 𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡} is the information set faced by customers. From equation 
(3.4), it is straightforward that 𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐶 = 𝑓𝑡+1
𝐶 . Considering the linear relationship 
between demand and expected returns, one can get: 
 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆[𝐸𝑡
𝑖(𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐶 |Ω1𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 ) − 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡] = 𝜆[𝐸𝑡
𝑖(𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡|Ω1𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 ) − 𝑓𝑡] = 𝜆𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡 (3.11) 
Step 2 
This step studies the behaviour of dealers in the interbank market. Transactions in the 
customer market have been conducted and dealer i observes his own net customer 
order flow 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 , current inventory position 𝐼2𝑖,𝑡 , his price in step 1 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡  and all the 
other relevant information in step 1 Ω1𝑖,𝑡. As mentioned above, customer order flow 
contains private information from the customer. Dealer i will extract information from 
customer order flow and adjust his expected value of the exchange rate: 
 
𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑉1𝑖,𝑡 +
1
𝜆
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 (3.12) 
where 𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 is the expected currency value of dealer i after he receives customer order 
flow in the customer market. With heterogeneous information and expectations, 
dealers set prices to trade in the interbank market. This is in fact an auction market 
with independent private value. 
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Proposition 3: With information set Ω2𝑖,𝑡 = {𝑓𝑡 , 𝐼1𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐼2𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡} , the optimal 
quoting strategy of dealer i is： 
 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡 +
1
𝜆
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝜃 
(3.13)  𝑆 = {
−1    , 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 > 0
0        , 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 0
1        , 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 < 0
 
 𝜃 =
1
𝐴
ln (
𝑀 − 1 + 𝐴𝑏
𝑀 − 1
) 
Here 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 is price setting after the transactions in the customer market. 𝑀 indicates 
the number of dealers and b is the scale parameter of distribution of expected value. 𝜃 
is a function of the quantity of dealers.  
Proof: 
The sign of 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 influences the derivation of dealer’s utility and thus causes the dealer 
to make different decisions over price setting. It is desirable to consider the model in 
different cases of 𝐶𝑖,𝑡. The simplest case is when 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 0. The dealer gets no new 
information and thus quotes the same price as that in step 1, which is 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡. If 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 > 0 , it means that dealer i  receives net purchase transaction in the customer 
market and holds a negative inventory position. In this case, the gain from every unit 
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of inventory is 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡. The cost will be 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 (if a deal is made) or 𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 (if no deal). 
The equation below shows the utility under different deal conditions: 
 
𝑈 = {
𝑊 = −𝑒−𝐴(𝑓𝑡−𝑃2𝑖,𝑡)         , 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒      
𝑊 = −𝑒−𝐴(𝑓𝑡−𝑉2𝑖,𝑡)         , 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒
 (3.14) 
The probability of a deal is the probability of price being higher than others. The 
expected utility is then: 
 𝐸(𝑈) = −𝑒−𝐴(𝑓𝑡−𝑃2𝑖,𝑡)𝑃𝑟{𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 } 
+(−𝑒−𝐴(𝑓𝑡−𝑉2𝑖,𝑡))(1 − 𝑃𝑟{𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 }) 
(3.15) 
Rearranging equation (3.15), it becomes: 
 𝐸(𝑈) = 𝑒−𝐴𝑓𝑡(𝑒𝐴𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑒𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡)𝑃𝑟{𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 } − 𝑒−𝐴(𝑓𝑡−𝑉2𝑖,𝑡) (3.16) 
Intuitively, the higher the probability of dealer i’s expected value being greater than 
that of the others, the higher the probability of dealer i’s price setting being better. 
Our model assumes that dealers share a common Laplace Distribution on expected 
value: 
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𝑃𝑟{𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 } = 𝑃𝑟{𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 } = [𝐹 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡))]
𝑀−1
 (3.17) 
where 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (  ) is an inverse function of 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡). 𝐹(  ) indicates the 
cumulative distribution function. Laplace Distribution is a continuous probability 
distribution that contains two exponential distributions. The formation of probability 
density function is shown below: 
 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
2𝑏
{
𝑒−
𝜇−𝑥
𝑏   , 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 𝜇
𝑒−
𝑥−𝜇
𝑏   , 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 𝜇
 (3.18) 
where μ is the mean of the distribution and b is a scale parameter. The corresponding 
cumulative distribution function is: 
 
𝐹(𝑥) = {
1
2
𝑒
𝑥−𝜇
𝑏             , 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 𝜇
1 −
1
2
𝑒−
𝑥−𝜇
𝑏   , 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 𝜇
 (3.19) 
Substituting equation (3.17) into (3.16), the expected utility becomes: 
 
𝐸(𝑈) = 𝑒−𝐴𝑓𝑡(𝑒𝐴𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑒𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡) [𝐹 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡))]
𝑀−1
− 𝑒−𝐴(𝑓𝑡−𝑉2𝑖,𝑡) (3.20) 
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In order to solve the utility maximization problem, we take the first-order differential 
by 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡. 
 
(𝑀 − 1) [𝐹 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡))]
𝑀−2
𝐹′ (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡)) (𝑒
𝐴𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑒𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡)
𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
′ (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡))
 
−𝐴𝑒𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 [𝐹 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡))]
𝑀−1
= 0 
(3.21) 
Rearranging equation (3.21), and recall that 𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡), we have: 
 (𝑀 − 1)[𝐹(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡)]
𝑀−2
𝐹′(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡)𝑒
𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐴𝑒𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡[𝐹(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡)]
𝑀−1
𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
′ (𝑉2𝑖,𝑡) 
= (𝑀 − 1)[𝐹(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡)]
𝑀−2
𝐹′(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡)𝑒
𝐴𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 
(3.22) 
Taking integration on both sides: 
 
[𝐹(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡)]
𝑀−1
𝑒𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 = ∫ (𝑀 − 1)[𝐹(𝑥)]𝑀−2𝐹′(𝑥)𝑒𝐴𝑥𝑑𝑥
𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
−∞
 (3.23) 
The only information available to dealer i is the formation of Laplace Distribution and 
his own expected value of the exchange rate. Therefore, it is reasonable that dealer i 
takes his expected value of the exchange rate 𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 as the mean μ of distribution when 
he makes a decision on the price setting. Substitute equation (3.19) into (3.23): 
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[
1
2
𝑒−
𝑉2𝑖,𝑡−𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
𝑏 ]
𝑀−1
𝑒𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 
= ∫ (𝑀 − 1) [
1
2
𝑒
𝑥−𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
𝑏 ]
𝑀−2 1
2𝑏
𝑒
𝑥−𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
𝑏 𝑒𝐴𝑥𝑑𝑥
𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
−∞
 
(3.24) 
Rearranging equation (3.24): 
 
(
1
2
)
𝑀−1
𝑒𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 = (
1
2
)
𝑀−1
∫
(𝑀 − 1)
𝑏
[𝑒
𝑥−𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
𝑏 ]
𝑀−1
𝑒𝐴𝑥𝑑𝑥
𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
−∞
 (3.25) 
 
𝑒𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 = ∫
(𝑀 − 1)
𝑏
𝑒
(𝑀−1+𝐴𝑏)𝑥−(𝑀−1)𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
𝑏 𝑑𝑥
𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
−∞
 (3.26) 
 
𝑒𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑀 − 1
𝑀 − 1 + 𝐴𝑏
𝑒𝐴𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 (3.27) 
Taking logarithm of both sides, the optimal quoting strategy of dealer i is solved: 
 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜃 = 𝑓𝑡 +
1
𝜆
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜃 
(3.28) 
 𝜃 =
1
𝐴
ln (
𝑀 − 1 + 𝐴𝑏
𝑀 − 1
) 
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Similarly, if 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 < 0, the utility of a unit of volume would be: 
 
𝑈 = {
𝑊 = −𝑒−𝐴(𝑃2𝑖,𝑡−𝑓𝑡)         , 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒      
𝑊 = −𝑒−𝐴(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡−𝑓𝑡)         , 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒
 (3.29) 
and thus expected utility becomes: 
 𝐸(𝑈) = −𝑒−𝐴(𝑃2𝑖,𝑡−𝑓𝑡)𝑃𝑟{𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 } 
+(−𝑒−𝐴(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡−𝑓𝑡))(1 − 𝑃𝑟{𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 }) 
(3.30) 
Clearly, 
 
𝑃𝑟{𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 } = 𝑃𝑟{𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 } = [1 − 𝐹 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡))]
𝑀−1
 (3.31) 
By solving the utility maximization problem, we obtain: 
 
−(𝑀 − 1) [1 − 𝐹 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡))]
𝑀−2
𝐹′ (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡)) (𝑒
−𝐴𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑒−𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡)
𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
′ (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡))
 
+𝐴𝑒−𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 [1 − 𝐹 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
−1 (𝑃2𝑖,𝑡))]
𝑀−1
= 0 
(3.32) 
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Rearranging equation (3.32) to: 
 (𝑀 − 1)[1 − 𝐹(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡)]
𝑀−2
𝐹′(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡)𝑒
−𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 
+𝐴𝑒−𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡[1 − 𝐹(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡)]
𝑀−1
𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
′ (𝑉2𝑖,𝑡) 
= (𝑀 − 1)[1 − 𝐹(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡)]
𝑀−2
𝐹′(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡)𝑒
−𝐴𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 
(3.33) 
Taking integration of both sides: 
 
[1 − 𝐹(𝑉2𝑖,𝑡)]
𝑀−1
𝑒−𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 = ∫ (𝑀 − 1)[1 − 𝐹(𝑥)]𝑀−2𝐹′(𝑥)𝑒−𝐴𝑥𝑑𝑥
+∞
𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
 (3.34) 
While x ≥ 𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 , cumulative distribution function in equation (3.19) should be 
expressed as the case when x ≥ μ: 
 
[
1
2
𝑒−
𝑉2𝑖,𝑡−𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
𝑏 ]
𝑀−1
𝑒−𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 
= ∫ (𝑀 − 1) [
1
2
𝑒−
𝑥−𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
𝑏 ]
𝑀−2 1
2𝑏
𝑒−
𝑥−𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
𝑏 𝑒−𝐴𝑥𝑑𝑥
+∞
𝑉2𝑖,𝑡
 
(3.35) 
The solution is: 
68 
 
 
𝑒−𝐴𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑀 − 1
𝑀 − 1 + 𝐴𝑏
𝑒−𝐴𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 (3.36) 
and the optimal quoting strategy becomes: 
 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑉2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃 = 𝑓𝑡 +
1
𝜆
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃 
(3.37) 
 𝜃 =
1
𝐴
ln (
𝑀 − 1 + 𝐴𝑏
𝑀 − 1
) 
When 𝑀 is approaching infinity, 𝜃 is approaching zero: 
 
lim
𝑀→∞
𝜃 = lim
𝑀→∞
1
𝐴
ln (1 +
𝐴𝑏
𝑀 − 1
) =
1
𝐴
ln 1 = 0 (3.38) 
Therefore, the quoting strategy captures the features of the competition. When the 
competition of a market rises, the number of dealers 𝑀 increases, making their quotes 
closer to their expected values of the exchange rate. 
As can be seen, the quoting strategy of dealers captures the real-time states of the 
interbank market. Given trading volume 𝑄, the market depth in the quoting strategy 
mentioned above can be calculated as: 
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 2
𝜆
𝑄 + 2𝜃 (3.39) 
In a competitive market, market depth is nearly proportional to twice trading volume. 
This is consistent with the finding of Rime (2003), which is shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Depth of bid and ask quotes at a time point in Reuters D2000-2 (Rime 
2003) 
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Figure 3.1 shows the depth of bid and ask quotes at 16:00 in Reuters D2000-2 when 
both the European market and the American market are active. The X-axis is 
accumulative order flow and the Y-axis is exchange rate. The depth of bid and ask are 
similar and spread between bid (lower) curve and ask (upper) curve increases when 
trading size becomes larger. 
After dealer i observes others’ quotes, he may conduct speculative transactions to 
make profits. However, this may be regarded as the initial trial and error in the 
process of exchange rate determination and this chapter elects to concentrate on 
studying speculative demand and price setting in equilibrium. 
Proposition 4: In a competitive market that is assumed to have no arbitrage, the 
optimal quoting strategy in the interbank market ensures market equilibrium as: 
 
𝑃2,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡 +
1
𝑀𝜆
∑𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
 (3.40) 
where 𝑃2,𝑡 denotes the price in equilibrium. 
Proof: 
Remember that dealer i will end with a negative inventory position in the customer 
market if 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 > 0. In order to share risk, he would like to buy foreign currency at 
𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡 +
1
𝜆
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜃. Similarly, dealer j would like to sell at 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡 +
1
𝜆
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃  
when 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 < 0. While 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑃2𝑗,𝑡, the deal will be matched. 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 decreases and 𝑃2𝑗,𝑡 
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increases. The assumption of no arbitrage requires 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 , and competition 
makes θ = 0. The pricing problem is then solved: 
 
𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡 +
1
𝜆
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡 +
1
𝜆
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 = 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂  (3.41) 
Rearranging equation (3.41) to: 
 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 =
1
𝑀
∑𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
 (3.42) 
The optimal pricing strategy in equilibrium becomes: 
 
𝑃2,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡 +
1
𝑀𝜆
∑𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
 (3.43) 
It should be noted that our model does not make any assumption or impose any 
limitation on the process from heterogeneous information to market equilibrium with 
information completely shared. It could be that other dealers send order requests and 
trade directly. Alternatively it might be that dealer i’s limit order is matched to the 
limit orders of other dealers by a broker or electronic trading system and he trades 
indirectly. This captures different types of trading tools in the interbank market. 
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Proposition 5: In equilibrium, speculative demand is eliminated and imbalance of 
customer order flow equals imbalance of interbank order flow. 
 
∑𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
=∑𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
 (3.44) 
Proof: 
Following Evans and Lyons (2002), the wealth of dealer i  after he conducts 
speculative demand is: 
 𝑊 = 𝐶𝑖,𝑡(𝑓𝑡 − 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡) + [𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸(𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 |Ω2𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 )](𝑃2,𝑡 − 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 ) 
−𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 (𝑃2,𝑡 − 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡) 
(3.45) 
where 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑂  is the hedge demand against incoming order flow and the information set 
Ω2𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 = {𝑓𝑡 , 𝐼1𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐼2𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑃1𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 , 𝑃2,𝑡} . In equilibrium, 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 = 0  and 𝑃2𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃2𝑖,𝑡
𝑂 = 𝑃2,𝑡 . There would be no additional benefit to gain from holding any 
speculative demand. The assumption of no arbitrage eliminates speculative demand 
and thus: 
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 0 (3.46) 
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Consider the relationship between customer order flow and interbank order flow: 
 
∑𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
=∑𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
+∑𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
 (3.47) 
Therefore, net customer order flow is the same as net interbank order flow: 
 ∑𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
=∑𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
 (3.48) 
Proposition 5 does not imply that dealers are purely liquidity providers. In the real-
time exchange market, dealers could have speculative demand based on their private 
information. However, dealers will take the opposite position on speculative demand 
at a profitable price until market equilibrium is achieved. Therefore, our model allows 
the existence of diversified trading styles as seen among the dealers studied by 
Bjønnes and Rime (2005). Equation (3.48) describes the relationship between 
imbalance of customer order flow and imbalance of interbank order flow, but not the 
relationship between trading volumes in the customer market and that in the interbank 
market. In addition to the possible speculative demand, the frequency of transactions 
in the interbank market is higher than in the customer market, in order to share risk 
and information. Therefore, our model also allows larger trading volume in the 
interbank market than in the customer market. 
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In the model of Evans and Lyons (2002), the speculative demand of dealer i  is 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝐶𝑖,𝑡, with α > 0. The relationship between customer order flow and interbank 
order flow would be 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = (𝛼 + 1)𝐶𝑖,𝑡. However, in the third trading round to share 
overnight risk with the public, the quantity to trade is ∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖 . This indicates that 
dealers will hold α∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖  of inventory position overnight. This is contrary to the 
finding of Bjønnes, Rime, and Solheim (2005) that dealers will not stay with any 
overnight imbalance position. For this aspect, our model obeys the evidence found in 
the literature. 
Step 3 
Inspired by Cao, Evans, and Lyons (2006), this study describes the inventory effect in 
the process of sharing overnight risk with the public. In order to avoid overnight risk, 
the quantity to trade with the public is inventory position 𝐼3𝑖,𝑡. Dealer i quotes lower 
price 𝑃3𝑖,𝑡 to ensure sufficient expected returns for the public to absorb imbalance of 
inventory position. 
 𝐼3𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆[𝐸𝑃(𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1|Ω𝑃) − 𝑃3𝑖,𝑡] (3.49) 
where 𝐸𝑃(𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1) is expected value of the exchange rate for the public in the next 
period. Ω𝑃 = {𝑓𝑡 , 𝑃2,𝑡, 𝑃3𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑅}  is the information set. 𝑅  indicates increment of the 
exchange rate in the public’s expectation. 
When dealers share information completely in the interbank market, the private part 
of information on the exchange rate is discovered. The public would recognize the 
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value of the exchange rate in market equilibrium. Moreover, there are many more 
liquidity providers among the public than there are dealers. Their risk-bearing 
capacity is large enough to take overnight risk. The expected value of the exchange 
rate in the next period for the public is the sum of equilibrium price and expected 
increment of the exchange rate: 
 𝐸𝑃(𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1|Ω𝑃) = 𝑃2,𝑡 + 𝑅 (3.50) 
Combining equations (3.49) and (3.50), the demand of the public becomes: 
 𝐼3𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆[𝑃2,𝑡 − 𝑃3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅] (3.51) 
Now, all the information available to dealer i  is information set Ω2𝑖,𝑡 , price 
equilibrium in the interbank market 𝑃2,𝑡, information of public demand function 𝑃3𝑖,𝑡, 
𝐼3𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅 and risk-free payoff for holding domestic currency 𝑟𝑑. 
Proposition 6: With information set 𝛺3𝑖,𝑡 = {𝛺2𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑃2,𝑡, 𝐼3𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑃3𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑅, 𝑟𝑑}, the expected 
value of the exchange rate for dealer i in the next period is: 
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𝐸(𝑃1𝑖,𝑡+1|𝛺3𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑃1,𝑡 + (
𝐴
2
𝜎𝑃
2 −
1 + 𝑟𝑑
𝜆
) 𝐼3𝑖,𝑡 
+𝑅(1 + 𝑟𝑑) +
1
𝑀𝜆
∑𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
 
(3.52) 
Here 𝐸(𝑃1𝑖,𝑡+1|𝛺3𝑖,𝑡) is the expected value of the exchange rate for dealer i in the next 
period. 𝜎𝑃
2 is volatility of 𝐸(𝑃1𝑖,𝑡+1|𝛺3𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑃2,𝑡. 
Proof: 
In order to solve the expected value of the exchange rate in the next period, one needs 
to calculate the benefit from controlling inventory and the compensation for holding 
risky assets overnight. The expected utility in these two cases is: 
 𝐸(𝑈) = {
−𝑒−𝐴𝐼3𝑖,𝑡(𝑃3𝑖,𝑡−𝑃2,𝑡)(1+𝑟𝑑)          , 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒     
𝐸(−𝑒−𝐴𝐼3𝑖,𝑡(𝑃1𝑖,𝑡+1−𝑃2,𝑡)|𝛺3𝑖,𝑡) , 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒
 (3.53) 
For the utility function U = −𝑒−𝐴𝑥, it is known that if x  is normally distributed with 
N(μ, 𝜎2), 𝐸(𝑈) = −𝑒−𝐴(𝜇−
1
2
𝐴𝜎2)
. Therefore, expected utility of dealer i is: 
 𝐸(𝑈) = {
−𝑒−𝐴𝐼3𝑖,𝑡(𝑃3𝑖,𝑡−𝑃2,𝑡)(1+𝑟𝑑)                       , 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒        
−𝑒−𝐴[𝐼3𝑖,𝑡(𝐸(𝑃1𝑖,𝑡+1|𝛺3𝑖,𝑡)−𝑃2,𝑡)−
𝐴
2
𝐼3𝑖,𝑡
2 𝜎𝑃
2] , 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒
 (3.54) 
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To make the expected utilities indifferent to dealer i, we need: 
 
−𝐴𝐼3𝑖,𝑡(𝑃3𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃2,𝑡)(1 + 𝑟𝑑) 
= −𝐴 [𝐼3𝑖,𝑡(𝐸(𝑃1𝑖,𝑡+1|𝛺3𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑃2,𝑡) −
𝐴
2
𝐼3𝑖,𝑡
2 𝜎𝑃
2] 
(3.55) 
Rearranging equation (3.55) we have: 
 𝐸(𝑃1𝑖,𝑡+1|𝛺3𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑃2,𝑡 = (𝑃3𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃2,𝑡)(1 + 𝑟𝑑) +
𝐴
2
𝐼3𝑖,𝑡𝜎𝑃
2 (3.56) 
Combined with the demand function of the public in equation (3.51), the expected 
value of the exchange rate in the next period becomes: 
 
𝐸(𝑃1𝑖,𝑡+1|𝛺3𝑖,𝑡) − (𝑓𝑡 +
1
𝑀𝜆
∑𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
) 
= −(
1
𝜆
𝐼3𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅) (1 + 𝑟𝑑) +
𝐴
2
𝐼3𝑖,𝑡𝜎𝑃
2 
(3.57) 
Rearranging equation (3.57) to: 
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 𝐸(𝑃1𝑖,𝑡+1|𝛺3𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑓𝑡 + (
𝐴
2
𝜎𝑃
2 −
1 + 𝑟𝑑
𝜆
) 𝐼3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅(1 + 𝑟𝑑) +
1
𝑀𝜆
∑𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
 (3.58) 
Recall that 𝑃1,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡 and ∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖 = ∑ 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖 , then: 
 
𝐸(𝑃1𝑖,𝑡+1|𝛺3𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑃1,𝑡 + (
𝐴
2
𝜎𝑃
2 −
1 + 𝑟𝑑
𝜆
) 𝐼3𝑖,𝑡 
+𝑅(1 + 𝑟𝑑) +
1
𝑀𝜆
∑𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
 
(3.59) 
In this step, dealers hold the same level of inventory position 𝐼3𝑖,𝑡  after market 
equilibrium in the interbank market. The common public demand function ensures 
that they will quote the same price to close inventory position. Therefore, all the 
dealers have the same information in the same public environment and thus show the 
same behaviour. Price setting of dealer i is sufficient to represent the market-level 
movement of the exchange rate. Rearranging equation (3.52), one obtains the equation 
for the motion of the exchange rate: 
 ∆𝑃1,𝑡 = (
𝐴
2
𝜎𝑃
2 −
1 + 𝑟𝑑
𝜆
) 𝐼3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅(1 + 𝑟𝑑) +
1
𝑀𝜆
∑𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
 (3.60) 
∆𝑃1,𝑡 is the exchange rate movements between the beginning of time t and t + 1. As 
can be seen from equation (3.60), our model is composed of three parts. The first part 
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incorporates the inventory effect. If 
𝐴
2
𝜎𝑃
2 <
1+𝑟𝑑
𝜆
, the exchange rate is negatively 
associated with the inventory position. The second part, 𝑅(1 + 𝑟𝑑) , captures the 
influence of macro variables. The third item, 
1
𝑀𝜆
∑ 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖 , represents the information 
effect. The coefficient on the informative part is positive. This is consistent with the 
findings in the literature that the information effect should be positively correlated 
with exchange rate movements. 
Consider the relationship between the inventory position in step 1, 𝐼1𝑖,𝑡, and in step 3, 
𝐼3𝑖,𝑡. According to Proposition 4, equilibrium in the interbank market requires dealers 
to quote the same price, and optimal quoting strategy in market equilibrium states that 
dealers share the imbalance of customer order flow jointly and equally. Therefore, the 
change of inventory position from the beginning of step 1 to the end of step 2 is the 
average of net customer order flow. 
 𝐼3𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐼1𝑖,𝑡 −
1
𝑀
∑𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
 (3.61) 
Substituting equation (3.61) into (3.60), we obtain: 
 ∆𝑃1,𝑡 = (
𝐴
2
𝜎𝑃
2 −
1 + 𝑟𝑑
𝜆
) 𝐼1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅(1 + 𝑟𝑑) + (
2 + 𝑟𝑑
𝜆
−
𝐴
2
𝜎𝑃
2)
1
𝑀
∑𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
 (3.62) 
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Note that if dealers end without any inventory positions in a trading period, they must 
start with zero inventory position in the next trading period. The inventory position in 
step 1 should be zero: 
 𝐼1𝑖,𝑡 = 0 (3.63) 
Movements of the exchange rate then become: 
 ∆𝑃1,𝑡 = 𝑅(1 + 𝑟𝑑) + (
2 + 𝑟𝑑
𝜆
−
𝐴
2
𝜎𝑃
2)
1
𝑀
∑𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
𝑖
 (3.64) 
The parameter on order flow in equation (3.64) incorporates both inventory and 
information effects, while 
𝐴
2
𝜎𝑃
2 <
1+𝑟𝑑
𝜆
, 
𝐴
2
𝜎𝑃
2 <
2+𝑟𝑑
𝜆
. The correlation between 
exchange rate movements and order flow is positive. While the debate on reasons for 
the empirical success of order flow is still unresolved, our model says that order flow 
effect is a composite result of both inventory and information effects. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The microstructure approach to the exchange rate has emerged as a promising 
alternative to macro models. However, there is still a scarcity of literature providing a 
theoretical framework that treats the exchange rate determination as a process driven 
by the interaction between the interbank and customer markets. To fill this critical 
void, this chapter develops a theoretical model to bridge DL and ML models. Based 
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on the study of optimal reaction of dealers to incoming information, associated with 
the condition of market equilibrium, our model builds the connection between dealers’ 
behaviour and the market’s behaviour, changing price setting at the dealer level to 
exchange rate determination at the market level.  
This chapter sheds new light on the process of exchange rate determination under the 
influence of inventory and information effects. Compared to the existing literature, 
the model offers the following advantages: 
 Compared to Lyons’ model, Huang and Stoll’s model and Ding’s model, our 
model is developed in a more realistic environment with multi-structure 
framework of the foreign exchange market. It has no restrictive assumptions or 
limitations with regard to dealers’ trading styles. It allows diversified tools and 
motivations to make a deal, beyond the controlling of inventory by incoming 
order requests. 
 Compared to Evans and Lyons’ model and Cao, Evans and Lyons’ model, our 
model allows heterogeneous expectations of the exchange rate and thus 
heterogeneous price setting in the interbank market. It captures the features of the 
real-time exchange market and market depth. It also shows that the extent to 
which dealers’ quotes reflect the expected value of the exchange rate depends on 
the extent of competition in the interbank market. Therefore, the parameters of 
individual dealers enter into the order flow model and it is said to influence the 
impact of order flow on exchange rate. 
 Proposition 6 is the original contribution of this chapter. Compared to Evans and 
Lyons’ model and Cao, Evans and Lyons’ model, our model incorporates both 
the information effect and inventory effect. Information effect enters into the 
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model by way of the behaviour of customers with private information and the 
reaction of dealers’ optimal quoting strategy to incoming information. Realized 
order flows in the customer market and the interbank market are carriers of 
information. Inventory effect enters into our model by quote shading when 
dealers try to share risk with the public and stay with no overnight imbalance of 
inventory position. In addition, the model in Proposition 6 gives a deeper picture 
of the composition of order flow impact on exchange rate and provides a 
theoretical tool to analyse the relationship between market parameters and the 
impact of order flow. 
The model in this chapter raises several issues which deserve further research. First, 
order flow is calculated according to a method developed in the equity market. While 
this method has been used for more than a decade, and performs reasonably well, it is 
desirable to develop a method to construct the order flow index that takes specific 
consideration of characteristics of the foreign exchange market. Second, a natural 
extension of the study would be to test the model empirically. Specification of the 
empirical model and the appropriate method to adopt are unknown at this stage, 
especially for an environment where very high frequency data will be deployed. 
Future research should strive to use some real data to test the model. However, 
currently, most data are private. A market dealer/trading platform cannot disclose 
their individual customer information for confidentiality reasons. If, in the future, I 
am able to obtain relevant data, I will include it in my future research. The results 
obtained from using the derived model can be compared with the standard model, so 
that the differences in the results can be used to justify the derived theoretical model. 
Third, it is worth finding a way to measure influences of the inventory effect and 
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information effect on exchange rate movements separately, because our model 
incorporates both these effects. Finally, it would be interesting to apply the model to 
the mature and emerging markets respectively and study the potential differences. 
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Chapter 4  
Trading Intensity, Information-based 
Trading and Price Impact in the Chinese 
Foreign Exchange Market 
4.1 Introduction 
In light of the fact that macro exchange rate models have received little support in 
empirical research, the microstructure of the foreign exchange market has attracted 
growing attention. In their seminal work, Evans and Lyons (2002) conclude that the 
order flow model captures above 60% of daily change for DM/USD, and more than 
40% of daily change for Yen/USD. Subsequent research has shown order flow to be 
an important indicator to capture the dynamics of exchange rates for various currency 
pairs (Duffuor, Marsh, and Phylaktis 2012, Evans and Lyons 2005, Berger et al. 2008, 
Zhang, Chau, and Zhang 2013, Cheung and Rime 2014). The majority of empirical 
studies on order flow models adopt fixed time intervals such as weekly, daily, or 5-
minute intervals. However, as has been pointed out by Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1987), Easley and O'Hara (1992), the time between two consecutive transactions 
contains information on the reasons for different types of time interval. Ignoring 
irregular time intervals in ultra-high frequency data might lead to losing information 
on the behaviours of market participants behind transactions. Prior studies (Dufour 
and Engle 2000b, Manganelli 2005, Holder, Qi, and Sinha 2004) on the information 
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content of trading duration have been mainly concerned with the stock market, option 
market and futures market. Little attention has been paid to foreign exchange markets, 
especially those in the emerging market economies. As the importance of China for 
the international economy is growing, attempts to provide a fuller picture on the 
Chinese foreign exchange market are necessary and desirable for market participants 
and regulators.  
Given the availability of ultra-high frequency data on exchange rate transactions, this 
chapter aims to answer the following questions: 
(1) Does order flow have significant impacts on the exchange rate in ultra-high 
frequency transaction? Although order flow has been proved to play an important role 
in capturing daily exchange rate changes in China, the ultra-high frequency relation 
between order flow and exchange rate movement needs to be explored. 
(2) What exactly is the information content of trading duration? In the research to date, 
the information content of trading duration has normally been detected by the 
significant relation between trading duration and price changes, and is usually 
explained theoretically. However, exactly what information is contained in trading 
duration, and the validity of that information, still require further research. 
(3) How does trading duration impact on exchange rate changes and volatility? 
Evidence on impact of trading duration on exchange rate return and volatility has not 
been conclusive. One theory (Easley and O'Hara 1992) advocates that long trading 
duration mirrors no news and low activity of informed traders, leading to small 
exchange rate changes and low volatility. However, according to another theory 
(Admati and Pfleiderer 1988), there are discretionary uninformed traders who are able 
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to choose the time to trade in order to minimize adverse selection cost. They will 
postpone their trading if there is a high arrival rate of informed traders. Therefore, 
long trading duration implies the absence of discretionary uninformed traders and a 
high proportion of informed traders, a situation associated with large exchange rate 
changes and high volatility. Both theories sound convincing and both are supported 
by empirical research. The present study aims to discover the reason behind these 
completely opposite results, and whether trading duration has an impact on exchange 
rate returns and volatility in the Chinese foreign exchange market. 
This chapter contributes to the literature of microstructure studies on exchange rates 
in several ways. First, this research is one of the very few to study the microstructure 
of the Chinese foreign exchange market. Given that China is one of the biggest 
economies in the world, it is surprising that the literature on the dynamics of the 
Chinese foreign exchange market is quite limited. One possible reason is the lack of 
high frequency data. Our study enriches the line of microstructure study by providing 
analysis with ultra-high frequency data. This could help improve the understanding of 
foreign exchange markets in the emerging world.  Second, by adopting the probability 
of information-based trading (PIN) model and the autoregressive conditional duration 
(ACD) model, this chapter presents a picture on the intraday pattern of informed 
traders, the probability of information occurring and trading duration. Given that the 
literature relates trading duration to arrival of informed traders theoretically, one of 
our contributions is to study directly the relationship between the content of 
information-based trading and both components of trading duration. Third, we try to 
uncover the trading behaviours of market participants hidden behind high frequency 
data. Guided by both the theoretical underpinning in Chapter 3 on the role of order 
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flow in price discovery and further discussions in this chapter on the PIN model, we 
test the price impacts of both variables as they are closely related. While it is well 
established in the literature the empirical significance of order flow, special emphasis 
is applied to the PIN variable in terms of its effects on prices through signed expected 
trading duration and signed unexpected trading duration in the Chinese foreign 
exchange market. It is natural to expect that exchange rate dynamics would change in 
different market situations. Distinct from many previous studies on trading duration, 
this study adopts a nonlinear model, the Markov regime-switching model, to 
investigate the relation between exchange rate returns and both signed components of 
trading duration in different market regimes. We also study impacts of the arrival rate 
(reciprocal of trading duration) on conditional volatility. For the first time in the 
literature, we develop a micro structure framework that captures comprehensively the 
critical role of order flow in exchange rate dynamics as well as the price impacts 
across difference market regimes. In addition, our model finds that the intraday 
pattern of informed trading in the Chinese foreign exchange market shows a time-of-
the-day effect. This sheds critical lights on the possible strategy of secret official 
intervention, which would affect for market liquidity situations depending when the 
intervention is being conducted. 
The main findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows. First, the probability 
of information-based trading is highest around the beginning and end periods of 
trading hours, and lowest during lunch time. This gives a U-shaped intraday pattern. 
In contrast, trading duration shows a distinctive inverted U-shaped intraday pattern. 
Some evidence is found that on average both expected and unexpected trading 
durations are relevant to the arrival rate of informed traders, but not to the probability 
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of information occurring. Second, trading duration in the Chinese foreign exchange 
market exhibits high persistence. A long trading duration is normally followed by 
another long trading duration. Third, order flow is proved to be an important 
determinant in ultra-high frequency exchange rate returns. Price impact of order flow 
is larger when the market is illiquid. Furthermore, both signed expected trading 
duration and signed unexpected trading duration contain information in addition to 
order flow. Our model captures around 13 per cent of exchange rate changes per 
transaction with linear estimation. This is consistent with the results of Zhang, Chau, 
and Zhang (2013), who adopt daily order flow in the Chinese foreign exchange 
market. Fourth, consistent with the theory of Engle and Russell (1998), expected 
arrival rate plays a more important role in capturing conditional volatility than does 
the unexpected arrival rate. Fifth, our estimation results support both theories on the 
trading behaviours of informed traders and discretionary uninformed traders. 
However, we argue that the final effect of trading duration on exchange rate is a 
composite result due to activities of uninformed and informed traders. It is also 
influenced by market structure and situation. In a placid market, short expected 
trading duration implies high trading intensity of existing informed traders, leading to 
large exchange rate changes and increased volatility. When the market is volatile, 
liquidity traders are expelled from the market. Long expected trading duration means 
a high proportion of informed traders, which is associated with large exchange rate 
changes and increased volatility. Because the number of market participants is limited 
in the interdealer market, the number of informed traders is limited and discretionary 
uninformed traders dominate the signed unexpected trading duration of order flow. 
This is found to have a positive impact on the exchange rate in different market 
regimes. 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the descriptive 
statistics of the data. Section 3 introduces the PIN model and illustrates the intraday 
pattern of PIN. Section 4 introduces the ACD model and provides a picture on the 
intraday pattern of trading duration; this captures time clustering and divides trading 
duration into expected component and unexpected component. Section 5 examines the 
relation between different information components of PIN and different components 
of trading duration. Section 6 explores the price impact of signed expected trading 
duration and signed unexpected trading duration in both the linear model and 
nonlinear model. Section 7 presents the estimation results of the ACD-GARCH model. 
Section 8 summarizes the main findings and implications of the research. 
4.2 Introduction to the Chinese foreign exchange market 
From 1949 to 1978 trading in foreign exchange was prohibited in China. Only the 
central bank could trade with western countries, while individuals could apply for a 
very limited amount of US dollars for business use. From 1978, Deng Xiaoping 
established the open-door policy in China. The Chinese foreign exchange rate was set 
to follow the fixed USD exchange rate regime. In April 1994 the interbank foreign 
exchange trading system was established in Shanghai, under which the People’s Bank 
of China (Central Bank) and the State Administration of Foreign exchange (SAFE) set 
up the China Foreign Exchange Trading System (CFETS), and the RMB was first 
traded in the interbank market. 
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4.2.1 Trading System 
Since 1994, the electronic RMB trading platform, the CFETS, has played an 
important role in foreign exchange market operations. April 2007 saw the 
establishment of a new generation trading system and in 2009 the CFETS upgraded 
the RMB electronic trading system, which now supports the CFETS Straight Through 
Process (CSTP). CSTP can support a range of products in the foreign exchange 
trading system, including foreign exchange Spot, Forward, NDF, Swap, Cross 
Currency Swap, and Option. The CFETS is based on members’ cooperatives, and all 
financial institutions that satisfy the requirements set by the regulators can apply for 
membership. The trading system serves the needs of various trading modes, such as 
anonymous trading and bilateral trading. It also includes One Click, Limit Order, 
Anonymous Inquiry Trading and Bilateral Inquiry Trading modes. The system offers 
the USD, EUR, JPY, HKD, GBP, AUD, NZD, SGD, CHF, and CAD against CNY for 
major trading currency pairs.
5
 For regional trading, the system offers trading in CNY 
against the MYR, RUB, THB and KZT. The trading hours for most products are from 
9:30 to 23:30
6
 (Chinese Holidays excluded). The CFETS provides a centralized 
clearing service for anonymous trading, and for bilateral trading clear and settle are 
based on agreement with each trading party. 
4.2.2 Trading Mechanism 
In 2005, the Chinese monetary authority established the managed floating exchange 
rate regime based on market supply and demand with reference to a basket of 
currencies. The People’s Bank of China (PBC) announces the Central Parity Rate 
                                                 
5 Here we mainly introduce the RMB/FX Spot market. 
6 The trading hours is extended to 9:30 - 23:30 after 4th January 2016. 
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(CPR) every business day with crawling bands. In 2005, the RMB/USD exchange rate 
floating band could not move above or below 0.3%. In 2007 the floating band was 
expanded to 0.5%, and in 2012 it became 1%. It was extended again in 2014 to 2%.  
On August 11, 2016 the PBC announced an improvement to CPR quotation whereby 
the market maker supplied quotation
7
 should reference the previous day’s interbank 
market closing rate, and take into account the changes of the previous day’s 
international major currency exchange rates and foreign exchange market supply and 
demand, for fine tuning. 
  
                                                 
7 The major market maker should supply their quotation to the CFETS before the interbank market 
opening time for the intraday CPR calculation. 
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Table 4.1 The calculation method of the Central Parity Rate 
The Central 
Parity Rate 
Calculation Method 
The CPR of 
USD/CNY 
The CPR of USD/CNY is calculated in the following way: On 
each business day the market makers should give the CFETS 
their quote prices before the market opening time. The CFETS 
excludes the highest price and the lowest price, then calculates 
the weight average of the remaining prices as the intraday CPR. 
The market makers’ trading volumes and their market-making 
performance are used as indicators to determine the weights. 
The CPR of 
HKD/CNY and 
CAD/CNY 
The CPR of HKD/CNY and CAD/CNY are transformed from the 
central parity of USD/CNY cross rate with reference to the price 
of HKD/USD and CAD/USD at 9am in the international FX 
market, respectively. 
The CPR of 
EUR/CNY, 
JPY/CNY, 
GBP/CNY, 
AUD/CNY, 
NZD/CNY, 
SGD/CNY, 
CHF/CNY, 
MYR/CNY and 
RUB/CNY 
On each business day the market makers give their quote price to 
the CFETS before market opening time.  Then the CFETS 
calculates the average price as the CPR of RMB against EUR, 
JPY, GBP, AUD, NZD, SGD, CHF, MYR and RUB for the 
intraday. 
Notes: All the calculation methods are based on the People’s Bank of China 
authorized official website, China Money. 
 http://www.chinamoney.com.cn/fe/Channel/2781516, last accessed on 18 March 
2016. 
 
4.3 Data Description 
Due to data availability, the raw data in this chapter is tick transaction data of 
CNY/USD in the Chinese foreign exchange market between 9
th
 December 2009 and 
13
th
 December 2012. It is collected from Reuter Xtra 3000 and covers around three 
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years, with 733 trading days. The available variables are timestamp, transaction price, 
bid quote and ask quote. For the convenience of analysis, this chapter prepares the 
raw data in the following ways. First, the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is applied 
to determine the direction of every transaction. Specifically, every time-stamped 
transaction is defined as buyer-initiated transaction (valued as 1) or seller-initiated 
transaction (valued as -1). Second, the duration between two transactions is calculated 
from the timestamp. Third, if transactions are dealt at the same time, they are 
considered as one observation; transaction directions are summed up, and this is the 
order flow. Fourth, in order to eliminate the effect of overnight information, the first 
observation of every trading day is excluded. We also delete some transaction data 
without bid and ask price around the early trading. Fifth, observations whose 
transaction direction cannot be determined are excluded from our dataset. Sixth, this 
chapter deletes all the transactions outside the opening hours. As a result, finally, the 
data reduces from 158646 observations to 155721 observations. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics (09/12/2009–13/12/2012) 
 
𝛥𝑃𝑖 𝑂𝐹𝑖 𝑥𝑖 
Observations 155721 155721 155721 
Mean 9.09 × e−7 -0.0928 123.4021 
Median 0 -1 46 
Minimum -0.5363 -2 1 
Maximum 0.5424 9 15120 
Std. Dev. 0.0127 1.01 301.0962 
Skewness 0.1477 0.1869 13.2272 
Kurtosis 183.8759 1.1418 265.6339 
Jarque-Bera 2.12 × e8*** 23309.83*** 4.52 × e8*** 
Notes: 𝛥𝑃𝑖  is the log difference of the exchange rate times 100. 𝑂𝐹𝑖  means the 
difference between buyer-initiated transaction and seller-initiated transaction at one 
time, named order flow. 𝑥𝑖 is calculated as  𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖−1, which denotes actual duration 
between transactions. Jarque-Bera is the statistics of normality test. The significance 
levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%.  
 
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics of exchange rate returns, order flow and 
trading duration. Exchange rate returns are calculated from the log difference of two 
consecutive exchange rates times 100. It is interesting that CNY/USD depreciated 
from 6.8276 on 9
th
 December 2009 to 6.232 on 13
th
 December 2012, a decrease of 
around 8.72%. However, intraday exchange rate changes in our data are not as 
obvious, since the mean of 𝛥𝑃𝑡 is nearly zero and the median is exactly zero. The 
maximum exchange rate change is almost the same as the minimum exchange rate 
change. From the raw data, it can be found that the majority of CNY/USD 
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depreciation happens around the beginning of trading hours and after the market has 
closed. The accumulated depreciation rate around opening time reaches as high as 
7.73%, and that after the market has closed is around 0.87%. These trades are deleted 
during the preparation of the data. As can be seen in the second column of Table 4.2, 
seller-initiated transactions dominate in the Chinese foreign exchange market: mean 
and median of order flow are -0.0928 and -1, respectively. 𝑥𝑖  denotes transaction 
duration; the calculation formula is 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖−1, where 𝑡𝑖 denotes the arrival time of 
point process 𝑖. The average of trading duration is 123.4 seconds. Trading intensity in 
our data sample differs widely. The shortest trading duration is only 1 second, while 
in an inactive market it can reach as long as 15120 seconds. 
4.4 Intraday Pattern of Informed Trading 
Given a sample of transaction data, how to discover the information content of 
transactions is a problem. Easley et al. (1996) develop a structural sequential trading 
model based on Kyle (1985), Easley and O'Hara (1987) to calculate the probability of 
information-based trading. In this section, we adopt the PIN model to analyse the 
information pattern within one day. 
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4.4.1 The PIN model 
The sequential trade model introduced by Easley et al. (1996) describes the 
behaviours of market making in a mixed setting of discrete-and-continuous time.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Trading process of the PIN model 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.1, nature determines whether an information event happens 
before trading hours, and the probability is 𝛼 . Once information appears, the 
probability of it being good news is 1 − 𝛿 and the probability of it being bad news is 
𝛿. There are three types of market participants: the market maker, informed trader and 
uninformed trader. They are all assumed to be risk neutral and competitive. Informed 
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traders are able to observe the type of information. Under the assumption of risk 
neutral and competitive, his optimal reaction is to buy the asset at good news and sell 
at bad news. The arrival rate of informed traders is 𝜀 and follows a Poisson process. 
Uninformed traders also follow an independent Poisson process, and arrive at the rate 
of 𝜇. Uninformed traders cannot observe the information events, and buy or sell the 
asset regardless of whether an information event occurs. Therefore, both the buy 
arrival rate at good news and the sell arrival rate at bad news are 𝜀 + 𝜇 . In the 
remaining cases, the buy arrival rate or the sell arrival rate is 𝜀. The market maker 
knows the probability of an information event occurring, the probability of different 
types of information and the arrival rate of orders. However, he does not know which 
path has been determined by nature: good news, bad news or no information. Because 
the market maker is risk neutral and competitive, the posted bid and ask prices are the 
expected values of the asset conditional on available information. He adopts the 
Bayes rule to update the belief on information events. The likelihood of observing any 
sequence of buyer-initiated transactions and seller-initiated transactions on a good-
news day of total time T is: 
 𝑒−(𝜖+𝜇)𝑇
[(𝜀 + 𝜇)𝑇]𝐵
𝐵!
𝑒−𝜀𝑇
(𝜀𝑇)𝑆
𝑆!
 (4.1) 
Similarly, the likelihood of observing orders on a bad-news day is given by: 
 𝑒−𝜀𝑇
(𝜀𝑇)𝐵
𝐵!
𝑒−(𝜀+𝜇)𝑇
[(𝜀 + 𝜇)𝑇]𝑆
𝑆!
 (4.2) 
98 
 
On a day with no information, the likelihood becomes: 
 𝑒−𝜀𝑇
(𝜀𝑇)𝐵
𝐵!
𝑒−𝜀𝑇
(𝜀𝑇)𝑆
𝑆!
 (4.3) 
𝜀  is the arrival rate of uninformed traders to buy and sell assets, 𝜇  represents the 
arrival rate of informed traders, 𝑇 denotes the total time of trading period, 𝐵 is the 
number of buyer-initiated trades and 𝑆 means the number of seller-initiated trades. 
Therefore, the likelihood of observing trading activity with unknown type is equal to 
the weighted average of three types of information: 
 
𝐿((𝐵, 𝑆)|𝜃) = 𝛼(1 − 𝛿)𝑒−(𝜖+𝜇)𝑇
[(𝜀 + 𝜇)𝑇]𝐵
𝐵!
+ 𝛼𝛿𝑒−𝜀𝑇
(𝜀𝑇)𝐵
𝐵!
 
× 𝑒−(𝜀+𝜇)𝑇
[(𝜀 + 𝜇)𝑇]𝑆
𝑆!
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝑒−𝜀𝑇
(𝜀𝑇)𝑆
𝑆!
𝑒−𝜀𝑇
(𝜀𝑇)𝐵
𝐵!
𝑒−𝜀𝑇
(𝜀𝑇)𝑆
𝑆!
 
(4.4) 
where 𝛼 is the probability of an information event happening, and 𝛿 is the probability 
of information being good news. Across 𝐼 independent trading days, the likelihood 
becomes: 
 𝐿(𝑀|𝜃) =∏𝐿(𝜃|(𝐵𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖))
𝐼
𝑖=1
 (4.5) 
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In order to deal with the convergence problem in numerical maximization when the 
numbers of buyer-initiated transactions and seller-initiated transactions are large, we 
follow Aktas et al. (2007) to adopt a common term from the probability of three 
branches, and the likelihood function is rewritten as: 
 
𝐿(𝑀|𝜃) =∑[−2𝜀 +𝑀𝑡 𝑙𝑛(𝑧) + (𝐵𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡)𝑙𝑛(𝜀 + 𝜇)]
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
+∑𝑙𝑛[𝛼(1 − 𝛼)𝑒−𝜇𝑧𝑆𝑡−𝑀𝑡 + 𝛼𝛿𝑒−𝜇𝑧𝐵𝑡−𝑀𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑧𝐵𝑡+𝑆𝑡−𝑀𝑡]
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
(4.6) 
where 𝑀𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐵𝑡 , 𝑆𝑡) +
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐵𝑡,𝑆𝑡)
2
 and 𝑧 =
𝜀
(𝜀+𝜇)
. 
According to Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), Easley et al. (2008), Easley et al. 
(1996), PIN is calculated as the unconditional probability of informed trading: 
 𝑃𝐼𝑁 =
𝛼𝜇
𝛼𝜇 + 2𝜀
 (4.7) 
4.4.2 Estimation results 
Our data spans the period from 9
th
 December 2009 to 13
th
 December 2012. On 9
th
 
December 2010, the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) announced that 
it would shorten the trading day by one hour, so that trading hours changed from 9:30-
17:30 to 9:30-16:30.  In order to unify the trading hours of the data for analysis, we 
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divide our data into two sub-samples. The first sub-sample ranges from 9
th
 December 
2009 to 10
th
 December 2010, with trading hours between 9:30 and 17:30; the second 
ranges from 13
th
 December 2010 to 13
th
 December 2012, with trading hours between 
9:30 and 16:30.  
First, the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is applied to determine the trade direction. 
Specifically, if transaction price is larger than middle price, it is defined as buyer-
initiated transaction (valued as 1). If transaction price is smaller than middle price, it 
is defined as seller-initiated transaction (valued as -1). In the case that transaction 
price equals middle price, it is defined as buyer-initiated transaction if transaction 
price is larger than the previous one, and as seller-initiated transaction if transaction 
price is smaller than the previous one. Second, in order to contain sufficient data to 
calculate PIN parameters and the value of PIN, we calculate the number of buyer-
initiated transactions and seller-initiated transactions within a trading period lasting 30 
minutes, and all the trading days within the same trading period are adopted to 
determine PIN parameters, excluding the trading days with no transactions. Third, 
PIN package in R lab is introduced to compute the PIN parameters, which minimizes 
the log-likelihood function (4.6). Finally, PIN is calculated from equation (4.7). 
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Table 4.3 Intraday pattern of parameters and PIN (09/12/2009–10/12/2010) 
Timestamp 𝜀 𝜇 𝛼 𝛿 PIN 
09:30 – 10:00 1 1 0.1298 0.4029 0.061 
10:00 – 10:30 0.9152 1 0.7201 0.9979 0.2823 
10:30 – 11:00 1 1 0.1872 0.154 0.0856 
11:00 – 11:30 1 1 0.1857 0.1561 0.085 
11:30 – 12:00 1 1 0.1876 0.1375 0.0858 
12:00 – 12:30 1 0.0243 0.4795 1 0.0058 
12:30 – 13:00 0.9226 0.0057 0.5956 0.9733 0.0018 
13:00 – 13:30 0.9999 0.9995 0.2097 0.3514 0.0949 
13:30 – 14:00 1 1 0.2082 0.109 0.0943 
14:00 – 14:30 1 1 0.2001 0.137 0.0909 
14:30 – 15:00 1 1 0.1884 0.1524 0.0861 
15:00 -15:30 1 1 0.1865 0.1551 0.0853 
15:30 – 16:00 1 1 0.184 0.1586 0.0842 
16:00 – 16:30 0.9997 0.9113 0.1178 0.9929 0.051 
16:30 – 17:00 0.9209 0.9838 0.4911 0.9093 0.2078 
17:00 – 17:30 0.9999 1 0.1707 0.1771 0.0786 
Notes: This table shows the intraday pattern of PIN parameters and the PIN value 
every 30 minutes. 𝜀 is the arrival rate of uninformed traders, 𝜇 is the arrival rate of 
informed traders, 𝛼 is the probability of information event relevant to asset value, 𝛿 
denotes the probability of an information event being bad news, PIN is the 
measurement of asymmetric information. 
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Figure 4.2 Intraday pattern of PIN (09/12/2009-10/12/2010) 
 
Table 4.3 shows the estimated parameters and PIN for each trading period from 9
th
 
December 2009 to 10
th
 December 2010. As can be seen from the second column, the 
arrival rate of uninformed traders remains high all day, as shown by the fact that the 
majority of 𝜀 equal 1, and all are above 0.9. Informed traders normally arrive at a high 
rate, but this drops dramatically around lunch time, which is from 12:00 to 13:00. 
During trading hours, information is most likely to arrive thirty minutes after the 
market opens (10:00-10:30), at lunch time (12:00-13:00) and in the half hour before 
the end of trading hours (16:30-17:00). Figure 4.2 shows the intraday pattern of PIN 
between 9
th
 December 2009 and 10
th
 December 2010. There are two trading periods 
with higher PIN, which are around half an hour after the market opens (10:00-10:30) 
and half an hour before the market closes (16:30-17:00). During lunch time (12:00-
13:00), although the probability of information event is large, the arrival rate of 
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informed traders is quite low. Therefore, PIN reaches its minimum value of the day 
around lunch time. 
 
Table 4.4 Intraday pattern of parameters and PIN (13/12/2010–13/12/2012) 
Timestamp 𝜀 𝜇 𝛼 𝛿 PIN 
09:30 – 10:00 1 1 0.1975 0.3378 0.0899 
10:00 – 10:30 1 1 0.4117 0.7815 0.1707 
10:30 – 11:00 1 1 0.196 0.0893 0.0893 
11:00 – 11:30 1 1 0.1934 0.093 0.0882 
11:30 – 12:00 1 1 0.2087 0.1268 0.0945 
12:00 – 12:30 1 1.0012 × e−6 0.2685 0.6276 1.3441 × e−7 
12:30 – 13:00 0.9388 0.0028 0.5025 1 0.0007 
13:00 – 13:30 0.9998 0.997 0.2192 0.3515 0.0985 
13:30 – 14:00 1 1 0.2297 0.0942 0.103 
14:00 – 14:30 1 1 0.1928 0.0939 0.0879 
14:30 – 15:00 1 1 0.1886 0.0987 0.0862 
15:00 -15:30 1 1 0.4761 0.3395 0.1923 
15:30 – 16:00 1 1 0.1481 0.2884 0.0689 
16:00 – 16:30 1 1 0.13 0.4266 0.061 
Notes: This table shows the intraday pattern of PIN parameters and the PIN value 
every 30 minutes. 𝜀 is the arrival rate of uninformed traders, 𝜇 is the arrival rate of 
informed traders, 𝛼 is the probability of information event relevant to asset value, 𝛿 
denotes the probability of information event being bad news, PIN is the measurement 
of asymmetric information. 
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Figure 4.3 Intraday pattern of PIN (13/12/2010-13/12/2012) 
 
Table 4.4 presents the estimated parameters and PIN for each trading period from 13
th
 
December 2010 to 12
th
 December 2012. Similar to the first sub-period, the arrival rate 
of uninformed traders remains high all day. Informed traders arrive at a high rate 
during regular trading hours but are almost absent during lunch time (12:00-13:00). 
There is a higher probability of information event happening during the second half 
hour of trading (10:00-10:30), the second half hour of lunch time (12:30-13:00) and 
one hour before the market closes (15:00-15:30). A similar intraday pattern of PIN is 
illustrated in Figure 4.3. PIN reaches one of its peak values from 10:00 to 10:30 and 
drops to its valley bottom around lunch time (12:00-13:00). The second peak is 
between 15:00 and 15:30, one hour before the end of trading hours. 
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As can be seen above, although trading hours differ between the two sub-samples, 
asymmetric information exhibits similar intraday patterns. There is a high probability 
of information being revealed half an hour after the market opens and thus we see a 
higher PIN. During lunch time, informed traders are probably absent from the market 
and PIN reaches its minimum value. In line with the fact that the trading day in this 
sub-period has been cut short by one hour, the higher probability of information 
arrival and higher PIN move one and a half hours ahead of the time in the previous 
sub-period, from 16:30-17:00 to 15:00-15:30. 
Our result is consistent with the finding of Chung, Li, and McInish (2005) that the 
arrival rate of uninformed tradersε stays at a high level, which is around 1 in our data 
and 0.8822 on average in their sample of 538 NYSE stocks with 30-minute interval. 
Compared to the stock market, the participation of uninformed traders in the foreign 
exchange market is enhanced, because liquidity is both quote-driven and order-driven. 
According to Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara (1997), the estimated parameters of PIN vary 
largely depending on different stocks. Similarly, it is possible to find the estimated 
parameters varying across different markets. On average, the probability of 
information event happening α is 0.2668, in contrast to 0.4712 as found by Chung, Li, 
and McInish (2005). Besides economic condition and fundamental value, the stock 
market could be impacted by individual events such as merger and acquisition, 
growth of revenue, and change of company strategy.  The frequency of information 
event is normally higher in the stock market than in the foreign exchange market. 
Compared with the average μ in the stock market, which is 0.2984 in the results of 
Chung, Li, and McInish (2005), informed traders arrive at a high level in the Chinese 
foreign exchange market, except at lunch time.  
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Attention should be paid to two features of the Chinese foreign exchange market. One 
is the possibility of central bank intervention. As a market participant, the central 
bank represents the political targets of the government. Therefore, it is a kind of 
informed trader, with policy information. A high arrival rate of central bank activity 
indicates frequent foreign exchange intervention. The other feature is the market 
structure of the Chinese foreign exchange market. Customers, such as import and 
export enterprises, represent an important information resource. They cannot make a 
deal in the interdealer market and must therefore trade with dealers. The customer 
information gradually arrives in the interdealer market when dealers, especially the 
big state-owned banks, trade for customers. Both the central bank and state-owned 
banks will break during lunch time, and at that time the arrival rate of informed 
traders is lowest. 
4.5 Intraday Pattern of Trading Intensity 
One feature of our high frequency data is irregular time-spacing. As has been pointed 
out by Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), Easley and O'Hara (1992), the time between 
two consecutive transactions contains information on the reasons for different types of 
time interval. A seminal model to capture trading duration is the ACD model 
introduced by Engle and Russell (1997, 1998). However, the estimation should be 
performed with certain necessary constraints, in order to keep all the possible 
conditional durations positive. More importantly, the standard ACD model overreacts 
to extreme (very short or very long) trading duration, which suggests that a nonlinear 
formation of ACD model will be more appropriate. Therefore, this section adopts one 
extension of the ACD model, namely the Box-Cox ACD model, to study two 
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components of trading duration: the expected component and the unexpected 
component. 
4.5.1 The Box-Cox ACD model 
The Box-Cox ACD model is one of the extensions of the ACD model introduced by 
Dufour and Engle (2000a). The main assumption of the Box-Cox ACD model is that 
trading duration is determined by the expected and standardized durations: 
 𝑥𝑖 = 𝜓𝑖𝑒𝑖 (4.8) 
where subscript 𝑖 is a sequence of variable. The standardized duration 𝑒𝑖 follows an 
independent and identical distribution, with 𝐸(𝑒𝑖) = 1 . Furthermore, expected 
duration is conditional on past standardized duration and expected duration. The 
conditional mean function in the Box-Cox model is the nonlinear formation: 
 𝑙𝑛 𝜓𝑖 = 𝜔 +∑𝜃𝑗𝜀𝑖−𝑗
𝛽
𝑝
𝑗=1
+∑𝜑𝑗 𝑙𝑛 𝜓𝑖−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1
 (4.9) 
The conditional mean function in equation (4.9) shows a formation similar to that of 
the class of GARCH models. So the econometrical model is specified accordingly. 
But while GARCH models usually describe volatility clustering, the Box-Cox model 
will capture clusters of trading duration. 
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4.5.2 Estimation results 
As pointed out above, trading hours in the Chinese market changed on 13
th
 December 
2010, which falls within our data sample period. In order to discover the intraday 
pattern of trading intensity accurately, this section similarly divides the data into two 
sub-periods.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Average trading durations in a day for two sub-periods 
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Figure 4.4 depicts the intraday average trading durations in the two sub-periods. 
Consistent with the literature (Taylor 2004, Yang 2011), trading intensity in both sub-
periods shows a distinctive inverted U-shaped intraday pattern. Trading duration is 
short at the beginning and end periods of trading hours, and much longer around 
lunch time. In order to eliminate the time-of-day effect (Dufour and Engle 2000b, Sita 
and Westerholm 2011), we use a cubic smoothing spline model to simulate the 
intraday periodic component. One hundred spline nodes are chosen to improve the 
fitting accuracy, and only unique nodes are adopted, for reasons of stability. The 
polynomial spline is estimated with penalized least-square and fitted to a rounding 
solution with unique nodes determined by the efficient algorithm introduced by 
Helwig (2013). After dividing original trading duration by the periodic component, 
we obtain diurnally adjusted trading duration 𝑥?̃?, with its mean equalling one. 
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Figure 4.5 Periodic component of trading durations in a day for two sub-periods 
 
The estimated results of the cubic smoothing spline model are presented in Figure 4.5. 
The dotted line shows the average trading duration, while the solid line denotes the 
estimated periodic component of trading duration. In both sub-periods, polynomial 
spline captures the feature that trading is more frequent at the beginning of market 
hours and around the end of the trading day, but much more infrequent around lunch 
time. 
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Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics of trading duration 
 
09/12/2009-10/12/2010 13/12/2010-13/12/2012 
 𝑥𝑖 𝑥?̃? 𝑥𝑖 𝑥?̃? 
Observations 43825 43825 111896 111896 
Mean 159.4292 0.9999 109.2918 0.9999 
Median 87 0.5414 45 0.702 
Minimum 1 0.0006 1 0.0015 
Maximum 8954 51.0335 15120 161.6635 
Std. Dev. 380.1122 1.422 262.433 1.1408 
Skewness 10.1715 7.2223 15.5181 50.7678 
Kurtosis 142.2389 117.7022 391.9679 6022.548 
Ljung-Box (15 
lags) 
7001*** 13609*** 11603*** 4255.9*** 
Notes: 𝑥𝑖 is trading duration between two transactions and calculated as 𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖−1; 𝑥?̃? 
means diurnally adjusted trading duration, which is derived from 𝑥𝑖  divided by 
intraday periodic component. Ljung-Box (15 lags) is the statistics of Ljung-Box test 
to detect autocorrelation up to 15 lags. The significance levels are displayed as *** 
for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%.  
 
Table 4.5 lists the descriptive statistics of diurnal trading duration and diurnally 
adjusted trading duration respectively in the two sub-periods. After eliminating the 
time-of-day effect, the majority of data statistics decrease compared with those of the 
original data. Standard deviation of trading duration is reduced from 380.1122 to 
1.422 in the first sub-period, and from 262.433 to 1.1408 in the second sub-period. 
The mean of diurnally adjusted trading duration is reduced from 159.4292 in the first 
sub-period, and 109.2918 in the second, to nearly 1. Consistent with Engle and 
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Russell (1997), there is clear excess dispersion for both the original data and adjusted 
data in both sub-periods, as shown by the fact that standard deviations are larger than 
the corresponding means. The last row of Table 4.5 reports the statistics of Ljung-Box 
test with 15 lags. All the data series in both sub-periods show significant 
autocorrelation, as Ljung-Box test is rejected in all cases. 
Over-dispersion in our data implies that the unconditional distribution of trading 
duration is probably not exponential distribution, although this does not mean that 
conditional distribution of trading duration could not be exponential. According to 
Dufour and Engle (2000a), among exponential distributions, i.e. the Weibull 
distribution and Generalized Gamma distribution, Weibull distribution is the most 
appropriate for standardized duration. Furthermore, ACD(1,1) normally performs well 
in capturing the temporal dependence of trading duration (Pacurar 2008). Therefore, 
in this section we adopt the Box-Cox ACD(1,1) model with Weibull distribution (W-
BC-ACD model). We adopt fACD package in R lab to estimate all the parameters in 
equation (4.9). 
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Table 4.6 Estimation results of W-BC-ACD(1,1) model 
Parameters 09/12/2009–10/12/2010 13/12/2010–13/12/2012 
𝜔 
0.0034*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0025*** 
(0.0003) 
𝜃 
0.048*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0528*** 
(0.0015) 
𝛽 
0.8004*** 
(0.0209) 
0.835*** 
(0.014) 
𝜑 
0.9968*** 
(0.0006) 
0.9822*** 
(0.0012) 
𝛾 
1.1089*** 
(0.0038) 
1.4132*** 
(0.0027) 
L-Likelihood -39042.6 -98458.8 
Ljung-Box (1 lag) 0.2808 0.0036 
Ljung-Box (15 lags) 95.422*** 108.07*** 
Notes: 𝜔, 𝜃, 𝛽 and 𝜑 are estimated parameters of equation (4.9).  The figure shown 
below in parentheses is the standard error. 𝛾  is the shape parameter of Weibull 
distribution. Ljung-Box (1 lag) is the statistics of Ljung-Box test to detect 
autocorrelation of standardized duration with 1 lag. Ljung-Box (15 lags) is Ljung-Box 
test up to 15 lags. The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and 
* for 10%.  
 
After regressing the W-BC-ACD(1,1) model on diurnally adjusted trading duration in 
the two sub-periods, the estimation results are shown in Table 4.6. Our model 
captures trading duration clustering quite well, as shown by the fact that all the 
coefficients are highly significant for both sub-periods. It is proved to be more 
appropriate in removing temporal dependence of trading duration than the standard 
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ACD model, as β is significant at 1% level. Both θ and φ are positively significant. 
Therefore, a longer (shorter) trading duration would be expected after a longer 
(shorter) time interval of no transaction. High persistence of trading duration is 
detected for both sub-periods: estimated values of φ are 0.9968 from 9th December 
2009 to 10th December 2010, and 0.9822 from 13th December 2010 to 13th 
December 2012. Both are a whisker away from 1. Because the absolute values of φ in 
both sub-periods are smaller than 1, conditional mean of our estimated model is 
stationary. In both sub-periods, the shape parameters of Weibull distribution γ are 
significant and larger than 1. Hazard function for Weibull distribution is 
monotonically increasing, but not the flat conditional hazard function implied by 
exponential distribution. In other words, the probability of transaction arrival is 
increased after a long time interval of no trade. As can be found in Table 4.6, 
estimated parameters of the W-BC-ACD(1,1) model in the two sub-periods are quite 
similar. This provides some evidence that the feature of trading duration clustering 
probably does not suffer from dramatic change after the reduction of trading hours. 
The last two rows present the results of the Ljung-Box test of standardized duration 
with 1 lag and 15 lags, respectively. Autocorrelation of standardized duration in both 
sub-periods disappears with only 1 lag. In addition, the statistics of Ljung-Box test up 
to 15 lags for diurnally adjusted trading duration are dramatically reduced, from 
13609 and 4255.9 to 95.422 and 108.07. However, both are still rejected by the 
Ljung-Box test and autocorrelation could still exist. The standard deviation has been 
reduced from 1.422 to 1.0667 for the first sub-period and from 1.1408 to 0.8924 for 
the second sub-period. The extent of excess dispersion is reduced, and even becomes 
under dispersion in the second sub-period. The W-BC-ACD(1,1) model proves to be 
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able to significantly reduce temporal dependence of trading duration, although it does 
not remove it completely. 
4.6 Information Content of Trading Duration 
The information content of trading duration has attracted extensive attention in the 
literature. Its relation with information-based trading is commonly confirmed by the 
evidence that higher price change is found to be associated with short trading duration 
(Dufour and Engle 2000b, Yang 2011). Other studies divide the trading duration into 
temporal component and innovation component, arguing that the temporal component 
of trading duration captures the liquidity effect, whereas the innovation component 
represents the dynamic behaviour of informed traders (Sita 2010, Sita and 
Westerholm 2011, Bowe, Hyde, and McFarlane 2013). This section aims to study 
empirically the relation between information-based trading and trading duration. 
If the PIN model is a good measure of information asymmetry and if trading duration 
does contain information, there should be a relation that can be detected in our data. 
As discussed above with regard to the trading process of the PIN model, information-
based trading is relevant to two components: the probability of information arriving 𝛼, 
and arrival rate of informed traders 𝜇. Intuitively, the next questions will be which of 
these is relevant to trading duration, and to which part of trading duration: the 
expected component or the unexpected component? In order to answer our questions, 
this section will regress different models among PIN, the probability of information 
occurring, the arrival rate of informed traders, expected trading duration, standardized 
trading duration and exchange rate returns. We average all the ultra-high frequency 
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variables on every transaction within every 30 minutes to match the frequency of the 
PIN model. 
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Table 4.7 Information content of trading duration (09/12/2009–10/12/2010) 
Panel 
A 
PIN 𝜇 𝛼 𝛥𝑃𝑖(10
4) 
OLS Ridge OLS Ridge OLS Ridge OLS Ridge 
Consta
nt 
1.2407* 
(0.6783) 
0.8085 
8.7816* 
(4.3366) 
7.3178 
-1.2439 
(2.0682) 
-0.0861 
-0.518 
(0.401) 
-0.5922 
𝜓𝑖 
-0.5255 
(0.4423) 
-0.3177 
(0.2502) 
-3.2483 
(2.5955) 
-2.5663* 
(1.3235) 
0.255 
(1.3158) 
-0.066 
(0.33) 
-6.13 
(5.65) 
0.651** 
(0.2698) 
𝑒𝑖 
-0.6171** 
(0.2693) 
-0.3947 
(0.2493) 
-4.6206** 
(1.9929) 
-3.8458*** 
(1.3193) 
1.2542 
(0.8482) 
0.4253 
(0.3297) 
7.86 
(5.78) 
1.029*** 
(0.2671) 
𝑅2 0.0693  0.3083  -0.0327  0.4732  
CVD 5.6 × e−5  1.9 × e−5  6.6 × e−5  0.0008  
Panel 
B 
𝜓𝑖 𝜓𝑖 𝑒𝑖 𝑒𝑖 𝛥𝑃𝑖(10
4) 𝛥𝑃𝑖(10
4) 
OLS OLS Ridge OLS OLS Ridge OLS OLS Ridge 
Const
ant 
1.01*** 
(0.017) 
1.0566*** 
(0.0471) 
-0.9986 
1.0294*** 
(0.0255) 
1.0582*** 
(0.0464) 
1.039 
-0.819 
(0.775) 
-0.0891 
(0.357) 
-0.2936 
PIN 
-0.1239 
(0.1956) 
  
-0.2079 
(0.2042) 
  
6.74* 
(3.52) 
  
𝜇  
-0.0433 
(0.0466) 
-0.00005 
(0.00009) 
 
-0.0637 
(0.049) 
-0.0436* 
(0.0259) 
 
-0.368 
(0.937) 
0.0292 
(0.4867) 
𝛼  
-0.0736 
(0.0676) 
-0.00008 
(0.0002) 
 
0.0269 
(0.0375) 
0.033 
(0.0471) 
 
6.87 
(4.31) 
5.108*** 
(1.5081) 
𝑅2 -0.0436 -0.0769  0.0065 0.0992  0.0202 0.4517  
CVD  0.0165   0.0075   0.0028  
Notes: 𝛥𝑃𝑖 is the average log return of every transaction within every 30-minute period. 𝜓𝑖 denotes the 
average expected duration of every transaction within every 30-minute period. 𝑒𝑖 means the average 
standardized duration of every transaction within every 30-minute period. 𝑅2 is adjusted R square. 
CVD is the smallest condition number of covariance matrix from coefficient variance decomposition to 
detect potential collinearity. The variables in the first row of each panel are dependent variables. The 
variables in the first column are explanatory variables. In the equation of 𝛥𝑃𝑖 as dependent variable, all 
the independent variables are times -1 if 𝛥𝑃𝑖 is negative in order to measure quantity impact of 
independent variables without regarding exchange rate appreciation or depreciation. All the 
coefficients and standard deviations in equation 𝛥𝑃𝑖 are times 10
4 for convenience of reading. Models 
are estimated by OLS with HAC robust errors and Ridge regression with normal distribution. The 
figures in parentheses are standard errors. The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 
5%, and * for 10%. 
118 
 
 
Table 4.7 shows synthetically the estimation results of our model from 9
th
 December 
2009 to 10
th
 December 2010. The first row in panel A and panel B represents 
dependent variables of the estimated model, and the first column contains independent 
variables. All the models with two or more independent variables are estimated by 
two methods: OLS with heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) 
robust errors, and Ridge regression with normal distribution and the optimal ridge 
parameter determined by the method of Cule and De Iorio (2012) in order to deal with 
the problem of collinearity. The last row of panel A and panel B lists the smallest 
condition number of covariance matrix from variance decomposition, which is a 
collinearity test based on the results of OLS with HAC robust errors. Expected trading 
duration 𝜓𝑖  is said to be potentially collinear with standardized trading duration 𝜀𝑖 , 
because the smallest condition numbers for the four models in panel A are all below 
0.001. 
The second and third columns in panel A of Table 4.7 report the estimated results of 
PIN regressing on expected trading duration and standardized trading duration. The 
unexpected component of trading duration is found to negatively and significantly 
influence the probability of information-based trading. The shorter the unexpected 
trading duration is, the higher the PIN is. The coefficient of standardized trading 
duration becomes insignificant in Ridge regression of the same model. 
When we regress the arrival rate of informed traders 𝜇 on the two components of 
trading duration, standardized trading duration is negatively significant in both OLS 
and Ridge regression. In other words, if the unexpected component of trading duration 
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decreases, the arrival rate of informed traders increases. Informed traders prefer a 
liquid market and short expected trading duration is associated with the high arrival 
rate of informed traders. However, the evidence is weak, since expected trading 
duration is only weakly significant in Ridge regression. In contrast, for both 
components of trading duration there is no evidence that they impact on the 
probability of information occurring 𝛼, and coefficients are insignificant in both OLS 
and Ridge regression. The estimated model is inappropriate and 𝑅2  is negative. 
Intuitively, this is consistent with the assumption of the PIN model that the 
probability of information happening is determined by nature, and not influenced by 
trading intensity. 
The last two columns of panel A present a first picture on price impacts of trading 
duration. The log exchange rate returns can be positive or negative. The sign only 
represents depreciation or appreciation of the exchange rate. We assume that informed 
traders will trade once price-relevant information occurs, and trading duration impacts 
only on the quantity of exchange rate returns, but not the sign. Therefore, all the 
explanatory variables are times the sign of exchange rate returns. Estimated results of 
OLS with HAC robust errors have obvious collinearity because all the coefficients are 
insignificant and 𝑅2 is large. The ridge parameter cannot be determined automatically. 
Therefore, we adopt one principal component to determine the ridge parameter, using 
the same algorithm as in the method of Cule and De Iorio (2012). On average, both 
longer expected trading duration and unexpected trading duration are associated with 
a larger exchange rate change. The results are left for comparison purposes only, and 
further research with ultra-high frequency data will be conducted in the next section. 
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Panel B of Table 4.7 lists the estimated influence of PIN, 𝜇 and 𝛼 on expected trading 
duration, standardized trading duration and log exchange rate return. Collinearity 
between the arrival rate of informed traders and the probability of information 
occurring has not been significantly detected in the first four models. However, they 
perform poorly between 9
th
 December 2009 and 10
th
 December 2010. 𝑅2 is quite low 
or negative, and all the coefficients are insignificant, with the exception that the 
arrival rate of informed traders is negatively weak significant in explaining the 
unexpected component of trading duration by Ridge regression. In the last two models 
of panel B, all the independent variables are again times the sign of exchange rate 
returns. Although the smallest condition number of the last model is larger than 0.001, 
there is clear evidence that signed arrival rate of informed traders and signed 
probability of information occurring have collinearity, as both coefficients are 
insignificant and  𝑅2  is large. There is weak evidence that larger exchange rate 
changes are associated with higher PIN, which is mainly determined by the 
probability of information arrival. 
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Table 4.8 Information content of trading duration (13/12/2010–13/12/2012) 
Panel A 
PIN 𝜇 𝛼 𝛥𝑃𝑖(10
4) 
OLS Ridge OLS Ridge OLS Ridge OLS Ridge 
Constant 
-0.9742 
(1.951) 
-0.0191 
-2.5564 
(14.0581) 
0.3555 
-2.053 
(6.1618) 
-0.2015 
0.27 
(0.273) 
0.263 
𝜓𝑖 
1.1301 
(0.8953) 
0.503 
(0.364) 
8.6024 
(5.6037) 
6.3673 
(3.8872) 
-0.3092 
(2.5676) 
-0.5923 
(0.707) 
1.64 
(7.84) 
0.608*** 
(0.1257) 
𝑒𝑖 
-0.0778 
(1.2709) 
-0.4023 
(0.47) 
-5.2877 
(10.6199) 
-5.9488 
(5.0159) 
2.6326 
(3.8316) 
1.0586 
(0.913) 
-0.392 
(7.88) 
0.6054*** 
(0.1274) 
𝑅2 0.0008  0.2117  -0.0522  0.6113  
CVD 5.1 × e−6  1.2 × e−6  2.7 × e−6  6 × e−5  
Panel B 
𝜓𝑖 𝜓𝑖 𝑒𝑖 𝑒𝑖 𝛥𝑃𝑖(10
4) 𝛥𝑃𝑖(10
4) 
OLS OLS Ridge OLS OLS Ridge OLS OLS Ridge 
Constant 
0.9969*** 
(0.0097) 
0.9869*** 
(0.0092) 
0.9951 
1.0024*** 
(0.0077) 
1.0069*** 
(0.006) 
1.0025 
0.233 
(0.297) 
0.174 
(0.302) 
0.2022 
PIN 
0.1309* 
(0.0627) 
  
-0.0846 
(0.0503) 
  
11.69*** 
(2.17) 
  
𝜇  
0.0262*** 
(0.0075) 
0.0187** 
(0.0086) 
 
-0.0175*** 
(0.005) 
-0.0129* 
(0.0068) 
 
1.13*** 
(0.216) 
0.9861*** 
(0.343) 
𝛼  
-0.0039 
(0.0235) 
-0.0108 
(0.026) 
 
0.0121 
(0.0152) 
0.0139 
(0.0207) 
 
0.961 
(0.848) 
1.282 
(1.1972) 
𝑅2 0.0839 0.1977  0.0331 0.1575  0.5572 0.6293  
CVD  0.0012   0.0035   0.033  
Notes: 𝛥𝑃𝑖 is the average log return of every transaction within every 30-minute period. 𝜓𝑖  denotes the 
average expected duration of every transaction within every 30-minute period. 𝑒𝑖 means the average 
standardized duration of every transaction within every 30-minute period. 𝑅2 is adjusted R square. 
CVD is the smallest condition number of covariance matrix from coefficient variance decomposition to 
detect potential collinearity. The variables in the first row of each panel are dependent variables. The 
variables in the first column are explanatory variables. In the equation of 𝛥𝑃𝑖 as dependent variable, all 
the independent variables are times -1 if 𝛥𝑃𝑖 is negative, in order to measure quantity impact of 
independent variables without regarding exchange rate appreciation or depreciation. All the 
coefficients and standard deviations in equation 𝛥𝑃𝑖 are times 10
4 for convenience of reading. Models 
are estimated by OLS with HAC robust errors and Ridge regression with normal distribution. The 
figures in parentheses are the standard errors. The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** 
for 5%, and * for 10%. 
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The same models are conducted with data from 13
th
 December 2010 to 13
th
 December 
2012, and estimated results are shown in Table 4.8. The smallest condition numbers 
for the four models in panel A are all less than 0.001. Similar to the results for the first 
sub-period, unexpected trading duration and standardized trading duration are again 
detected to have potential collinearity. The ridge parameter of the four models cannot 
be determined automatically, and once again, we adopt one principal component to 
determine ridge parameter. Neither OLS with HAC robust errors nor Ridge regression 
to deal with collinearity is able to provide supporting evidence on the performance of 
our estimated models, except for the last model estimated by Ridge regression. 
Consistent with the results in the first sub-period, both signed expected trading 
duration and signed unexpected trading duration are found to positively and 
significantly impact on the exchange rate change. 
In panel B, we first discover the impact of PIN on the two components of trading 
duration. PIN is found to positively influence the expected component of trading 
duration, but the impact is weak. Then, we study more specific information content 
and regress expected trading duration and standardized trading duration respectively 
on two elements of information content of PIN, namely the arrival rate of informed 
traders 𝜇  and the probability of information occurring 𝛼 . Again, there is no clear 
evidence to prove that 𝜇 and 𝛼 have collinearity. The arrival rate of informed traders 
but not the probability of information happening has significant impact on both 
expected component and unexpected component of trading duration. When there are 
more informed traders, expected trading duration tends to be longer. A high arrival 
rate of informed traders makes transactions more risky to liquidity traders, because of 
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asymmetric information. In this situation liquidity providers tend to be expelled from 
the market and market liquidity becomes inactive, leading to the decrease of expected 
trading intensity. Conversely, a higher arrival rate of informed traders is associated 
with shorter unexpected trading duration. In the last model with Ridge regression, the 
ridge parameter cannot be determined automatically, and again we adopt one principal 
component for estimation. Consistent with the results in the first sub-period, on 
average, with higher PIN there is larger exchange rate change. However, this is 
mainly determined by the arrival rate of informed traders, and not the probability of 
information arriving. 
This section provides some empirical evidence on the information content of trading 
duration. Attention should be paid to the drawbacks of the PIN model. First, the 
calculation of PIN varies among different studies in the literature (Chung, Li, and 
McInish 2005), and further discussion is needed as to which measure is better. Second, 
the information content of trading duration is tested on the average value of every 
transaction within every 30-minute period in a day, including exchange rate returns, 
expected component and unexpected component of trading duration. This might 
eliminate some information contained in our high frequency data and conceal the 
significant relation between trading duration and information-based trading. 
Furthermore, the model assumes constant probability of information happening, 
constant probability of good news and bad news, and the constant arrival rate of 
informed traders and uninformed traders within the estimation period. Finally, a large 
data sample is required to ensure the estimated parameters are sufficiently accurate. 
Therefore, further research is needed to develop a new model or an improved PIN 
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model (Easley et al. 2008) in order to measure asymmetric information in high 
frequency data. 
4.7 Price Impact of Trading Duration 
In their seminal work on the microstructure of the foreign exchange market, aimed at 
discovering the connection between daily exchange rate returns and daily order flow, 
(Evans and Lyons 2002) find that order flow explains a large proportion of exchange 
rate changes. However, ignoring the timing of transactions might lead to loss of 
information. This section aims to discover the price impact of order flow and trading 
duration with ultra-high frequency data. 
4.7.1 The estimated model 
A basic order flow model describes only the relationship between exchange rate 
returns, order flow and interest rate differential. The econometrical formula is: 
 ∆𝑃𝑖 = 𝑐 + 𝜌1𝑂𝐹𝑖 + 𝜌2𝐼𝑅𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (4.10) 
where, 𝑂𝐹𝑖 is order flow, and 𝐼𝑅𝑖 is interest rate differential. Inspired by Dufour and 
Engle (2000b), Sita and Westerholm (2011), Bowe, Hyde, and McFarlane (2013), we 
introduce two explanatory variables into our estimated model: signed expected trading 
duration of order flow (𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑂𝐹𝑖)𝜓𝑖) and signed unexpected trading duration of order 
flow (𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑂𝐹𝑖)𝑒𝑖). The highest frequency of the interest rate is daily, which cannot 
satisfy the high frequency of other data. Therefore, it is removed from our model. The 
specification of the final model then is: 
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 ∆𝑃𝑖 = 𝑐 + 𝜌1𝑂𝐹𝑖 + 𝜌2𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑂𝐹𝑖)𝜓𝑖 + 𝜌3𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑂𝐹𝑖)𝑒𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (4.11) 
where, 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑂𝐹𝑖) is valued as +1 if 𝑂𝐹𝑖 is buyer-initiated and as -1 if 𝑂𝐹𝑖 is seller-
initiated. It will become 0 if 𝑂𝐹𝑖 is 0. We adopt signed trading duration of order flow 
because it reflects both direction and duration of transactions. Our model is slightly 
different from the models adopted by Bowe, Hyde, and McFarlane (2013), Sita and 
Westerholm (2011), which try to capture bid-ask spread or price impact on the 
components of trading cost such as order handling cost and adverse selection cost. In 
contrast, our model focuses on the transaction price determinants extended from the 
order flow model. Furthermore, in the discussion above there is some evidence that 
unexpected component of trading duration but not innovation of trading intensity is 
relevant to the arrival rate of informed traders. Signed trading duration reflects the 
timing of transaction and probably contains information on foreign exchange 
transactions. Therefore, this section examines signed unexpected trading duration of 
order flow, but not signed innovation of trading intensity. 
4.7.2 A simple OLS estimation 
For a first picture of the price impact of trading duration, we estimate a simple linear 
model by OLS with HAC robust errors. Models (1) and (3) are benchmark models 
containing order flow as the only independent variable. The model specification for 
the respective periods is: 
 ∆𝑃𝑖 = 𝑐 + 𝜌1𝑂𝐹𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (4.12) 
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where c is constant and  OFi is order flow. Models (2) and (4) are extended models 
and their specification across the sub-sample periods is equation (4.11). The 
estimation results are shown in Table 4.9.  
 
Table 4.9 OLS estimation results of price impact 
Parameters 09/12/2009–10/12/2010 13/12/2010–13/12/2012 
 (1) (2) (3) 4) 
𝑐(104) 
5.19*** 
(0.306) 
5.72*** 
(0.316) 
3.58*** 
(0.232) 
3.59*** 
(0.234) 
𝑂𝐹𝑖(10
4) 
37.16*** 
(0.795) 
52.91*** 
(1.64) 
48.29*** 
(0.63) 
43.99*** 
(6.16) 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑂𝐹𝑖)𝜓𝑖(10
4)  
-19.13*** 
(1.1) 
 
3.26 
(6.24) 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑂𝐹𝑖)𝑒𝑖(10
4)  
2.98*** 
(0.452) 
 
1.03*** 
(0.38) 
𝑅2 0.1229 0.1321 0.132 0.1321 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the standard errors. 𝑅2 is adjusted R square. All the 
coefficients and standard deviations are times 104 for convenience of reading. The 
significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%.  
 
Order flow is positively significant at 1% level in both sub-periods. One unit of 
buyer-initiated transaction will increase exchange rate returns by 0.0053% from 9
th
 
December 2009 to 10
th
 December 2010, and by 0.0044% from 13
th
 December 2010 to 
13
th
 December 2012. The coefficient on signed expected trading duration is 
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negatively significant from 9
th
 December 2009 to 10
th
 December 2010 and 
insignificant from 13
th
 December 2010 to 13
th
 December 2012. In other words, 
exchange rate changes are smaller when expected trading duration is longer. There are 
two plausible explanations for this result. First, recalling the finding in the above 
section, informed traders prefer a liquid market, where it is easier for them to make 
profits based on private information. An inactive market with fewer informed traders 
thus leads to smaller exchange rate changes. Second, as has been argued by 
Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997), Sita and Westerholm (2011), Yang 
(2011), informed traders will split large trades into small orders for easier execution. 
Because 𝜓𝑖  captures the expected component of duration clustering, it is related to 
both the persistence of liquidity traders and continuous trading of existing informed 
traders. Therefore, shorter expected trading duration probably implies higher activity 
of existing informed traders, thus leading to larger exchange rate changes. 
The signed unexpected trading duration of order flow is positively significant at 1% 
level in both sub-periods. This is the same as the result in the above section, that 
longer unexpected trading duration is associated with larger exchange rate changes. 
This seems to conflict with the finding that longer unexpected trading duration is 
associated with a lower arrival rate of informed traders and thus leads to a smaller 
exchange rate change. Attention should be paid to the structure of the Chinese foreign 
exchange market. The interdealer foreign exchange market in China adopts a 
membership system, so that unlike the stock market, only a limited number of 
members are able to participate. Therefore, the number of informed traders in the 
foreign exchange market is much smaller than in the stock market, leading to a weak 
rate of increase of informed traders. According to Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), in 
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addition to informed traders, discretionary uninformed traders will choose the time to 
trade in order to minimize adverse selection cost. The unexpected component of 
trading duration should capture the rate of growth in the number of both uninformed 
traders and informed traders. When there are more informed traders arriving, 
unexpected trading duration should be shorter. However, the higher arrival rate of 
informed traders will reduce trading activities of discretionary uninformed traders. 
Unexpected trading duration will thus increase. Both the higher arrival rate of 
informed traders and inactive trading of discretionary uninformed traders increase the 
proportion of informed traders in the market. Our results show that absence of 
discretionary uninformed traders dominates the unexpected component of trading 
duration in both sub-periods. A longer signed unexpected trading duration of order 
flow is associated with a greater proportion of informed traders, leading to larger 
exchange rate changes. The estimated results in both sub-periods are quite similar, 
and our model explains 13.21% of exchange rate returns in ultra-high frequency data. 
Consideration of trading duration improves the explanatory power of the model by 
0.92% in the first sub-period and 0.01% in the second sub-period. The small 
improvement in the second sub-period is probably due to the insignificance of signed 
expected trading duration, which might be because information is lost due to the 
linear framework of OLS estimation. 
4.7.3 A Markov regime-switching estimation 
The simple OLS estimation results have provided a general picture on the price 
impact of order flow and signed trading duration. However, it is possible that the 
information content of trading duration varies with market conditions. This section 
adopts a well-known nonlinear model, the Markov regime-switching model, to 
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investigate the relationship between exchange rate returns, order flow and signed 
trading duration of order flow in different regimes. 
We adopt a two regimes Markov switching model for estimation of equation (4.11). 
Both expected component and unexpected component of trading duration are 
introduced into the determinant of time-varying regime transition probability. Figure 
4.6 illustrates exchange rate returns from 9
th
 December 2009 to 10
th
 December 2010, 
with regime 1 highlighted by grey bars.  
 
Figure 4.6 Exchange rate returns in regime 1 (09/12/2009-10/12/2010) 
 
From the figure, it is clear that regime 1 is detected as having larger exchange rate 
change. Exchange rate return in regime 1 reaches an average of 0.00057%, which is 
4.07 times that in regime 2.  In regime 1, exchange rate return ranges from -0.2962% 
to 0.3006%. In contrast, in regime 2 the range is only -0.0118% to 0.0106%. Figure 
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4.7 illustrates exchange rate returns from 13
th
 December 2010 to 13
th
 December 2012, 
with regime 2 highlighted by grey bars.  
 
Figure 4.7 Exchange rate returns in regime 2 (13/12/2010-13/12/2012) 
 
The average of exchange rate returns in regime 2 is 0.00031%, which is 11.07 times 
that in regime 1. In regime 2, exchange rate returns range from -0.5363% to 0.5424%. 
In contrast, the range in regime 1 is only -0.0167% to 0.0169%. Figure 4.7 seems to 
have a very high level of regime persistence because it needs to present much more 
data than Figure 4.6 within the same size of picture. In fact, 6989 out of 43825 
observations in the first period are LH regime, which is 15.95%. In the second period, 
13287 out of 111896 observations are LH regime, and the proportion is 11.87%. The 
second period has a lower proportion of LH regime. However, the difference is not 
large. 
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Estimation results of the two regimes Markov switching model are shown in Table 
4.10. From 9
th
 December 2009 to 10
th
 December 2010, regime 1 is more volatile than 
regime 2, as shown by the fact that standard deviation of regime 1 is larger than that 
of regime 2. Conversely, from 13
th
 December 2010 to 13
th
 December 2012, regime 2 
has higher volatility than regime 1. Therefore, the Markov regime-switching model 
detects two kinds of regime in our data: large exchange rate changes with high 
volatility (LH regime) and small exchange rate changes with low volatility (SL 
regime). 
Estimated coefficients of equation (4.11) in both sub-periods exhibit similar results. 
All the coefficients are significant at 1% level, except for the signed unexpected 
trading duration of order flow in the LH regime from 13
th
 December 2010 to 13
th
 
December 2012.  
In the first sub-period, order flow is found to be positively related to exchange rate 
returns in both regimes. Consistent with findings by Wu (2012), Duffuor, Marsh, and 
Phylaktis (2012), order flow is much more informative in the LH regime, which is 
associated with lower market liquidity, and one unit of buyer-initiated transaction will 
increase exchange rate returns by 0.0046%. This is 0.0021% greater than for the SL 
regime. In the SL regime, the foreign exchange market is placid, and there is little 
evidence to suggest that informed traders are active there. If price-relevant 
information occurs, informed traders prefer getting into the market when it is full of 
liquidity. In addition, shorter expected trading duration may be associated with higher 
activity of existing informed traders, and thus greater exchange rate changes. This is 
consistent with the findings from OLS estimation.  
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In the LH regime, the price impact of signed expected trading duration is opposite to 
that in the SL regime. Both large exchange changes and high volatility show that 
informed traders are active in the market. Recall the findings above that the high 
arrival rate of informed traders makes transactions riskier to liquidity traders, because 
they suffer asymmetric information. This will expel the existing liquidity traders and 
make them inactive. Longer signed expected trading duration of order flow is 
associated with a higher proportion of informed traders, leading to greater exchange 
rate changes.  
Consistent with the findings from OLS estimation, changes of discretionary 
uninformed traders’ trading intensity dominates the unexpected component of trading 
duration in both regimes. A new finding is that reduction of discretionary uninformed 
traders’ trading intensity is larger in the LH regime, as shown by the fact that 
coefficient on signed unexpected trading duration is greater than that in the SL regime. 
P11 means the probability of staying in Regime 1 if the previous one is also Regime 1. 
As can be seen from the estimation results of time-varying regime transition 
probability between 9
th
 December 2009 and 10
th
 December 2010, both the expected 
and the unexpected components of trading duration positively influence the 
probability of the market remaining in Regime 1; in other words, the LH regime. 
According to the theory of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), uninformed traders will 
choose the time to trade in order to minimize adverse selection cost. When the foreign 
exchange market is already in the LH regime, long expected trading duration and 
unexpected trading duration imply inactivity of existing liquidity traders and 
discretionary uninformed traders and therefore high proportion of informed traders. 
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This increases the probability of the foreign exchange market remaining in the LH 
regime. 
When the foreign exchange market is in the SL regime, if expected trading duration is 
long and market liquidity is inactive, the market will be less favoured by informed 
traders. Furthermore, long expected trading duration implies a low probability of 
continuous trading by existing informed traders. Therefore, the probability of 
transition from SL regime to LH regime decreases.  
On average, both regimes are highly persistent. There is high probability of the 
market trading remaining in the original regime: 0.8048 for LH and 0.9493 for SL. 
Non-discretionary liquidity traders and discretionary uninformed traders have stronger 
power to dominate the market, and transition probability from LH regime to SL 
regime is 0.1952, which is 3.85 times the probability of transiting from SL regime to 
LH regime. The average of time-varying expected durations for different regimes is 
extremely large, because very few expected durations implied by the transition matrix 
are unrealistically extremely large. If we define expected durations longer than 10000 
as extreme values, the percentages of observations for LH regime and SL regime are 
0.09% and 0.79% respectively. After removing extreme values, the expected 
durations on average for LH regime and SL regime are 16.7672 and 233.7768, 
respectively. The duration of market remaining in the SL regime is much longer than 
that in the LH regime.  
For the period from 13
th
 December 2010 to 13
th
 December 2012, regime 1 is detected 
as a SL regime and regime 2 is a LH regime. Estimation results are quite similar to 
those in the first sub-period. Order flow has greater price impact, and one unit of 
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buyer-initiated transaction leads to 0.0043% of exchange rate changes in the SL 
regime, and 0.0134% in the LH regime. The coefficients on signed trading duration of 
order flow have the same sign as in the first sub-period. For the transition probability, 
when the market is already in a SL regime, long expected trading duration implies 
inactive market liquidity and existing informed traders. It is less attractive to informed 
traders, and the probability of the market remaining in the SL regime increases. 
Conversely, long unexpected trading duration denotes a large proportion of informed 
traders, which thus decreases the probability of the market staying in the SL regime. 
When the market is in a LH regime, inactivity of either existing liquidity traders or 
discretionary uninformed traders will make it harder for the market to become placid 
and the probability of transition from LH regime to SL regime decreases.  
Both regimes are highly state dependent and the probability of the market staying in 
the original regime is high. It is not easy for informed traders to agitate the foreign 
exchange market, since the probability of transition from SL regime to LH regime is 
only 0.0312. In addition, the expected duration of SL regime is longer than that of LH 
regime. All the evidence indicates that the dynamic structure of the market and the 
behaviours of market participants do not exhibit a dramatic change between the two 
sub-periods. 
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Table 4.10 Estimation results of Markov regime-switching model 
Parameters 
09/12/2009–10/12/2010 13/12/2010–13/12/2012 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2 
𝑐(104) 
18.2*** 
(2.69) 
2.12*** 
(0.136) 
2.05*** 
(0.122) 
12.82*** 
(2.61) 
𝑂𝐹𝑖(10
4) 
45.87*** 
(10.14) 
24.99*** 
(0.29) 
42.97*** 
(0.512) 
134.16*** 
(4.31) 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑂𝐹𝑖)𝜓𝑖(10
4) 
84.63*** 
(11.33) 
-4.95*** 
(0.324) 
-11.26*** 
(0.497) 
22.3*** 
(2.58) 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑂𝐹𝑖)𝑒𝑖(10
4) 
10.45*** 
(3.05) 
1.56*** 
(0.112) 
0.807*** 
(0.146) 
0.631 
(2.71) 
log (𝜎) 
-3.8092*** 
(0.0018) 
-6.0301*** 
(0.0035) 
-5.6044*** 
(0.0022) 
-3.4677*** 
(0.0015) 
𝑃11 − 𝑐 
0.0492 
(0.1484) 
1.3632*** 
(0.1335) 
𝑃11 − 𝜓𝑖 
0.7408*** 
(0.1812) 
2.2286*** 
(0.1373) 
𝑃11 − 𝑒𝑖 
0.8106*** 
(0.0756) 
-0.1132*** 
(0.0145) 
𝑃21 − 𝑐 
-0.2916** 
(0.1361) 
-0.871*** 
(0.1101) 
𝑃21 − 𝜓𝑖 
-3.295*** 
(0.1703) 
-0.3484*** 
(0.1033) 
𝑃21 − 𝑒𝑖 
0.000013 
(0.0383) 
-0.1192*** 
(0.0409) 
Expected durations 3343323 801.6473 1.9e+10 9.365 
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(6.5e+08) (26545.15) (4.8e+12) (1384.753) 
Expected durations 
(remove extreme values) 
16.7672 
(164.2147) 
233.7768 
(825.9191) 
40.7792 
(110.79) 
5.0028 
(20.0796) 
Regime 1 
0.8048 
(0.0871) 
0.1952 
(0.0871) 
0.9688 
(0.0115) 
0.0312 
(0.0115) 
Regime 2 
0.0507 
(0.0405) 
0.9493 
(0.0405) 
0.2078 
(0.0175) 
0.7922 
(0.0175) 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the standard errors. All the coefficients and standard 
deviations of explanatory variables are times 104  for convenience of reading. 𝜎  is 
standard deviation in different regimes. 𝑃11 − 𝑐, 𝑃11 − 𝜓𝑖, 𝑃11 − 𝑒𝑖, 𝑃21 − 𝑐, 𝑃21 − 𝜓𝑖 
and 𝑃21 − 𝑒𝑖  are logistic coefficients on regime transition probability of constant, 
expected trading duration and unexpected trading duration. Expected duration shows 
mean and standard deviation of regime duration. Expected durations (excluding 
extreme values) are calculated after we remove the time-varying expected durations 
of regimes longer than 10000. The last two rows present mean and standard deviation 
of time-varying regime transition probability. The significance levels are displayed as 
*** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%.  
 
4.8 Relations between Trading Duration and Volatility 
According to Engle and Russell (1998), conditional instantaneous volatility is related 
to conditional hazard function of trading duration. Recalling that our estimated shape 
parameters of Weibull distribution 𝛾 are positive, conditional instantaneous volatility 
should positively link to expected arrival rate 
1
𝜓𝑖
. As has been discussed above, trading 
duration significantly influences the probability of transition between the LH regime 
and the SL regime. It is probable that it has a significant impact on volatility, as well 
as exchange rate returns. This section will study directly the relationship between 
trading duration and volatility. 
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4.8.1 BC-ACD-EGARCH model 
Following the ACD-GARCH model introduced by Engle (2000), the conditional 
volatility for a transaction is formulated as: 
 𝑉𝑖−1(∆𝑃𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = ℎ𝑖 (4.13) 
Given that volatility is normally measured at a constant time interval, the conditional 
volatility of one unit of time can be defined as: 
 𝑉𝑖−1 (
∆𝑃𝑖
√𝑥𝑖
|𝑥𝑖) = 𝜎𝑖
2 (4.14) 
In order to capture asymmetric impact of trading duration on conditional volatility, we 
adopt the EGARCH model in this section. The final model to measure conditional 
volatility per unit of time is shown as: 
 
∆𝑃𝑖
√𝑥𝑖
= 𝑐 + 𝜌1𝑂𝐹𝑖 + 𝜌2𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑂𝐹𝑖)𝜓𝑖 + 𝜌3𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑂𝐹𝑖)𝑒𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 
(4.15) 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜎𝑖
2) = 𝜔 +∑𝜃𝑗 |
𝜖𝑖−𝑗
𝜎𝑖−𝑗
|
𝑝
𝑗=1
+∑𝛿𝑗
𝜖𝑖−𝑗
𝜎𝑖−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
+∑𝜑𝑗 𝑙𝑛(𝜎𝑖−𝑗
2 )
𝑞
𝑗=1
+ 𝜌4
1
𝜓𝑖
+ 𝜌5
1
𝜀𝑖
 
Conditional volatility per transaction is defined as: 
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 ∆𝑃𝑖 = 𝑐 + 𝜌1𝑂𝐹𝑖 + 𝜌2𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑂𝐹𝑖)𝜓𝑖 + 𝜌3𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑂𝐹𝑖)𝑒𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 
(4.16) 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔(ℎ𝑖) =  𝜔 +∑𝜃𝑗 |
𝜖𝑖−𝑗
𝜎𝑖−𝑗
|
𝑝
𝑗=1
+∑𝛿𝑗
𝜖𝑖−𝑗
𝜎𝑖−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
+∑𝜑𝑗 𝑙𝑛(ℎ𝑖−𝑗)
𝑞
𝑗=1
+ 𝜌4
1
𝜓𝑖
+ 𝜌5
1
𝜀𝑖
 
For comparison, we estimate a benchmark model similar to equations (4.15) and 
(4.16), but the mean equation contains only a constant term, without any other 
explanatory variables. 
4.8.2 Estimation results 
Following Engle (2000), the absolute value of 
∆𝑃𝑖
√𝑥𝑖
 is adjusted by the same simulation 
method of the spline model as used in trading duration, in order to remove time-of-
day effect. In this section, EGARCH(1,1) with one lag of asymmetric impact on 
conditional volatility is estimated. 
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Table 4.11 Estimation results of BC-ACD-EGARCH(1,1) model 
Parameters 
09/12/2009–10/12/2010 13/12/2010–13/12/2012 
𝛥𝑃?̃? 𝛥𝑃𝑖(10
4) 𝛥𝑃?̃? 𝛥𝑃𝑖(10
4) 𝛥𝑃?̃? 𝛥𝑃𝑖(10
4) 𝛥𝑃?̃? 𝛥𝑃𝑖(10
4) 
𝑐 
0.0121*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0904 
(0.0572) 
0.0157*** 
(0.0011) 
0.875*** 
(0.06) 
0.0215*** 
(0.0016) 
1.07*** 
(0.0996) 
-0.0008 
(0.002) 
-0.291** 
(0.121) 
𝜌1 
0.5658*** 
(0.0043) 
16.97*** 
(0.138) 
  
0.9567*** 
(0.0087) 
42.05*** 
(0.405) 
  
𝜌2 
-0.1266*** 
(0.0024) 
-1.07*** 
(0.0623) 
  
-0.3707*** 
(0.0078) 
-13.94*** 
(0.351) 
  
𝜌3 
-0.0704*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0025 
(0.0473) 
  
-0.1116*** 
(0.002) 
0.0663 
(0.11) 
  
𝜔 
-0.0633*** 
(0.0118) 
-1.1689*** 
(0.0894) 
-0.4249*** 
(0.0088) 
-1.6303*** 
(0.0289) 
-0.2462*** 
(0.0067) 
-1.1465*** 
(0.0143) 
-0.2366*** 
(0.0037) 
-1.0039*** 
(0.0095) 
𝜃𝑗 
4.332*** 
(1.0048) 
2.5234 
(1.5369) 
0.3828*** 
(0.006) 
0.3881*** 
(0.0051) 
0.4588*** 
(0.0122) 
0.4204*** 
(0.0062) 
0.2882*** 
(0.0027) 
0.3183*** 
(0.0026) 
𝛿𝑗 
1.6093*** 
(0.3749) 
0.7008 
(0.4274) 
0.0813*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0888*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0029 
(0.0036) 
-0.0085*** 
(0.003) 
-0.0372*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0442*** 
(0.0023) 
𝜑𝑗 
0.9755*** 
(0.0008) 
0.9272*** 
(0.001) 
0.9103*** 
(0.0021) 
0.8906*** 
(0.0021) 
0.9267*** 
(0.0008) 
0.9204*** 
(0.001) 
0.9406*** 
(0.0007) 
0.9308*** 
(0.0007) 
𝜌4 
0.0693*** 
(0.0027) 
0.2884*** 
(0.0046) 
0.1703*** 
(0.0059) 
0.1701*** 
(0.0059) 
0.0711*** 
(0.006) 
0.1113*** 
(0.0071) 
0.0504*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0888*** 
(0.0044) 
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𝜌5 
0.00003 
(0.00009) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0056*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0044*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0007 
(0.0008) 
0.001** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0052*** 
(0.0004) 
Df 
2.0009*** 
(0.0004) 
2.0105*** 
(0.0129) 
3.4325*** 
(0.0502) 
4.2922*** 
(0.0584) 
2.3237*** 
(0.0209) 
2.609*** 
(0.0233) 
3.5769*** 
(0.0326) 
4.0423*** 
(0.0351) 
Ljung-Box 
(5 lags) 
0.0806 0.0284 0.7897 0.02 0.0063 0.1381 0.0017 0.0139 
Ljung-Box 
(15 lags) 
0.1553 0.1003 0.9768 0.043 0.0176 0.3698 0.0053 0.0418 
Notes: 𝑐 , 𝜌1 , 𝜌2 , 𝜌3 , 𝜔 , 𝜃𝑗 , 𝛿𝑗 , 𝜑𝑗 , 𝜌4  and 𝜌5 are the estimated parameters of equations (4.15) and 
(4.16). df is the student distribution statistics. The figures in parentheses are the standard errors. The 
last two rows present the Q-statistics of Ljung-Box test on the squared standardized residuals for 5 lags 
and 15 lags. 𝛥𝑃?̃? is diurnally adjusted exchange rate return per unit of time. All the coefficients and 
standard deviations of explanatory variables in the mean equation of (4.16) are times 104  for 
convenience of reading. The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%.  
Estimation results of equations (4.15) and (4.16) and of the benchmark models are 
presented in Table 4.11. Our model performs well in capturing volatility clustering in 
exchange rate returns per unit of time, and exchange rate returns per transaction. The 
Ljung-Box tests on the squared standardized residuals for both 5 lags and 15 lags are 
insignificant in all estimated models. Student t distribution proves to be a better fit 
than normal distribution and the student distribution statistics are significant at 1% 
level in all estimated models.  
Consistent with our findings above, order flow impacts positively on both exchange 
rate returns per unit of time and exchange rate returns per transaction in both sub-
periods. In addition, longer signed expected trading duration of order flow is 
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associated with smaller exchange rate changes per unit of time and per transaction in 
both sub-periods.  
Conditional volatility exhibits high persistence, as shown in the evidence that 𝜑𝑗 in 
the majority of models is greater than 0.9. News impact is found to be asymmetric and 
the asymmetric terms 𝛿𝑗 are significant at 1% level in the majority of our estimated 
models. Between 9
th
 December 2009 and 10
th
 December 2010, the Chinese foreign 
exchange market seems to react much more violently to news on Chinese RMB 
depreciation than to news on appreciation. Conversely, from 13
th
 December 2010 to 
13
th
 December 2012, conditional volatility is much larger with Chinese RMB 
appreciation than with depreciation.  
Consistent with the theory of Engle and Russell (1998), conditional volatility is 
mainly determined by the expected arrival rate, but not the unexpected arrival rate. In 
all the estimated results of variance equations, the expected arrival rate is significant 
at 1% level and positively related to conditional volatility.  
Furthermore, the coefficient on the expected arrival rate is much larger than that on 
the unexpected arrival rate. In addition to more active trading of existing informed 
traders, a  higher expected arrival rate implies higher market liquidity, which is more 
attractive to informed traders, and thus conditional volatility will increase. The 
probability of the market remaining in the SL regime decreases and the probability of 
transition from SL regime to LH regime increases.  
An interesting result is that signed unexpected trading duration of order flow is 
negatively related to exchange rate returns per unit of time in both sub-periods. Also, 
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the unexpected arrival rate is found to positively impact on conditional volatility per 
unit of time. This seems to conflict with our findings above. However, note that 
exchange rate return per unit of time is calculated as the exchange rate return divided 
by trading duration. It thus naturally has negative correlation with unexpected trading 
duration, and conditional volatility tends to be positively correlated with unexpected 
arrival rate.  
The results of exchange rate returns per transaction are composite effects of trading 
duration and exchange rate returns per unit of time. This is proved by the fact that 
signed unexpected trading duration of order flow and unexpected arrival rate in 
equation (4.16) are no longer significant. Further, between 9
th
 December 2009 and 
10
th
 December 2010, the unexpected arrival rate negatively impacts on conditional 
volatility in the benchmark model. As for the estimation results of the benchmark 
model in the second sub-period, the unexpected arrival rate changes its sign from 
positive for conditional volatility per unit of time to negative for conditional volatility 
per transaction. In other words, a higher unexpected arrival rate implies more 
participation by discretionary uninformed traders and lower proportion of informed 
traders, leading to a decrease of conditional volatility. Both the probability of the 
market remaining in the SL regime and the probability of it transiting from LH regime 
to SL regime increase. 
4.9 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we adopt a PIN model to examine the intraday pattern of informed 
trading in the Chinese foreign exchange market. Information generally arrives half an 
hour after the market opening, during lunch time and half an hour before the end of 
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trading hours. However, informed traders are inactive during lunch time. The 
probability of information-based trading is thus highest around the beginning and 
closing of the business of the day, and lowest during lunch time. This is consistent 
with the time-of-day effect.  
Following Dufour and Engle (2000a), we adopt the W-BC-ACD model to capture the 
clustering of trading duration. This allows us to discover the information content of 
both expected trading duration and unexpected trading duration. Expected trading 
duration shows the persistence of liquidity traders and existing informed traders. 
Unexpected trading duration represents the change of trading activity of discretionary 
uninformed traders and new informed traders. Our estimation outcome provides some 
evidence that both components of trading duration matter to the arrival rate of 
informed traders, but not to the probability of information occurring. 
In addition, we uncover evidence that supports the theory of Engle and Russell (1998). 
Specifically, conditional volatility is positively related to expected arrival rate. 
Furthermore, conditional volatility in the Chinese foreign exchange market is mainly 
determined by the expected arrival rate, but not the unexpected arrival rate. However, 
this research shows that the negative impact of trading duration on exchange rate 
returns per unit of time, and conditional volatility per unit of time, should be carefully 
explained in the ACD-GARCH model introduced by Engle (2000). When the 
dependent variable is the exchange rate returns divided by trading duration, it will 
naturally be negatively related to trading duration. 
Finally, order flow plays an important role in capturing exchange rate dynamics, and 
the price impacts are greater in a LH regime when the market is illiquid than in a SL 
144 
 
regime. We find that, in addition to order flow, both expected component and 
unexpected component of trading duration contain information for the process of 
price discovery, and thus, by including these in the estimation, the explanatory power 
of our model is improved. The two components reflect the trading behaviours behind 
the transactions of uninformed traders and informed traders. The effect of trading 
duration on exchange rate returns is a composite result from the complicate 
behaviours of both uninformed traders and informed traders, and not due simply to 
active informed traders or the absence of uninformed traders.  
In the Chinese foreign exchange market, when the market is placid there is no clue to 
prove the active trading of informed traders. Short expected trading duration implies 
high trading intensity of existing informed traders and plentiful market liquidity, 
which is preferred by informed traders, followed by large exchange rate changes and 
high volatility. Correspondingly, the participation by informed traders is noticeable 
when exchange rate changes are large and volatility is high. Liquidity traders will 
postpone their trading and the expected trading duration will be long. Absence of 
liquidity traders will increase the probability of the market remaining in the LH 
regime. With regard to the unexpected component of trading duration, discretionary 
uninformed traders prefer to leave the market when there are informed traders, and 
long unexpected trading duration implies a high proportion of new informed traders; 
thus exchange rate changes are large and volatility will be high. 
Given that trading duration is related to both exchange rate returns and volatility, 
taking into consideration the effects of trading duration will be helpful for 
understanding the process of price discovery and asset pricing. Furthermore, our 
findings provide advice with regard to the trading strategy of market participants and 
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central bank intervention. Uninformed traders are advised to trade carefully if 
expected trading duration is short and unexpected trading duration is long in a placid 
market. This further implies high trading intensity of existing informed traders and a 
large proportion of new informed traders.  
Our findings also suggest that secret central bank intervention in the foreign exchange 
market is better conducted when the market is liquid, since during these periods it is 
more difficult for the market to discover the intervention, and on average this would 
lead to a larger impact of intervention on the exchange rate and its changes. Given 
that the press usually suspects that the central bank conducts intervention around the 
beginning and end of business hours, it seems that our suggested intervention strategy 
coincides with the practice. When the market expected value of the exchange rate is 
outside the fluctuation band around the CPR, the exchange rate exhibits large changes 
and stays around the edges of the fluctuation band. Before the exchange rate reaches 
its market expected value, liquidity traders reduce their trading activity, which renders 
the market illiquid, with only informed traders left. Unless the central bank intervenes 
to provide liquidity or market expectation changes, the liquidity situation will worsen.  
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Chapter 5   
Driving Forces behind Official Intervention 
in the Foreign Exchange Market 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the foreign exchange intervention research, many studies attempt to discover what 
drives the official intervention. Historically, intervention in foreign exchange markets 
has usually been kept secret, and in the absence of public announcements the early 
researches sought out the data from news reports (Galati and Melick 1999, 
Dominguez 1998, Bonser-Neal and Tanner 1996). Even today, only very few 
countries would disclose official intervention information. Therefore, the literature on 
the intervention reaction function is limited to certain developed markets, such as the 
USA (Baillie and Osterberg 1997b, Humpage 1999), Germany (Dominguez 1998, Jun 
2008), Japan (Frenkel, Pierdzioch, and Stadtmann 2002, Chen, Chang, and Yu 2012, 
Ito and Yabu 2007) and Australia (McKenzie 2004, Rogers and Siklos 2003, Kim and 
Sheen 2002). Among the emerging markets, Turkey is the focus of most researches, 
for example Akinci et al. (2005), Herrera and Özbay (2005), ÖzIü and Prokhorov 
(2008). 
This chapter attempts to discover the driving forces of foreign exchange intervention 
in the second biggest economy of the world, China. As one of the most important 
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emerging markets, China is attracting increasing research attention with regard to its 
economic and financial regime. This study will enrich the line of research on foreign 
exchange intervention in emerging markets. According to the features of China’s 
foreign exchange regime, we define another type of intervention in addition to the 
traditional intervention via transaction (central bank transaction intervention, or CBT), 
namely the central parity rate (CPR) intervention. Seven factors are considered: 
deviation from the target exchange rate, excess volatility, interest rate differential, 
national economy, intervention persistence, deviation from target appreciation rate 
and market liquidity. We introduce 1-day moving average, 21-day moving average, 
and 150-day moving average as the target exchange rate, and price impact, return 
reversal and effective cost as the measurements of market liquidity. We ignore return 
reversal because it is collinear with price impact. Finally, our reaction function 
comprises ten factors. 
Since intervention data is not disclosed by the Chinese government, we collect the 
indicators of intervention from news reports from 4
th
 January 2011 to 13
th
 December 
2012. Because of this, we can only decide the sign of intervention. The dependent 
variables are assigned the value of -1, 0 or 1. Therefore, this chapter adopts a Logit 
model to capture the asymmetric reaction function of appreciation-target intervention 
and depreciation-target intervention. In addition, we use the Ordered Logit model to 
examine both types of intervention in the same equation and estimate the neutral band 
of non-intervention.  
First, consistent with the literature, the Chinese government is proved to ‘lean-
against-the-wind’, and intervention persistence is significant in the majority of our 
estimations. In addition, the Chinese government is concerned with a gradual 
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achievement of the appreciation target, especially before 12
th
 June 2012 in our sample. 
The results for excess volatility are less conclusive, showing that only appreciation-
target CBT intervention is carried out to remove excess volatility.  
Intervention is asymmetric and dynamic. After 12
th
 June 2012, the target appreciation 
rate ceases to be a driving force of intervention. Besides the common significance of 
interest rate differential, appreciation-target CBT intervention aims to provide 
liquidity when the foreign exchange market is illiquid. By contrast, CPR intervention 
is more concerned with the national economy. We also compare the Logit model with 
the OLS model in terms of in-sample fitting performance and out-of-sample 
forecasting performance. We find that the Logit model is a better choice in terms of 
both RMSE and MAE. 
Second, with the potential driving forces considered in our model, the Chinese 
government is generally more tolerant of appreciation of the USD (CNY depreciation) 
than of USD depreciation (CNY appreciation).  The exception to this is during the 
period before 12
th
 June 2012, when the central bank actively accelerated the 
appreciation of CNY to counter the high rate of inflation, thus showing more 
tolerance of USD depreciation (CNY appreciation) than USD appreciation (CNY 
depreciation).  
Third, when we compare the predictive ability of our model with a constant 
probability, our model is shown to improve the accuracy of prediction of intervention. 
We also introduce noise-to-signal ratio to minimize the problems of surprise and false 
alarm. After 12
th
 June 2012, following a central bank announcement that it would 
reduce the frequency of intervention and improve the method of intervention, CBT 
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intervention becomes irregular and harder to predict. The neutral band of non-
intervention is not significant and intervention is no longer persistent. In contrast, 
CPR intervention becomes a more frequently used tool. It is easier to predict than 
before 12
th
 June 2012. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses main aspects of 
the driving force considered in our investigation. Section 3 defines two methods of 
intervention in China and describes the data sources. Section 4 presents the estimation 
results, including the final estimated equation decided upon, the breakpoint detected 
and the results of the Logit model and Ordered Logit model. Section 5 presents 
conclusions, based on the main findings. 
5.2 Driving Forces of Intervention: Theoretical Underpinning 
In order to study the driving forces of central bank intervention, most studies assume 
an intervention reaction function. Some derive the reaction function from a monetary 
authority loss function (Almekinders and Eijffinger 1996, Ito and Yabu 2007, Chen, 
Chang, and Yu 2012, Frenkel, Pierdzioch, and Stadtmann 2002). The simplest case, 
which is also the most frequently used in the literature, presents a cost function of 
intervention with the target exchange rate: 
 𝐸𝑡−1(𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡) = 𝐸𝑡−1(𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡
𝑇)2 (5.1) 
where 𝐸𝑡−1() denotes expectation at time t-1, 𝑃𝑡 is the actual exchange rate at time t, 
and 𝑃𝑡
𝑇 represents the target exchange rate. The actual exchange rate is assumed to 
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follow a random walk and when there is intervention, the exchange rate process 
becomes: 
 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜌𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 (5.2) 
where 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡  indicates intervention at time t and 𝑢𝑡  is a white noise. Substituting 
equation (5.2) into equation (5.1) and minimizing the loss function with respect to 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡, the intervention reaction function is: 
 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
∗ = −
1
𝜌
(𝑃𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑡
𝑇) (5.3) 
where 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
∗ is the optimal intervention. However, it is inadequate to consider only the 
target exchange rate in the loss function of the Chinese monetary authority. Da Silva 
and Nunes (2007) introduce a central bank loss function with richer contents: 
 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝐵 =∑𝜌𝑖−𝑡 [
(𝛼𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖)
2
2
+
𝛽(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖
𝑒)2
2
+
𝛾(𝑃𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖
𝑇)
2
2
] − 𝑈𝑡
∞
𝑖=𝑡
 (5.4) 
where 𝜌 is a discount factor, 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖  denotes the degree of intervention, 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖
𝑒  means 
intervention expected by the speculator, 𝛼  measures the intervention costs via the 
portfolio balance channel, and 𝛽  captures the intervention costs through the 
expectation channel. 𝛾 represents the costs of deviation from the target exchange rate. 
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𝑈𝑡 represents the utility function of domestic residences. Correspondingly, the loss 
function of a representative speculator is shown as: 
 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡
𝑆 =∑𝜌𝑖−𝑡 [
(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖
𝑒 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖)
2
2
] − 𝑈𝑡
∞
𝑖=𝑡
 (5.5) 
After minimizing both equations (5.4) and (5.5) by 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖 , we can get the Nash 
equilibrium as: 
 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
∗ =
1
𝛼2
[
𝜕𝑈𝑡
𝜕𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
− 𝛾(𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡
𝑇)
𝜕𝑃𝑡
𝜕𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
] (5.6) 
As can be seen from equation (5.6), if intervention cost in terms of the portfolio 
balance effect is large, the degree of intervention will become smaller. Foreign 
exchange intervention is concerned not only with the target exchange rate, but also 
with the wellbeing of domestic residences. The governor of the People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC) has made clear that monetary policy in China should not simply target 
a single ‘low inflation’ objective, but must also consider economic growth, 
employment and  balance of payments (Ni 2011). Given that the objective of 
intervention is complex and does not simply target a single objective, the driving 
forces of intervention in equation (5.6) will be discussed further below. 
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5.2.1 Deviation from target exchange rate 
As can be seen in equations (5.3) and (5.6), the target exchange rate is important in 
the study of intervention reaction function. However, the target exchange rate is an 
elusive concept. Some studies, such as  Frenkel, Pierdzioch, and Stadtmann (2002), 
advocate the PPP as the proxy for long horizon target exchange rate. Another 
frequently adopted measure is the moving average of the exchange rate. The order of 
moving average varies among studies. Geršl and Holub (2006) consider the exchange 
rate on previous day as the target exchange rate; Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) 
and Jun (2008) adopt a 7-day moving average; ÖzIü and Prokhorov (2008) advocate a 
22-day moving average; Akinci et al. (2005) use the 90-day moving average, while 
Neely (1998), LeBaron (1999) and Kim and Sheen (2002) suggest that 150 days is a 
common horizon among market traders. Alternatively, Ito and Yabu (2007) model the 
long-term target exchange rate as a combination of 1-year moving average, 3-year 
moving average and 5-year moving average. However, Herrera and Özbay (2005) 
argue that the central bank will not target the exchange rate at the long horizon due to 
the lack of independence in a managed floating rate regime. Following Chen, Chang, 
and Yu (2012), we consider three types of moving average of the exchange rate in this 
chapter: 
 𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑡−2 (5.7) 
 
𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡−1 −
1
21
∑𝑃𝑡−1−𝑖
21
𝑖=1
 
(5.8) 
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𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡−1 −
1
150
∑𝑃𝑡−1−𝑖
150
𝑖=1
 
(5.9) 
where 𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 is deviation from the short-term target exchange rate, 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡  is 
deviation from the medium-term target exchange rate, 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 is deviation from the 
long-term target exchange rate, and 𝑃𝑡−1 is the actual exchange rate. 
5.2.2 Excess volatility 
Volatility is a measure of market disorder. It is another driving force frequently 
discussed in the literature. High volatility in the foreign exchange market will increase 
trading cost of market traders and affect the confidence of importers and exporters. If 
the central bank prefers a stable market, then when the volatility of the foreign 
exchange market is higher, it may intervene to reduce the volatility and smooth the 
exchange rate. Technically, volatility is well described by the conditional variance 
estimated in the series of GARCH models. Kim and Sheen (2002) and Herrera and 
Özbay (2005) incorporate conditional variance into the intervention reaction function. 
Jun (2008) compares conditional variance with the equilibrium level (1.8255) of the 
Louvre Accord.
8
 ÖzIü and Prokhorov (2008) consider the difference between 
conditional variance and unconditional variance, referred to as excess exchange rate 
volatility. In this chapter, we adopt excess volatility, and the conditional variance is 
estimated by a GARCH (1,1) model as below: 
                                                 
8 The Louvre Accord was established on February 22nd 1987 in order to counter the influence of 
excess depreciation of USD on the world economy. It marked a new phase of exchange rate policy, 
and JPY/USD suffered a large depreciation temporarily. 
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 ∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
∗) + 𝑢𝑡 (5.10) 
 ℎ𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐼(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡) (5.11) 
where ∆𝑃𝑡 is 100 times the difference of the log exchange rate, 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 is intervention, 𝑖𝑡 
is the overnight interest rate of Shibor (Shanghai Inter-bank Offer Rate), 𝑖𝑡
∗  is the 
overnight interest rate of Libor (London Inter-bank Offer Rate), ℎ𝑡  is conditional 
variance, and 𝐼(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡) is the dummy indicator of intervention, which takes the value 1 
when there is intervention and 0 otherwise. The unconditional variance of the 
exchange rate is calculated as: 
 𝜎2 =
𝜔
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
 (5.12) 
where 𝜎2 denotes unconditional variance, and 𝜔 , 𝛼  and 𝛽  are the coefficients 
estimated in equation (5.11). Then the proxy for the excess exchange rate volatility is 
the difference between conditional variance and unconditional variance: 
 𝐸𝑉𝑡 = ℎ𝑡 − 𝜎
2 (5.13) 
where 𝐸𝑉𝑡 indicates excess exchange rate volatility.  
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5.2.3 Interest rate differential 
Interest rates represent the return on investment in a currency. If the difference 
between the interest rate of CNY and that of USD increases, the return on investment 
in the Chinese yuan increases. An increase in the value of the Chinese RMB means 
appreciation of the Chinese currency. Interest rate differential may be considered as a 
proxy of potential excessive exchange rate overshooting by the central bank. If the 
central bank wishes to smooth the deviation from the target exchange rate, it will 
intervene in the foreign exchange market (Kim and Sheen 2002, Herrera and Özbay 
2005). In this chapter, interest rate differential is defined as the overnight Shibor for 
China minus overnight Libor: 
 𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
∗ (5.14) 
where 𝐼𝑅𝑡 is interest rate differential, 𝑖𝑡 is overnight Shibor, and 𝑖𝑡
∗ is overnight Libor. 
5.2.4 National economy 
China is one of the biggest exporters in the world. In 2013, the value of the country’s 
exports reached 2.21 trillion USD. Exchange rate is an important factor affecting the 
amount of export. If the Chinese yuan appreciates, the price of China commodities 
rises in foreign currency, and China’s export will decrease. In order to maintain the 
national export competitiveness and economic growth, the central bank may intervene 
to combat the appreciation. Following Chen, Chang, and Yu (2012), we take the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index as a proxy for the national economy. The 
factor in the intervention reaction function is defined as: 
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 𝑁𝐸𝑡 = 100 × ∆𝑙𝑛 (𝑆𝐼𝑡) (5.15) 
where 𝑁𝐸𝑡 is national economy, and 𝑆𝐼𝑡  represents the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite Index. 
5.2.5 Intervention persistence 
Persistence of intervention refers to the fact that once intervention occurs, it will 
probably last for several days. Consideration of this factor has been introduced as the 
lag of intervention into the central bank reaction function (Frenkel, Pierdzioch, and 
Stadtmann 2002, ÖzIü and Prokhorov 2008, Jackman 2012). Ito and Yabu (2007) 
assert that persistence of intervention is due to political cost. Political cost is usually a 
consideration in the process to design the optimal intervention strategy. Before the 
execution of intervention, the central bank should engage in discussion with the 
Minister of Finance and other ministers. It should also negotiate with other major 
countries with relevant intervention currencies. Therefore, once intervention is 
approved, the political cost of a second intervention will be smaller than that of the 
first, and intervention will probably continue for several days. Another explanation of 
intervention persistence is the will to maintain policy credibility. If the exchange rate 
is considered as a policy instrument, intervention reflects a policy signal. The central 
bank will not favour invalid intervention or missing the intervention target. Therefore, 
intervention probably continues to ensure the credibility of the announced policy. In 
this chapter, we introduce the lag of intervention in the central bank reaction function. 
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5.2.6 Deviation from the target appreciation rate 
At the beginning of 2011, many institutions predicted that CNY/USD would 
appreciate by around 5% during that year. Interestingly, the central bank was 
frequently observed in the market, especially during December 2011. It was noted that 
the central bank tolerated appreciation of the Chinese yuan in order to meet the target 
appreciation rate decided at the beginning of 2011. Finally, the market closing price 
of CNY/USD on December 30
th
 2011 (6.294) showed an appreciation of 4.5% 
compared with the market close price on December 31
st
 2010 (6.5897). The Chinese 
government is dovish, and it is reasonable to assume that the central bank prefers a 
gradual appreciation of the Chinese yuan, especially to counter the high rate of 
inflation in 2011. In this chapter, we introduce Deviation from the Target 
Appreciation Rate (DTAR) as one of the driving forces behind central bank 
intervention: 
 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 100 ×
𝑃𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑡
𝑇
𝑇𝑡
 (5.16) 
where 𝑃𝑡−1 is the actual exchange rate of CNY/USD at the close of business at time t-
1, 𝑃𝑡
𝑇 represents the target exchange rate, 𝑇𝑡 indicates the working days left at time t 
until the end of year. The appreciation rate of the year 2011 was around 5%; therefore 
𝑃𝑡
𝑇 is set as 95% of the actual exchange rate on December 31
st
 2010. In contrast, in 
2012 there is no evidence that the central bank intervened in the foreign exchange 
market in order to achieve the target appreciation rate. At the beginning of the year 
2012, many institutions predicted that the Chinese yuan would appreciate by 3% to 
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4%. However, the Chinese government frequently stated that the exchange rate of 
CNY/USD had reached the equilibrium level. At the end of 2012, the actual exchange 
rate of CNY/USD had appreciated by only 1%. Therefore, we assume that 𝑃𝑡
𝑇 equals 
the actual exchange rate on December 30
th
 2011. As can be seen from equation (5.16), 
the further the deviation of the exchange rate from 𝑃𝑡
𝑇, the larger the 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡 is, and 
the higher the probability of central bank intervention. If the date is approaching the 
end of the year, 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡  will become large and the central bank will probably 
intervene. 
5.2.7 Market liquidity 
Liquidity is a critical attribute of financial markets. A liquid market means it is easier 
to make transactions between market participants; when there is less liquidity, the 
reverse is true. In China, the exchange rate regime does not allow the Chinese yuan to 
fluctuate freely, but only within a designated fluctuation band. When the market 
expected value of the Chinese yuan is outside the fluctuation band, the market price 
will deviate from the market expectation and no transactions will be dealt, leading to a 
lack of market liquidity. In order to make the foreign exchange market stable and 
healthy, it is likely that the central bank will intervene to provide liquidity, to adjust 
the market expectation and finally to recover the liquidity of the market. Hence, 
market liquidity is a special driving force in the regime of the Chinese foreign 
exchange market. Following Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2013), two 
categories
9
 of liquidity are considered in this chapter. 
                                                 
9 This chapter takes excess volatility as one of the driving forces of intervention; therefore, the 
third category of liquidity proposed by Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer (2013) – price 
dispersion (volatility) - is not considered here. 
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5.2.7.1 Price impact and return reversal 
Price impact reflects the movement of exchange rate reacting to order flow. When 
there is more market liquidity, the price change in response to a transaction is smaller 
(Kyle 1985, Rosu 2009). Evans and Lyons (2002) derive a price impact model which 
describes the relationship between the exchange rate and order flow. When the return 
reversal is introduced, the price impact model becomes: 
 ∆𝑃𝑡 =∝ +𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)𝑥𝑡 +∑𝐿𝑡,𝑘
(𝑟𝑟)𝑂𝐹𝑡−𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ 𝑢𝑡 (5.17) 
where ∆𝑃𝑡  is the log exchange rate return, ∝ is constant, 𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
 denotes price impact 
measure of liquidity, 𝑂𝐹𝑡  means order flow, 𝐿𝑡
(𝑟𝑟) = ∑ 𝐿𝑡,𝑘
(𝑟𝑟)𝐾
𝑘=1  indicates liquidity 
dimension of return reversal, and 𝑢𝑡 is residual. If a market lacks liquidity, market 
price will overreact to order flow. Although part of the price change is temporary and 
caused by risk-averse liquidity traders, reversal to fundamental value will be slow, 
due to illiquidity (Banti, Phylaktis, and Sarno 2011, Campbell, Grossman, and Wang 
1993, Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel 2005). Following Mancini, Ranaldo, and 
Wrampelmeyer (2013), this chapter calculates 100 times log exchange rate returns 
from the one minute closing exchange rate and regresses equation (5.17) with one 
minute frequency of each day. Order flow is calculated as the net of buyer-initiated 
trades and seller-initiated trades. Three lags of order flow are considered in the 
regression. Finally, we get the daily observations of 𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
 and 𝐿𝑡
(𝑟𝑟)
. 
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5.2.7.2 Trading cost 
Trading cost is an important aspect of liquidity. Logically, lower trading cost makes 
transaction easier, and consequently there is more liquidity. A widely used measure of 
liquidity in this regard is bid-ask spread. However, bid-ask spread is limited as a 
liquidity measure in that it is precise only if the transaction is executed at the posted 
quotes. In the first leg of transaction with new traders, when the volume of order is 
quite large and where it is dealt as a limit order, bid-ask spread is no longer a precise 
measure of trading cost (Grossman and Miller 1988). If we can get the transaction 
price, effective costs can be calculated as: 
 𝐿(𝑒𝑐) =
{
 
 100 ×
(𝑃 − 𝑃𝑀)
𝑃𝑀
,    for buyer-initiated trades
100 ×
(𝑃𝑀 − 𝑃)
𝑃𝑀
,    for seller-initiated trades
 (5.18) 
 
𝑃𝑀 =
𝑃𝐴 + 𝑃𝐵
2
 
(5.19) 
where 𝐿(𝑒𝑐) indicates the liquidity dimension of effective cost, 𝑃 is transaction price, 
𝑃𝑀 is mid quote, 𝑃𝐴 means ask quote, and 𝑃𝐵 means bid quote. Daily observation of 
𝐿(𝑒𝑐) is calculated as the average of effective costs of all the transactions each day. 
5.3 Data Description 
This chapter focuses on the years 2011 and 2012 for two reasons. First, the period 
contains a recent change in exchange rate behaviours. As shown in Figure 5.1, the 
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Chinese yuan (CNY) actual rate fluctuated between 6.6377 CNY/USD (January 10
th
 
2011) and 6.2223 CNY/USD (November 27
th
 2012). In general, the CNY appreciated 
over the two years under examination in this research. An exception to this was the 
period from January 2012 to July 2012. The CNY/USD first fluctuated around 6.3 
until mid-May 2012, and then began to depreciate. In 2012, the Chinese government 
frequently gave signals, both formally and informally, that the CNY/USD exchange 
rate had already reached the equilibrium. On April 16
th
 2012, the government 
increased the fluctuation band from 0.5 to 1 per cent of the announced central parity 
rate. This increased the elasticity of the Chinese foreign exchange market. 
Subsequently, the market exhibited a different behaviour pattern compared with the 
previous CNY appreciation. Therefore, the period is interesting and worthy of our 
attention. 
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Figure 5.1  CNY/USD exchange rate, January 2011 - December 2012 (Data 
source: Wind Info) 
 
The second reason lies in the change of economic environment, and thus the 
possibility of different intervention targets. In 2010, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
in China gradually increased from 1.5% in January to 4.6% in December.  It remained 
at a high level throughout 2011, with the highest CPI figure, announced as 6.5%, 
occurring in July. The average CPI in 2011 was 5.42%, 2.09% higher than that of 
2010. The Chinese government was under pressure of high inflation. It is considered 
that official intervention in the foreign exchange market aimed at using an appreciated 
CNY to combat the pressure of imported inflation. In 2012, the CPI was under control 
and gradually decreased to below 3% after June. CPI, reflected in active appreciation 
of the CNY, might no longer have been a main concern for the government. On 10
th
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May 2012, the central bank published the first quarter monetary policy report, 
announcing that it would reduce the frequency of intervention in the foreign exchange 
market and continue to improve the method of intervention. This implies a possible 
change of intervention behaviour afterwards. On 13
th
 September 2012, the USA 
decided to execute Quantitative Easing Ⅲ (QEⅢ). This may have raised concerns 
about the condition of the Chinese economy, and in order to counter the influence of 
QEⅢ, the Chinese government might have tried to keep the exchange rate stable. 
Therefore, the eventful years of 2011 and 2012 may enable us to reach a better 
understanding of China’s intervention behaviours.  
5.3.1 The central parity rate 
Currently, the Chinese government implements a managed floating exchange rate 
regime. The China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) is authorized by the 
central bank to announce the central parity rate (CPR)
10
 as a benchmark before the 
market opens. All transactions must be dealt within the range [1-a%, 1+a%] of the 
CPR that day. Here a% is the fluctuation band, 1 per cent after April 16
th
 2012. 
Therefore, the central bank is able to control the highest and lowest value of the 
exchange rate with the announcement of CPR and the help of the fluctuation band. 
5.3.2 Intervention data 
In this chapter, we define two types of official intervention in the Chinese foreign 
exchange market. In central bank trading intervention (CBT) the central bank 
intervenes via buying or selling domestic currency. The biggest challenge in CBT 
                                                 
10 The formation of CPR could be found in Table 4.1. 
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research is that the PBOC does not disclose any intervention data. A similar problem 
is encountered by studies of other markets. For example, the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance first disclosed intervention data in July 2001. Before that, the study of 
intervention relied on information in news media or financial reports (Galati and 
Melick 1999, Dominguez 1998, Bonser-Neal and Tanner 1996). Inspired by the 
previous literature, we collect intervention data from Factiva based on traders’ reports 
of possible official intervention.  
The other type of intervention is through the CPR. In order to distinguish CPR 
intervention from routine announcements of CPR, we invent two ways to capture the 
intervention: (1) If the CPR announced today differs from the market behaviour 
yesterday (measured by the closing rate yesterday) and the difference is larger than 90% 
of the fluctuation band, the setting of CPR today is said to be an intervention; (2) If 
Factiva reports that the value of CPR differs from the market expectation, the 
movement of CPR explains the purpose of the central bank, or the setting of CPR is 
due to some event, then CPR intervention is considered to have taken place. Table 5.1 
below shows examples of CBT intervention and CPR intervention. 
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Table 5.1 Examples of intervention 
Intervention 
Type 
Date Description 
CPR 04/01/2011 
The President of China, Hu JinTao, will visit 
America on January 19 this year. This is one of the 
most important factors in the recent appreciation of 
the Chinese yuan. 
CPR 08/04/2011 
Traders point out that in order to counter imported 
inflation, the regulator continuously sets CPR at a 
high level (appreciation). 
CPR 27/12/2011 
The central bank continuously sets CPR at a high 
level (appreciation); the market suspects that this is 
to achieve the target appreciation rate decided at the 
beginning of this year. 
CPR 01/06/2012 
Central bank sets CPR at a high level (appreciation), 
against the market trend. This could be aimed at 
countering the expectation of depreciation. 
CPR 10/10/2012 
The Chinese yuan has tended to appreciate recently. 
However, CPR remains at the same level. It is clear 
that the central bank is trying to keep the exchange 
rate stable. 
CPR 13/11/2012 
The close rate of CNY/USD yesterday is 6.2291, 
which is 1% below the CPR on that date. However, 
the announcement of CPR today is 6.2891, 0.95% 
higher than yesterday’s close rate. 
CBT 26/04/2011 
The central bank is suspected of selling the USD 
and intervening in the foreign exchange market for a 
second day in order to prevent the Chinese yuan 
from reaching the depreciation band. 
CBT 09/11/2012 
There is nobody to buy the USD this morning. In the 
afternoon, the central bank is suspected of providing 
liquidity and taking the Chinese yuan away from the 
appreciation band. 
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5.3.3 Statistics of dataset 
The raw data in this chapter include indicators for both types of intervention, tick data 
of the dealt exchange rate, bid and ask prices for transactions, and daily data for the 
overnight rates of Shibor and Libor and the stock index. Intervention indicators are 
defined according to the method described above. Tick data of exchange rate 
transactions is collected from Reuter Xtra 3000. Overnight Shibor, overnight Libor 
and stock index are taken from Wind Info. Due to data availability, the tick data of 
exchange rate transactions ends on 13
th
 December 2012. Therefore, the period studied 
in this chapter is from 4
th
 January 2011 to 13
th
 December 2012. 
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Table 5.2 Number of interventions defined (04/01/2011 –13/12/2012) 
 CBT intervention CPR intervention 
Take value of 1 18 56 
Take value of -1 30 119 
 
Table 5.2 gives a general picture on defined interventions for the period from 4
th
 
January 2011 to 13
th
 December 2012. CBT intervention is reported on a total of 48 
days. Meanwhile, CPR intervention is identified on a total of 175 out of 448 working 
days. If the purpose of intervention is to appreciate or slow the depreciation of the 
USD, we label it appreciation-target intervention and assign the value 1 to the 
intervention indicator. For example, purchase of the USD will make its rate against 
the RMB appreciate, so the intervention takes the value of 1. Similarly, if intervention 
aims to depreciate or slow the appreciation of the USD, we name it depreciation-
target intervention and the intervention indicator is valued as -1. If there is no 
intervention, we assign the value 0. As shown in the table, the number of observations 
valued at -1 is almost double that with the value 1; thus it is clear that the central bank 
pushes the CNY to appreciate more frequently than it promotes depreciation. 
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Table 5.3 Descriptions of driving force variables (04/01/2011 –13/12/2012) 
 
 
Observations  Mean  Std. Dev. Skewness  Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
SDER 447 -0.0008  0.0066  -0.2641  4.8851  71.3806***  
MDER 447 -0.01  0.0173  0.2068  3.5242  8.3052** 
LDER 447 -0.0693  0.0526  0.9329  2.6507  67.1062***  
EV 447 0.0002 0.0046 2.2414 9.7143 1213.926*** 
IR 448 2.8903  1.1202  1.8486  7.5682  644.7224***  
NE 448 779.5967  11.9445  0.1825  1.8942  25.3104***  
DTAR 447 0.1124 0.4956 2.4773 62.4855 66362.17*** 
𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
 448 0.0048  0.0048  5.8527  48.9727  42009.5***  
𝐿𝑡
(𝑟𝑟)
 448 -0.0025  0.0042  -6.7408  57.9429  59742.17***  
𝐿(𝑒𝑐) 448 0.0054 0.0042 3.788478 25.58795 10595.68***  
Notes: Jarque-Bera is the statistics of normality test. The significance levels are displayed as 
*** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%.  
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Table 5.3 shows the statistics of independent variables in our intervention reaction 
function. They are derived from equations (5.7) – (5.19) mentioned above. For some 
variables one observation is missing, because we take the difference of the exchange 
rate. On average, CNY experiences an appreciation process, while the means of 
SDER, MDER and LDER are all negative. Conditional volatility tends to be larger 
than unconditional volatility, as the mean of EV is positive. The averages of 𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
 and 
𝐿𝑡
(𝑟𝑟)  are positive and negative, respectively. In addition, in an exercise unreported 
here, test results strongly reject the null hypothesis that their means are equal to zero. 
This is consistent with the conclusion of Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2013) 
that order flow should positively impact on the exchange rate, and price change will 
reverse to the fundamental after excessive appreciation (depreciation), due to 
illiquidity. 
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Figure 5.2 Liquidity in the Chinese foreign exchange market 
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Figure 5.2 provides a picture of the three measures of liquidity in our data. 𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
 and 
𝐿(𝑒𝑐) follow a similar pattern across the whole period. In contrast, the trend of 𝐿𝑡
(𝑟𝑟)
 is 
the reverse of 𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
. Around the end of September 2011, the absolute value of liquidity 
measures is quite large. A similar picture is detected through December 2012. On the 
majority of these dates, CPR is set far from the closing price on the previous day, with 
the probable result that the open rate hits the fluctuation band and cannot return to 
market expectation. Market makers have no motivation to provide liquidity because of 
the high risk associated with the deviation from market expected price. The foreign 
exchange market then becomes less liquid. 
 
Table 5.4 Correlation of three trading cost measures 
 𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
 𝐿𝑡
(𝑟𝑟)
 𝐿
(𝑒𝑐) 
𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
 1 -0.9528 0.7332 
𝐿𝑡
(𝑟𝑟)
 -0.9528 1 -0.6344 
𝐿(𝑒𝑐) 0.7332 -0.6344 1 
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As can be seen from Table 5.4, 𝐿𝑡
(𝑟𝑟)
 is highly correlated with  𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
. This is consistent 
with the pattern shown in Figure 5.2. There is a possibility that 𝐿𝑡
(𝑟𝑟)
 is collinear with 
𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
. We will detect the potential collinearity and determine the final estimation 
model in the empirical section. 
5.4 Empirical Analysis 
5.4.1 Estimation model for intervention reaction function 
In the sections above, we have discussed many potential driving forces of intervention. 
To include all the variables mentioned above into the econometric model, we have: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 
+𝛽6𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑝𝑖) + 𝛽10𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑟𝑟) + 𝛽11𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑒𝑐) + 𝜀𝑡 
(5.20) 
We assign one lag to variables of 𝐸𝑉𝑡 , 𝐼𝑅𝑡 ,𝑁𝐸𝑡 , 𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
, 𝐿𝑡
(𝑟𝑟)
 and 𝐿𝑡
(𝑒𝑐)
 to avoid the 
simultaneity problem.  
In order to diagnose the potential collinearity amongst the regressors, we conduct 
coefficient variance decomposition based on the linear version equation (5.20). We 
first regress on equation (5.20) for both CBT intervention and CPR intervention using 
OLS with HAC, and the test results are shown in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 below: 
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Table 5.5 Coefficient variance decomposition of CBT intervention 
CBT intervention 
Condition 
3.6 × e−13 1.44 × e−11 2 × e−11 2.45 × e−11 3.6 × e−11 1.56 × e−10 
3.33 × e−10 1.69 × e−9 4.37 × e−8 2.98 × e−7 2.19 × e−6 1 
 𝛽0 𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 𝐸𝑉𝑡−1 𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 
Associated 
Eigenvalue 
0.0151 0.0765 0.0031 0.0001 0.0551 0.0103 
 𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡 𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑝𝑖) 𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑟𝑟) 𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑒𝑐) 
Associated 
Eigenvalue 
0.011 0.0039 0.0045 0.9909 0.9898 0.1217 
Notes: The condition number of each eigenvalue is shown in the first two rows. The last four rows 
display the decomposition proportions for each variable associated with the smallest condition number. 
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Table 5.6 Coefficient variance decomposition of CPR intervention 
CPR intervention 
Condition 
1.14 × e−12 9.56 × e−12 4.03 × e−11 5.38 × e−11 7.91 × e−11 1.95 × e−10 
3.49 × e−10 4.6 × e−9 3.18 × e−7 5.1 × e−7 2.18 × e−6 1 
 𝛽0 𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 𝐸𝑉𝑡−1 𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 
Associated 
Eigenvalue 
0.0005 0.0508 0.0002 0.0035 0.126 0.004 
 𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡 𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑝𝑖) 𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑟𝑟) 𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑒𝑐) 
Associated 
Eigenvalue 
0.00004 0.0924 0.0134 0.9827 0.9894 0.0363 
Notes: The condition number of each eigenvalue is shown in the first two rows. The last four rows 
display the decomposition proportions for each variable associated with the smallest condition number. 
 
The first two rows in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 present the condition number of the 
covariance matrix. In both the CBT intervention model and the CPR intervention 
model, 11 out of 12 condition numbers are smaller than 0.001. The smallest values are 
3.6 × e−13  and 1.14 × e−12, respectively. This indicates the existence of a large 
amount of collinearity in our estimation model. The second part of Table 5.5 and 
Table 5.6 shows the variance decomposition proportions associated with the smallest 
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condition number. In both models, only the values of 𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑝𝑖)
 and 𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑟𝑟)
 are larger than 
0.5: for the CBT intervention model they are 0.9909 and 0.9898, respectively, and for 
the CPR intervention model they are 0.9927 and 0.9894. The values are all quite close 
to 1, which tells us that 𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑝𝑖)
 and 𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑟𝑟)
 have a high level of collinearity. In order to 
avoid the collinearity problem, we drop 𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑟𝑟)
 from our model. The final model tested 
in this chapter becomes: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 
+𝛽6𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑝𝑖) + 𝛽10𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑒𝑐) + 𝜀𝑡 
(5.21) 
5.4.2 Structural break 
As has been discussed above, during 2011 the CNY steadily appreciated against the 
USD, and the central bank is suspected to have accelerated the appreciation in order 
to meet a pre-determined rate. However, in 2012, the Chinese government stated that 
the CNY/USD exchange rate was approaching equilibrium. The exchange rate 
suffered a period of depreciation and then recovered gradually. A possible difference 
of intervention reaction function might be hidden behind different exchange rate 
behaviours. This section will carry out the Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint test to detect 
potential structural changes during the sample period. After conducting OLS 
regression of equation (5.21) with HAC, the Chow test is performed on every date of 
the middle 70% of the sample period. 
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Figure 5.3 F-statistics test for breakpoints of CBT intervention and CPR 
intervention 
 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the F-statistics of the Chow test against the date. The solid line 
represents the test results for the CBT intervention model. There are four peaks in the 
middle 70% of the sample period. The largest F-statistic is 3.78, which lies at 12
th
 
June 2012. The test results for the CPR intervention model are shown by the dashed 
line. The largest F-statistic is 3.87, with a corresponding date of 8
th
 November 2011. 
The F-statistics of the remaining peaks are all quite similar. One lies at 14
th
 June 2012, 
which is quite close to the breakpoint of CBT intervention.  
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Figure 5.4 Filtered regime 2 probabilities of CBT intervention and CPR 
intervention 
 
Another method introduced to detect the breakpoints is the regime-shift model. We 
apply the Markov switching model to regress on equation (5.21). For both CBT 
intervention and CPR intervention, the estimation with three regimes is not 
convergent. When regressing on the model with two regimes, we get the regime 
probability of each regime at every date. Figure 5.4 shows the probabilities of Regime 
2 against the date for both CBT intervention and CPR intervention. As can be seen 
from the dashed line, CPR intervention is mainly in Regime 1; with regard to Regime 
2, there are very few instances of probability larger than 50%. There is no obvious 
breakpoint in the picture. In contrast, CBT intervention is almost all in Regime 1 
before 12
th
 June 2012. After that date, Regime 2 frequently appears. Therefore, 12
th
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June 2012 can be defined as a breakpoint for CBT intervention. This is consistent 
with the results of the Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint test. 
As has been discussed above, in our sample CNY started depreciating from mid-May 
2012. After June 2012, the difference between the exchange rate and CPR became 
gradually larger. The trend reversed at the end of July and the exchange rate 
frequently hit the fluctuation band. The market was said to lack liquidity for a period 
of time. On 16
th
 April 2012, the central bank doubled the fluctuation band. On the 
same date, a measure came into force allowing commercial banks to hold short 
positions of foreign exchange. According to the monetary policy report for the first 
quarter that year, published on 10
th
 May 2012, the central bank stated that it would 
reduce the frequency of intervention in the foreign exchange market and continue to 
improve the method of intervention. The intention was to let the market forces play a 
more important role than before in determining the exchange rate. This could be an 
important reform of intervention behaviour and exchange rate determination. Based 
on the results of the Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint test and the Markov switching 
model, 12
th
 June 2012 is detected as the date of the change of the intervention policy 
regime. This is around one month after the policy announcement in the first quarter 
monetary policy report, which can be explained by the time lag necessary for the 
Chinese foreign exchange administration to design and implement the operational 
actions. Therefore, we choose 12
th
 June 2012 as the common breakpoint for both CBT 
intervention and CPR intervention. 
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5.4.3 Asymmetric reaction function of intervention 
Intervention data differ from ordinary financial series data. During the sample period, 
on many days the intervention values are zero, since the central bank would not try to 
control the market all the time. In our data, 89.29% of the observations for CBT 
intervention and 60.94% of the observations for CPR intervention are zero, meaning 
that there is no intervention on these days. Therefore, a nonlinear model is considered 
a better choice for the estimation than a linear model. Also, we can collect only the 
indicators of intervention, but not the exact amount. In this section, we adopt a binary 
choice model to detect the determinants of appreciation-target intervention and 
depreciation-target intervention, separately.  
5.4.3.1 Estimation results 
Table 5.7 presents the estimation results of CBT intervention with equation (5.21). 
The column of appreciation-target intervention shows a dummy variable with the 
value of 1 if appreciation-target intervention occurs and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the 
column of depreciation-target intervention is a dependent variable with the value of 1 
if depreciation-target intervention takes place and 0 otherwise. The whole period 
covers the entire sample from 04/01/2011 to 13/12/2012. Period A denotes the 
subsample from 04/01/2011 to 11/06/2012. Period B contains the rest of our sample, 
from 12/06/2012 to 13/12/2012.  
As can be seen from the last row of Table 5.7, all the normality tests are rejected with 
1% significance. The distribution of residual shows a fatter tail than the normal 
distribution. The Logit model is considered a better choice among binary choice 
models. Finally, we adopt the Logit model with generalized linear model standard 
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errors (GLM) to deal with the inconsistent problem of non-normality and the general 
misspecification of the conditional distribution of intervention. 
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Table 5.7 Logit estimation results for CBT intervention 
 Appreciation-target intervention Depreciation-target intervention 
 Whole period Period B Whole period Period A Period B 
𝛽0 
64.6908*** 
(18.3425) 
-333.9747** 
(134.6805) 
-0.2888** 
(27.6908) 
63.3969 
(49.3548) 
-181.4945 
(125.5644) 
𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 
-9.9067 
(36.3195) 
4.202 
(56.6766) 
-73.8455 
(34.2342) 
-68.5214 
(51.5268) 
-106.3152 
(78.1714) 
𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 
-27.1259 
(18.8632) 
64.7764** 
(29.5047) 
[3.5562] 
18.7945 
(16.0641) 
40.5246 
(34.6552) 
105.5167** 
(50.1941) 
[7.2912] 
𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 
-46.3051*** 
(13.248) 
[-1.1159] 
-93.7264*** 
(28.3931) 
[-5.1456] 
14.4366** 
(7.152) 
[0.7161] 
-22.4878 
(20.9438) 
-34.5449 
(44.6479) 
𝐸𝑉𝑡−1 
-186.65** 
(81.1529) 
[-4.4983] 
-479.4968*** 
(174.8166) 
[-26.3244] 
-98.6038 
(66.9788) 
-81.3325 
(85.87) 
-303.2094 
(194.1481) 
𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 
-0.5517* 
(0.3195) 
[-0.0133] 
-6.2584*** 
(2.193) 
[-0.3436] 
0.2526 
(0.2223) 
-0.3351 
(0.5078) 
2.5407*** 
(0.8894) 
[0.1756] 
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𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 
-0.0923*** 
(0.0244) 
[-0.0022] 
0.4438** 
(0.178) 
[0.0244] 
-0.0039 
(0.0358) 
-0.0867 
(0.0634) 
0.2189 
(0.1605) 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 
0.9831 
(0.764) 
1.2248 
(1.0292) 
2.1063*** 
(0.7273) 
[0.1045] 
3.1077*** 
(1.1082) 
[0.1004] 
1.0624 
(1.5052) 
𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡 
-2.1459*** 
(0.6831) 
[-0.0517] 
0.0763 
(0.6293) 
1.6249*** 
(0.4657) 
[0.0806] 
1.2448** 
(0.6333) 
[0.0402] 
54.5033 
(36.3659) 
𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑝𝑖)
 
33.1074 
(36.9463) 
-61.6068 
(49.2862) 
56.6914 
(86.025) 
256.1008 
(445.4334) 
1169.326 
(794.6448) 
𝐿𝑡−1
(𝑒𝑐)
 
-9.3344 
(62.4859) 
396.0914*** 
(146.5848) 
[21.7454] 
-44.9246 
(90.4373) 
-253.5029 
(388.4937) 
-627.6562 
(618.1554) 
𝑅2 0.4625 0.5418 0.2519 0.3096 0.4118 
Jarque-
Bera 
144460.5*** 1207.12*** 22769.33*** 42905.44*** 9096.23*** 
Notes: The first row displays the estimated coefficient on CBT intervention in equation (5.21) 
by the Logit model. Figures in parentheses are standard errors and figures in the square 
brackets are the marginal effects of the exploratory variable. The whole period ranges from 
04/01/2011 to 13/12/2012. Period A spans from 04/01/2011 to 11/06/2012 and Period B from 
12/06/2012 to 13/12/2012. Jarque-Bera is the statistics of the normality test. The significance 
levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. 
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The whole period estimation results for CBT intervention show that 𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡  is 
negatively significant for appreciation-target intervention and positively significant 
for depreciation-target intervention. This indicates that the central bank is following a 
lean-against-the-wind policy. One hundred basis points of exchange rate deviation 
from the 150-day moving average will increase the probability of occurrence of 
appreciation-target intervention by 1.12%, and the probability of depreciation-target 
intervention by 0.72%. In addition, the 5% and 0% appreciation target rates for 2011 
and 2012 respectively are proved, because 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡  is negatively significant for 
appreciation-target intervention and positively significant for depreciation-target 
intervention.  
The increased probabilities of intervention for 100 unit deviation are 5.17% and 8.06% 
respectively; this is another type of lean-against-the-wind policy, with a decided target 
exchange rate but no moving average. This is mainly valid during period A (from 
04/01/2011 to 11/06/2012), but the driving forces of intervention seem to have 
changed, because 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡  is no longer significant in period B (from 12/06/2012 to 
13/12/2012).  
There are differences between the reaction functions of appreciation-target 
intervention and depreciation-target intervention. The central bank conducts 
appreciation-target intervention to remove excess exchange rate volatility and to 
reduce the potential excessive exchange rate overshooting. More specifically, one unit 
of excess volatility will increase the probability of appreciation-target intervention by 
449.83%, and one unit of interest rate differential tends to decrease the intervention 
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probability by 1.33%, because appreciation-target intervention will increase the 
excessive exchange rate overshooting. When the national economy is in good shape, 
the central bank has less motivation to intervene to depreciate the Chinese yuan to 
improve the competitiveness of exports. The decreased probability for 100 units of 
stock return is 0.22%. The depreciation-target intervention is less concerned with 
excess volatility and condition of the economy, as shown by the fact that 𝐸𝑉𝑡−1, 𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 
and 𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 are not significant. However, when a depreciation-target intervention has 
taken place on the previous day, the intervention probability today will increase by 
10.45%. 
There are only 3 observations of appreciation-target intervention in sub-period A, 
representing only 16.7% of all the appreciation-target interventions. Therefore, we 
ignore the estimation in sub-period A. 
For period B, 𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 for depreciation-target intervention becomes significant. In 2011, 
CNY gradually appreciated against the USD and remained stable until the end of May 
2012. Interest rate differential might not be a factor in driving the CBT intervention. 
However, significant changes in the foreign exchange market push the potential 
overshooting onto the intervention agenda, to protect the foreign exchange market 
from attack by international hot money. Both types of intervention are carried out to 
reduce the potential excessive exchange rate overshooting, and its influence increases: 
the probability is at least ten times that of the average of the whole period.  
Attention is to be paid to the coefficients on 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 , which are both positively 
significant. Most of the depreciation-target intervention in period B lies between the 
dates 12
th
 June 2012 and 4
th
 September 2012. In this period, CNY is exhibiting 
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depreciation against the USD and deviation from the CPR becomes larger. 
Depreciation-target intervention changes the lean-against-the-wind policy from a 150-
day moving average to a 21-day moving average.  
In period B, all the appreciation-target interventions occur after 20
th
 September 2012. 
The US decision to execute QEⅢ on 13th September 2012 causes a shock to China’s 
foreign exchange market, and CNY appreciates rapidly against the USD. The 
exchange rate stays around the edge of the fluctuation band for a long period. 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 
is already lower than the level of the exchange rate desired by the Chinese 
government. Therefore, the implementation of appreciation-target intervention will 
increase the deviation of the exchange rate from the 21-day moving average. Even 
though the national economy is in good condition, appreciation-target intervention is 
implemented to counter the influence of QEⅢ.  
Finally, attention should be paid to the behaviour of liquidity. The results show that 
one unit of additional effective cost increases the probability of appreciation-target 
intervention by 21.75%. Because the exchange rate remains around the fluctuation 
band for a long time, the foreign exchange market is illiquid during the second half of 
2012. The lack of liquidity increases the probability of appreciation-target 
intervention. This is consistent with market reports that the central bank intervened to 
provide liquidity, especially in November and December 2012. 
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  Table 5.8 Logit estimation results for CPR intervention 
 Appreciation-target intervention Depreciation-target intervention 
 Whole period Period B Whole period Period A Period B 
𝛽0 
94.3477*** 
(24.6973) 
274.9815** 
(107.9742) 
-24.0711* 
(14.3217) 
-6.1694 
(19.7959) 
-189.9712* 
(98.7891) 
𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 
-48.5732 
(37.9515) 
-84.4516 
(57.3446) 
-27.508 
(21.1838) 
-15.3433 
(23.1097) 
-107.9149* 
(65.0542) 
[-7.9965] 
𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 
-2.5033 
(17.2155) 
28.6601 
(27.9704) 
31.0392*** 
(11.2821) 
[4.0817] 
23.6096 
(16.3654) 
69.8991 
(43.4003) 
𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 
-17.07** 
(6.8192) 
[-0.9559] 
-30.6812*** 
(9.8109) 
[-2.884] 
1.0408 
(4.7264) 
-2.1013 
(8.9755) 
6.253 
(22.0365) 
𝐸𝑉𝑡−1 
-9.3223 
(54.0727) 
72.7781 
(82.3737) 
-27.5795 
(30.9388) 
-33.8957 
(35.1498) 
-189.7923 
(119.0905) 
𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 
-0.0187 
(0.2451) 
0.5764 
(0.5581) 
-0.0296 
(0.1229) 
-0.0822 
(0.1425) 
0.1601 
(0.7564) 
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𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 
-0.1257*** 
(0.0322) 
[-0.007] 
-0.3626*** 
(0.1408) 
[-0.0341] 
0.0283 
(0.0184) 
0.0054 
(0.0255) 
0.2453* 
(0.1295) 
[0.0182] 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 
1.9489*** 
(0.5661) 
[0.1091] 
0.9399 
(0.6486) 
2.15*** 
(0.2715) 
[0.2827] 
2.2292*** 
(0.3166) 
[0.3317] 
0.2088 
(0.7751) 
𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡 
-0.6 
(0.5043) 
0.2788 
(0.701) 
1.0197*** 
(0.329) 
[0.1341] 
0.8212** 
(0.3444) 
[0.1222] 
0.4035 
(5.5417) 
𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
 
20.7083 
(53.9394) 
29.3841 
(50.7008) 
-68.5997 
(127.745) 
-66.5443 
(197.3317) 
-716.3539 
(631.8521) 
𝐿𝑡
(𝑒𝑐)
 
-132.9584 
(90.5345) 
-169.2043 
(114.0784) 
125.3033 
(106.16) 
116.0207 
(159.83) 
507.0191 
(343.2495) 
𝑅2 0.4556 0.5349 0.2762 0.2461 0.4088 
Jarque-
Bera 
29584.85*** 542.97*** 327.26*** 121.43*** 1186.49*** 
Notes: The first row displays the estimated coefficient on CPR intervention in equation (5.21) 
by the Logit model. Figures in parentheses are standard errors and figures in square brackets 
are the marginal effects of exploratory variables. The whole period ranges from 04/01/2011 to 
13/12/2012. Period A spans from 04/01/2011 to 11/06/2012 and Period B from 12/06/2012 to 
13/12/2012. Jarque-Bera is the statistics of the normality test. The significance levels are 
displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. 
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Table 5.8 illustrates the Logit estimation results for CPR intervention. There are only 
10 observations of appreciation-target intervention in sub-period A, representing only 
17.86% of all the appreciation-target interventions. Therefore, we ignore the 
estimation of appreciation-target intervention in sub-period A. A common feature of 
both appreciation-target intervention and depreciation-target intervention is the strong 
significance of intervention persistence. CPR intervention seems to have stronger 
continuity than CBT intervention. The persistent probabilities of CPR appreciation-
target intervention and CPR depreciation-target intervention are 10.91% and 28.27% 
respectively, which are larger than those of CBT intervention. The driving forces for 
CPR intervention are simpler than those for CBT intervention, and the reaction 
function of CPR intervention is quite asymmetric. Appreciation-target intervention 
follows a lean-against-the-wind policy with a 150-day moving average, while 
depreciation-target intervention shows a similar policy with a 21-day moving average. 
However, the policy of depreciation-target intervention is not supported during either 
period A or period B, as 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡  is no longer significant for depreciation-target 
intervention. Appreciation-target intervention is also concerned with the condition of 
the national economy. If the economy is suffering downward pressure, the 
government is more likely to intervene to depreciate the RMB to maintain the 
competitiveness of exports. In contrast, depreciation-target intervention is conducted 
to meet the annual target appreciation rate. The increased probabilities for 100 unit 
deviation are 13.41% in the whole period and 12.22% in period A. It should be 
noticed that all the coefficients on liquidity are insignificant. This is because CPR is 
used to provide an official guide price for the exchange rate and limits its fluctuation. 
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Unlike CBT intervention, it involves no transaction activity and cannot provide any 
liquidity to the market. 
5.4.3.2 In-sample fitting performance 
Many studies have pointed out that OLS estimation can be inconsistent, and this is 
especially so given that in our sample many intervention days are assigned a value of 
zero. A nonlinear model such as the binary choice model is considered to perform 
better than an OLS model in capturing the driving forces for intervention. In order to 
determine which model is better, we introduce RMSE and MAE to measure the 
performance. Following Jun (2008), computation of the in-sample fitting RMSE and 
MAE is shown as: 
 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √
1
𝑇
∑(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇?̂?)
2
𝑇
𝑡=1
 (5.22) 
 𝑀𝐴𝐸 =
1
𝑇
∑|𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇?̂?|
𝑇
𝑡=1
 (5.23) 
where 𝑇  is the sample size, and 𝐼𝑁𝑇?̂?  is the in-sample fitted value of dependant 
variable.  
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Table 5.9 In-sample fitting performance of CBT intervention 
  Appreciation-target intervention Depreciation-target intervention 
  Whole period Period B Whole period Period A Period B 
RMSE 
OLS 0.1661 0.2509 0.2296 0.1842 0.2831 
Logit 0.1642 0.2333 0.227 0.1762 0.2574 
MAE 
OLS 0.0729 0.1476 0.1163 0.075 0.1898 
Logit 0.051 0.1093 0.1011 0.0634 0.1353 
 
The RMSE and MAE for CBT intervention as estimated by OLS with HAC, and by 
Logit model with GLM, are shown in Table 5.9. The smaller values are presented in 
bold. In all the estimations, the Logit model outperforms OLS in terms of both RMSE 
and MAE. The slope of the OLS model is too steep around the non-intervention point 
and intervention point, and too gentle in the middle range. The Logit model limits the 
dependant variable within [0, 1], but OLS might fit the value out of the range. On 
average, the difference of errors between OLS estimation and Logit estimation is 
larger for intervention fit than for non-intervention fit. The Logit model is proved 
superior to the OLS model in terms of in-sample fitting of RMSE and MAE. 
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Table 5.10 In-sample fitting performance of CPR intervention 
  Appreciation-target intervention Depreciation-target intervention 
  Whole period Period B Whole period Period A Period B 
RMSE 
OLS 0.2466 0.313 0.3647 0.3864 0.2839 
Logit 0.2327 0.3117 0.3646 0.3866 0.2712 
MAE 
OLS 0.1438 0.2149 0.2711 0.2996 0.1878 
Logit 0.1101 0.1912 0.2644 0.2982 0.1477 
 
Table 5.10 illustrates the in-sample fitting results of CPR intervention. In most cases, 
the Logit model captures the intervention reaction function better than the OLS model 
in terms of both RMSE and MAE. One exception is RMSE of depreciation-target 
intervention in period A. The Logit model generally produces less error with in-
sample fitting in period A. However, the number of large-size errors in the Logit 
model is greater than that in the OLS model. RMSE of the Logit model is thus slightly 
larger than that of the OLS model, but the difference is only 0.0002. 
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5.4.3.3 Out-of-sample forecasting performance 
Another method to evaluate the performance of the models is forecasting ability. In 
each regression, we leave k observations out of the estimation sample and forecast the 
dependant variable. The forecast error is derived by comparing the forecast value with 
the actual one. All the explanatory variables are adopted with actual value, except the 
lag of the dependant variable, which will be dynamically substituted by forecast value 
after the second step forecast. Once again, we adopt RMSE and MAE to measure the 
forecasting performance, and they are computed as: 
 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √
1
𝑘
∑(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇?̂?)
2
𝑘
𝑡=1
 (5.24) 
 𝑀𝐴𝐸 =
1
𝑘
∑|𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇?̂?|
𝑘
𝑡=1
 (5.25) 
k is the step of the forecast, and 𝐼𝑁𝑇?̂? is the out-of-sample forecasting value of the 
dependant variable. 
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Table 5.11 Out-of-sample performance of CBT intervention 
Forecast 
Horizon 
Appreciation-target intervention Depreciation-target intervention 
RMSE MAE RMSE MAE 
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
Whole period: 
1 day 0.5356 0.0211 0.5356 0.0211 0.5141 0.00001 0.5141 0.00001 
1 week 0.5442 0.7918 0.5229 0.7308 0.3379 0.006 0.2604 0.0044 
2 weeks 0.6465 0.7043 0.5813 0.5553 0.2671 0.5819 0.2007 0.3756 
Period A: 
1 day     0.0243 0.017 0.0243 0.017 
1 week     0.0577 0.0314 0.0549 0.0299 
2 weeks     0.0515 0.0316 0.0475 0.0298 
Period B: 
1 day 0.309 0.7043 0.309 0.7043 0.0667 0 0.0667 0 
1 week 1.0131 0.8944 0.8753 0.8 0.1396 0 0.1331 0 
2 weeks 0.9342 0.7129 0.7225 0.5288 0.9409 0.6314 0.7358 0.3996 
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In Table 5.11, the smaller value of out-of-sample forecasting RMSE and MAE for 
CBT intervention is presented in bold. The forecast horizons taken in this section are 
1-day, 1-week and 2-weeks. In the whole period, for estimation of appreciation-target 
intervention, the Logit model performs better than OLS in 1-day ahead forecast, but 
worse in 1-week ahead forecast. Two-week ahead forecast is less conclusive. The 
Logit model generally produces fewer forecasting errors, but large-size errors are 
dominant in terms of RMSE. In period B, the Logit model is worse in 1-day ahead 
forecast of appreciation-target intervention but better in longer forecast horizons. For 
the out-of-sample forecast performance of depreciation-target intervention, the Logit 
model is proved to be better, with only one exception in the 2-week ahead forecast of 
the whole period estimation. In total, the Logit model performs better than OLS in 11 
out of 15 cases in the out-of-sample forecast. 
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Table 5.12 Out-of-sample performance of CPR intervention 
Forecast 
Horizon 
Appreciation-target intervention Depreciation-target intervention 
RMSE MAE RMSE MAE 
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
Whole period: 
1 day 1.0273 0.9999 1.0273 0.9999 0.3363 0.0038 0.3363 0.0038 
1 week 0.6515 0.6425 0.459 0.4 0.2033 0.0113 0.1619 0.0093 
2 weeks 1.1485 0.448 0.9091 0.2094 0.1276 0.025 0.074 0.0197 
Period A: 
1 day     0.2781 0.2424 0.2781 0.2424 
1 week     0.5454 0.5275 0.5282 0.4946 
2 weeks     0.4581 0.4514 0.439 0.4294 
Period B: 
1 day 1.1873 0.9989 1.1873 0.9989 0.0987 0.0003 0.0987 0.0003 
1 week 0.4433 0.6425 0.3374 0.4 0.1469 0.0002 0.1337 0.00007 
2 weeks 2.3212 0.4472 1.8673 0.2 0.2399 0.4003 0.1789 0.2433 
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Table 5.12 shows the value of out-of-sample forecasting RMSE and MAE for CPR 
intervention, which are calculated on the basis of both Logit estimation and OLS 
estimation. The Logit model has better forecasting ability than the OLS model with 
two exceptions, namely 1-week ahead forecast of appreciation-target intervention in 
period B, and 2-week ahead forecast of depreciation-target intervention in period B. 
Overall, the Logit model is shown to be superior in terms of both RMSE and MAE in 
13 out of 15 comparisons. 
5.4.4 Ordered Logit model 
As has been discussed frequently in the literature, the binary choice model performs 
well in describing models such as the reaction function of appreciation-target 
intervention and depreciation-target intervention separately. However, it cannot 
capture both types of intervention simultaneously. In this section, we introduce the 
Ordered Logit model to discover the driving force of both interventions in a single 
equation, and to find the features of political cost.  
Unlike some advanced countries such as Japan, China does not implement a system of 
timely release of government intervention data. However, China’s obvious 
interventions have attracted international censure, especially from the US. In this 
situation, the question of political cost of China’s intervention, both domestic and 
international, is an important one for the Chinese authorities and international 
community alike. Economic loss, international pressure and potential influence on 
market activities are all critical parts of the political cost of intervention. Moreover, 
196 
 
failure to achieve the intended targets of intervention may compromise the authorities’ 
credibility, representing another significant political cost. 
5.4.4.1 Estimation results 
Table 5.13 presents the Ordered Logit estimation results for CBT intervention in 
equation (5.21). In most cases, the results are consistent with those from the separate 
estimation of appreciation-target intervention and depreciation-target intervention. For 
the whole period, the Chinese central bank has carried out a lean-against-the-wind 
policy. However, under the Ordered Logit model the target changes to 21-day moving 
average in period A, and in period B 0% appreciation rate is no longer significant. For 
the period as a whole and for period B, CBT intervention is found to aim at reducing 
the exchange rate overshooting. In the whole period and in period A, it is found to 
maintain the competitiveness of the national economy. The coefficient on 𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 in 
period A is positive because the majority of CBT intervention is depreciation-target 
intervention, and the significance is weak. In addition, if intervention is conducted, it 
will continue for several days. The persistence of intervention disappears in period B.  
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Table 5.13 Ordered Logit estimation results for CBT intervention 
 Whole period Period A Period B 
𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 
53.2388* 
(30.026) 
51.9623 
(40.9072) 
71.1814 
(56.6334) 
𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 
-11.0797 
(13.5212) 
-48.5566* 
(29.4417) 
-23.3361 
(22.9371) 
𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 
-25.0886*** 
(5.5492) 
20.5638 
(16.8977) 
-35.6061** 
(15.3463) 
𝐸𝑉𝑡−1 
-19.1313 
(39.0566) 
23.5292 
(54.8048) 
7.793 
(70.9178) 
𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 
-0.3376* 
(0.1916) 
0.2451 
(0.3086) 
-1.7437*** 
(0.6499) 
𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 
-0.0531** 
(0.0211) 
0.0997* 
(0.0548) 
-0.1262 
(0.0862) 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 
0.8443* 
(0.4737) 
2.4391*** 
(0.7703) 
-0.5301 
(0.5919) 
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𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡 
-1.8989*** 
(0.4031) 
-1.1517** 
(0.5373) 
-0.9302 
(0.8339) 
𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
 
32.7583 
(40.8935) 
-172.9282 
(313.4125) 
28.6813 
(51.9721) 
𝐿𝑡
(𝑒𝑐)
 
-52.2009 
(56.1411) 
173.6194 
(250.755) 
50.1914 
(118.5362) 
𝑢1 
-36.5504** 
(16.2843) 
82.7352** 
(42.5141) 
-95.2251 
(66.1006) 
𝑢2 
-44.4467*** 
(16.1132) 
73.6357* 
(42.8733) 
-103.7863 
(66.1025) 
𝑅2 0.2915 0.2457 0.3797 
Notes: The first row displays the estimated coefficient on CBT intervention in 
equation (5.21) with the Ordered Logit model. Figures in parentheses are standard 
errors. The whole period spans from 04/01/2011 to 13/12/2012. Period A ranges from 
04/01/2011 to 11/06/2012 and period B from 12/06/2012 to 13/12/2012. 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 
denote the thresholds in equation (2.26). Significance levels are displayed as *** for 
1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. 
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𝑢1 and 𝑢2 in Table 5.13 denote the thresholds of the Ordered Logit model. According 
to Ito and Yabu (2007), the threshold is a proxy of political cost. As can be found in 
Table 5.13, the neutral band is asymmetric and different in each period. In general, the 
central bank is much more tolerant of USD appreciation (CNY depreciation) than of 
USD depreciation (CNY appreciation), as the neutral band of no intervention is 
estimated as [-44.45, -36.55]. However, the neutral band changes considerably in 
period A. In the year 2011, the central bank is reported to have actively accelerated 
CNY appreciation to counter the high rate of inflation. It shows more tolerance 
toward USD depreciation (CNY appreciation) than USD appreciation (CNY 
depreciation), and the estimation neutral band is [73.64, 82.74]. In period B, the 
threshold is no longer significant. 
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Table 5.14 Ordered Logit estimation results for CPR intervention 
 Whole period Period A Period B 
𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 
4.8354 
(18.7984) 
9.0887 
(21.0213) 
-39.1438 
(46.66) 
𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 
-20.5068** 
(9.203) 
-16.2205 
(14.7953) 
7.2928 
(21.7638) 
𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 
-8.09** 
(3.7504) 
0.2759 
(8.1744) 
-25.5373*** 
(8.2486) 
𝐸𝑉𝑡−1 
25.5162 
(26.3703) 
47.9396 
(31.6663) 
91.1292 
(65.3699) 
𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 
-0.0557 
(0.1034) 
0.0893 
(0.1251) 
0.4507 
(0.4425) 
𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 
-0.0621*** 
(0.0151) 
-0.0009 
(0.023) 
-0.3024*** 
(0.0929) 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 
1.955*** 
(0.2224) 
1.9172*** 
(0.2808) 
0.8909** 
(0.4406) 
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𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡 
-1.0135*** 
(0.2898) 
-0.788** 
(0.3324) 
0.144 
(0.6497) 
𝐿𝑡
(𝑝𝑖)
 
16.8847 
(39.5768) 
184.3139 
(205.2556) 
30.3665 
(48.8712) 
𝐿𝑡
(𝑒𝑐)
 
-136.2886*** 
(49.9797) 
-227.6946 
(164.3532) 
-160.9922 
(105.0089) 
𝑢1 
-45.8405*** 
(11.6681) 
2.5781 
(17.8403) 
-229.1922*** 
(71.1384) 
𝑢2 
-50.4519*** 
(11.7475) 
-2.3837 
(17.8454) 
-233.8378*** 
(71.3299) 
𝑅2 0.3086 0.1913 0.421 
Notes: The first row displays the estimated coefficient on CPR intervention in 
equation (5.21) with the Ordered Logit model. Figures in parentheses are standard 
errors. The whole period spans from 04/01/2011 to 13/12/2012. Period A ranges from 
04/01/2011 to 11/06/2012 and period B from 12/06/2012 to 13/12/2012. u1 and u2 
denote the thresholds in equation (2.26). Significance levels are displayed as *** for 
1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. 
 
The Ordered Logit estimation results for CPR intervention in Table 5.14 are similar to 
those of the binary choice estimation discussed above. CPR intervention is found to 
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lean-against-the-wind with 21-day moving average, 150-day moving average and the 
target appreciation rate. Period A focuses on the target appreciation rate, and in period 
B the target becomes 150-day moving average. Persistence of intervention exists in all 
the periods and the central bank shows concern for the condition of the national 
economy both in the whole period and in period B. In the whole period estimation 
CPR intervention is associated with a negative cost. CPR intervention influences the 
exchange rate through the setting of CPR with a fluctuation band. The effect is 
extremely obvious if the exchange rate is around the edge of the band. This type of 
intervention does not involve any transactions and will not provide liquidity to the 
foreign exchange market. In fact, CPR intervention might even aggravate the degree 
of illiquidity. Therefore, caution is needed by the central bank when conducting CPR 
intervention to tighten the distance between the exchange rate and CPR.  
Consistent with the results of CBT intervention, the neutral band of CPR tells us that 
the Chinese government is much more tolerant of USD appreciation (CNY 
depreciation) than of USD depreciation (CNY appreciation); the estimated neutral 
bands for the whole period and period B are [-50.45, -45.84] and [-233.84, -229.19], 
respectively. The threshold in period A is not significant because the exchange rate is 
not far away from CPR in this period.  
Comparing the neutral band of CPR intervention with that of CBT intervention, it can 
be found that the range of neutral band 𝑢1 − 𝑢2 for CBT intervention is much larger 
than that for CPR intervention. In the whole period estimation, the range of neutral 
band for CBT intervention is 7.9, which is 71.37% larger than that for CPR 
intervention. CPR intervention is proved the easier and less costly of the two types of 
intervention operation. Intuitively, in addition to the cost of getting the permission for 
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intervention, CBT intervention would also incur the cost of obtaining sufficient funds 
to undertake the transaction intervention in the market, and the pecuniary cost of 
losses due to changes of the exchange rate. This is consistent with the fact that CPR 
intervention occurs much more frequently than CBT intervention in our sample. 
In period B, the central bank is seen to gradually reduce intervention and to try to test 
the elasticity and self-regulation ability of the foreign exchange market. Here the 
central bank clearly shows more tolerance toward volatility of the exchange rate. As 
has been discussed above, CBT intervention appears to have acquired new driving 
forces, which include the intention to provide liquidity. The neutral band of CBT 
intervention is not significant. However, with the reduction of CBT intervention CPR 
intervention plays a more important role. Finally, it can be seen that the central bank 
still shows more tolerance of USD appreciation (CNY depreciation) than of USD 
depreciation (CNY appreciation), as the neutral band is [-233.84, -229.19]. 
5.4.4.2 Prediction performance of intervention reaction function 
In order to see how helpful the intervention determinants in equation (5.21) are in 
predicting official intervention operation, we compare the intervention prediction 
ability of estimated equation (5.21) with that of a constant probability equation. A 
constant probability equation is the reaction function with no intervention factor in the 
equation. Intuitively, the classification of intervention is based on the category with 
maximum predicted probability. 
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Table 5.15 Prediction evaluation of CBT intervention 
Whole period 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 Obs. Correct Correct (%) Constant Correct (%) Gain (%) Percentage Gain (%) 
-1 30 4 13.33% 0% 13.33% 13.33% 
0 398 395 99.25% 100% -0.75%  
1 18 5 27.78% 0% 27.78% 27.78% 
Total 446 404 90.58% 89.24% 1.35% 12.5% 
Period A 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 Obs. Correct Correct (%) Constant Correct (%) Gain (%) Percentage Gain (%) 
-1 15 3 20% 0% 20% 20% 
0 304 304 100% 100% 0%  
1 3 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 322 307 95.34% 94.41% 0.93% 16.67% 
Period B 
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𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 Obs. Correct Correct (%) Constant Correct (%) Gain (%) Percentage Gain (%) 
-1 15 1 6.67% 0% 6.67% 6.67% 
0 94 91 96.81% 100% -3.19%  
1 15 6 40% 0% 40% 40% 
Total 124 98 79.03% 75.81% 3.23% 13.33% 
Notes: Correct and Correct (%) are the number and rate of correct predictions of equation (5.21) to 
actual intervention. Constant Correct (%) is the rate of correct predictions of intervention when the 
reaction function contains no factor of intervention. Gain (%) is calculated by Correct (%) minus 
Constant Correct (%). Percentage Gain (%) is the percentage of incorrect rate reduction for equation 
(5.21) compared with the constant specification. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.15, the constant probability equation predicts non-
intervention accurately, but has no ability to capture the date of intervention. The 
Ordered Logit estimation of equation (5.21) is able to capture part of the intervention 
but slightly reduces the accuracy of non-intervention prediction. It captures CBT 
intervention well in the whole period estimation and period A estimation. The correct 
rate reaches 90.58% for the whole period, an increase of 1.35% compared to the 
constant specification. The percentage of incorrect rate reduction is 12.5%.  
In period A, the total correct rate of equation (5.21) rises to 95.34%. The 
improvement of correct rate and percentage of incorrect rate reduction are 0.93% and 
16.67%, respectively. CBT intervention in period B is more difficult to predict, and 
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the total correct rate of equation (5.21) decreases to 79.03%. However, the constant 
probability equation performance is much worse, and the correct rate is 3.23% lower 
than in equation (5.21). The incorrect rate of equation (5.21) is 13.33% lower than 
that of the constant specification.  
It can also be found that our model has better prediction performance with regard to 
depreciation-target intervention in period A and appreciation-target intervention in 
period B. The asymmetric estimation of the reaction function sheds light on the 
possible reason. In period A, the exchange rate experiences active appreciation in 
2011 and becomes stable afterwards. Appreciation-target intervention is rare, and 
𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑡 is significant. The model captures depreciation-target intervention better. In 
period B, in addition to the common significant driving force, appreciation-target 
intervention is more driven by excess volatility, national economy and foreign 
exchange market liquidity than is depreciation-target intervention. Our model better 
describes the features of appreciation-target intervention. 
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Table 5.16 Prediction evaluation of CPR intervention 
Whole period 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 Obs. Correct Correct (%) Constant Correct (%) Gain (%) Percentage Gain (%) 
-1 118 71 60.17% 0% 60.17% 60.17% 
0 272 236 86.77% 100% -13.23%  
1 56 34 60.71% 0% 60.71% 60.71% 
Total 446 341 76.46% 60.99% 15.47% 39.66% 
Period A 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 Obs. Correct Correct (%) Constant Correct (%) Gain (%) Percentage Gain (%) 
-1 100 62 62% 0% 62% 62% 
0 212 184 86.79% 100% -13.21%  
1 10 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 322 246 76.4% 65.84% 10.56% 30.91% 
Period B 
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𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 Obs. Correct Correct (%) Constant Correct (%) Gain (%) Percentage Gain (%) 
-1 18 7 38.89% 0% 38.89% 38.89% 
0 60 46 76.67% 100% -23.33%  
1 46 38 82.61% 0% 82.61% 82.61% 
Total 124 91 73.39% 48.39% 25% 48.44% 
Notes: Correct and Correct (%) are the number and rate of correct predictions of equation (5.21) to 
actual intervention. Constant Correct (%) is the rate of correct predictions of intervention when the 
reaction function contains no factor of intervention. Gain (%) is calculated by Correct (%) minus 
Constant Correct (%). Percentage Gain (%) is the percentage of incorrect rate reduction for equation 
(5.21) compared with the constant specification. 
 
From Table 5.16, we can see that for CPR intervention the constant probability 
equation again well predicts non-intervention but not intervention observations. 
Ordered Logit estimation captures CPR intervention better than CBT intervention and 
the highest correct rate is 82.61%. However, it also delivers more wrong signals for 
the dates without intervention. Overall, the total correct rate is smaller in the 
prediction of CPR intervention. On a more positive note, the improvement made by 
the equation (5.21) estimation of CPR intervention compared to the constant 
specification is much greater than the improvement for CBT intervention. The 
increase in the correct rate and the percentage reduction in the incorrect rate are 
respectively 15.47% and 39.66% for the whole period, 10.56% and 30.91% for period 
A, and 25% and 48.44% for period B. Similar to the results for CBT intervention, the 
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correct rate of depreciation-target intervention in period A is larger and the reaction 
function of appreciation-target intervention performs better in period B due to the 
asymmetric effects of the driving forces. 
5.4.4.3 Minimization of surprise and false alarm 
In the prediction of intervention, there could be two types of error. Type one is a 
surprise, when no signal of intervention is predicted but an intervention actually 
occurs. Type two is a false alarm, where an intervention is predicted but does not 
actually take place. Also, it should be noted that intervention has direction. It is 
possible that an actual intervention takes place as predicted, but the direction is 
opposite to the prediction. Ito and Yabu (2007) label this as correct signal and argue 
that there is no such case in their data. In our sample, a few observations have higher 
fitted probability of appreciation-target intervention (depreciation-target intervention) 
than that of depreciation-target intervention (appreciation-target intervention), when 
in fact it is depreciation-target intervention (appreciation-target intervention) that 
occurs. In order to remove these noises and discover the optimal cut-off, we classify 
this case as a false alarm.  
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Table 5.17 The framework of surprise and false alarm 
 Correct intervention No intervention or wrong intervention 
Signal was issued A B 
Signal was not issued C D 
Notes: A is the number of the interventions as correctly predicted, including the direction. B is the 
number of type two errors. C is the number of type one errors. D is the number of non-interventions as 
predicted. 
 
Table 5.17 summarizes the framework of predicted and actual intervention. A is the 
number of interventions correctly predicted, including the direction; B represents the 
number of false alarms; C indicates the number of surprises; D is the number of days 
when no signal of intervention is predicted and there is no actual intervention. 
Following Ito and Yabu (2007), the noise-to-signal ratio is adopted to minimize the 
problems of surprise and false alarm. The ratio is defined as: 
 𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐵
(𝐵 + 𝐷)⁄
𝐴
(𝐴 + 𝐶)⁄
 (5.26) 
𝐴
𝐴+𝐶
 is the ratio of the correct signal to actual intervention. 
𝐵
𝐵+𝐷
 is the noise ratio of no 
intervention and intervention with wrong predicted direction. Cut-off point is chosen 
from [0, 1] to seek minimization of the value of the noise-to-signal ratio. If the fitted 
211 
 
probabilities of both appreciation-target intervention and depreciation-target 
intervention are greater than the cut-off value, the direction of intervention is 
determined by the larger fitted probability.  We ignore the minimization results due to 
B=0. 
 
Table 5.18 Optimal results of noise-to-signal ratio for intervention 
 CBT intervention CPR intervention 
 Whole period Period A Period B Whole period Period A Period B 
Cut-off 68% 38%-40% 63%-70% 78% 73% 82% 
A 7 6 6 33 26 26 
B 1 2 1 5 5 1 
C 41 12 24 140 83 37 
D 397 302 93 268 208 60 
Signal 0.1458 0.3333 0.2 0.1908 0.2385 0.4127 
Noise 0.0025 0.0066 0.0106 0.0183 0.0235 0.0164 
Noise-to-
signal ratio 
0.0172 0.0197 0.0532 0.096 0.0984 0.0397 
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Table 5.18 shows the optimal results of surprise and false alarm problem for both 
CBT and CPR interventions. In the period A estimation of CBT intervention, the 
optimal cut-off points are 38%-40%. Six out of 18 interventions are correctly 
predicted and the signal ratio is 33.33%. Two out of 304 non-intervention 
observations are predicted as intervention, and the noise ratio is 0.66%. The noise-to-
signal ratio is 1.97% in period A and quite predictable. In the period B estimation of 
CBT intervention, the optimal cut-off points range from 63% to 70%; 6 out of 30 
interventions are correctly captured and the signal ratio is 20%. There is only 1 false 
alarm against 94 non-intervention days, and the noise ratio is 1.06%. The noise-to-
signal ratio in period B reaches 5.32%, which is much larger than in period A. This is 
consistent with the discussion above, where it is stated that intervention is harder to 
predict in period B. 
Columns 5-7 of Table 5.18 report the results of CPR intervention. In period A the 
optimal cut-off point is 73%; 26 out of 109 interventions are correctly predicted and 
the signal ratio is 23.85%. A signal is issued for 4 days with no intervention and 1 day 
with wrong intervention direction. The noise ratio is 2.35% and the noise-to-signal 
ratio is 9.84%. In period B, the cut-off point is 82% and the signal ratio reaches as 
high as 41.27%. Only 1 false alarm occurs due to the wrong prediction of intervention 
direction and the noise signal is 1.64%. The noise-to-signal ratio is 3.97%, which is 
much smaller than that in period A. CPR intervention is found to be more 
unpredictable in period A than in period B. 
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5.5 Conclusions 
Although foreign exchange market intervention has attracted much research attention, 
most studies focus on the effects of intervention. There is very little research that 
attempts to discover the driving forces behind the intervention, and even less focus on 
the emerging markets. This chapter enriches the line of studies on intervention 
reaction function in emerging markets. It develops a new model to capture the driving 
force of intervention, providing insights into a large emergent economy that is not 
well researched in the English language literature. It also provides empirical insights 
into the attitude of government toward exchange rate movement and the behaviour of 
central bank intervention. The specific findings are as follow: 
1) The return reversal of order flow is highly correlated with price impact 
of order flow. Their trends in our sample are similar, but the direction is 
completely opposite. The exchange rate movement due to order flow is always 
associated with overreaction and return reversal in the Chinese foreign exchange 
market. 
2) With the help of the Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint test and the regime-
shift model, 12
th
 June 2012 is detected as a breakpoint of intervention reaction 
function in our sample 
3) In this chapter, we introduce both a Logit model and an Ordered Logit 
model to capture the driving forces of intervention. In general, the Chinese 
government prefers a gradual achievement of its target exchange rate. It is found 
to lean-against-the-wind with both 150-day moving average and the target 
appreciation rate, which is 5% in 2011 and 0% in 2012. However, the reaction 
functions of appreciation-target intervention and depreciation-target intervention 
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are asymmetric and dynamic. Before 12
th
 June 2012, both CBT intervention and 
CPR intervention are more concerned with the target appreciation rate, and the 
persistence is significant. After 12
th
 June 2012, CBT intervention is freer, that is 
irregular and less predictable, and both neutral band of non-intervention and 
intervention persistence are not significant. In addition to the common 
significance of interest rate differential, appreciation-target CBT intervention is 
responsive to excess volatility and the national economy. The intervention also 
aims to provide liquidity when the foreign exchange market is illiquid. For CPR 
intervention, conditions of the national economy are a significant driving force. 
4) In general, the Chinese government is more tolerant of USD 
appreciation (CNY depreciation) than USD depreciation (CNY appreciation). 
However, this can change according to the political target. Before 12
th
 June 2012, 
the central bank actively accelerated the appreciation of CNY and was more 
tolerant towards USD depreciation (CNY appreciation) than USD appreciation 
(CNY depreciation). After 12
th
 June 2012, despite the central bank announcement 
that it would allow market forces to play a more important role than before in 
determining the exchange rate, it continues to show more tolerance towards USD 
appreciation (CNY depreciation) rather than USD depreciation (CNY 
appreciation). 
5) In the majority of cases in our estimations, the Logit model is proved 
to perform better than the OLS model in terms of RMSE and MAE for both in-
sample fitting and out-of-sample forecasting comparisons.  
6) The introduction of driving forces into the reaction function does 
improve the prediction performance. In the second half year of 2012, the central 
bank announced that it would reduce the frequency of intervention, and CBT 
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intervention is more difficult to predict after 12
th
 June 2012 than before that date. 
Conversely, CPR intervention becomes a more frequently used tool, and it is 
harder to predict before 12
th
 June 2012 than after that date. 
In this chapter, deviation from desired level of the exchange rate is an important 
driving force of central bank intervention. In some cases, lack of liquidity in the 
foreign exchange market is another determinant factor. This chapter reports the degree 
of increased probability of intervention when the driving forces increase. However, 
what extent of deviation from desired level of the exchange rate and what degree of 
market illiquidity is necessary to trigger central bank intervention require further 
research. The degree of tolerable deviation, but not the formal declaration of exchange 
rate trading band, represents the valid fluctuation band desired by the central bank. If 
the central bank is willing to increase the flexibility of the Chinese foreign exchange 
regime, it can and should allow greater tolerance toward deviation from the desired 
level of the exchange rate.  
Our findings do reveal that China has changed its mode of intervention since 12
th
 June 
2012. The central bank has reduced the amount of CBT intervention and has started to 
provide liquidity when it is needed in the market. This is an attempt in the right 
direction toward the reform of China’s foreign exchange system. However, the central 
bank still relies heavily on CPR intervention to control the level and growth of the 
renminbi exchange rate. How to moderate or even totally abandon such CPR 
intervention will be a great challenge to the further reform of China’s exchange rate 
regime. 
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Chapter 6  
Conclusions 
6.1  Main Findings 
This thesis is among the few to apply a microstructure methodology to the Chinese 
foreign exchange market. Motivated by the scarcity of theoretical models to capture 
price discovery of the exchange rate in a multi-structure market and by the 
disconnection between the DL model and ML model, and starting from the pricing 
strategy of individual dealers with past information available, this thesis first develops 
a model to describe the transition process from individual price setting to market-wide 
exchange rate. Compared to the existing literature, our model provides richer content 
in the order flow model in a more realistic environment.  
Consistent with the features of the foreign exchange market in reality, the model 
points out that the number of dealers, which is relevant to market competition, is an 
important factor to influence the market depth and pricing strategy. When the market 
is more competitive, the quotes of individual dealers will become closer to their 
expected value of the exchange rate.  
In addition, our model shows that the empirical success of order flow on the exchange 
rate is related to both information effect and inventory effect. The information effect 
is incorporated into the model when customers with private information trade with 
dealers in the customer market, and is realized in the optimal quoting strategy of 
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dealers to incoming orders. Inventory effect influences the price setting of the 
exchange rate when dealers wish to share overnight risk with the public and stay with 
no imbalance of inventory position. The model provides detail on the components of 
price impact of order flow on exchange rates. Specifically, the impact of order flow 
on the exchange rate is positively related to macro variables and negatively related to 
overnight market risk, the number of dealers, parameters of utility function and risk-
bearing capacity. 
This theoretical model entails an important assumption, namely that the market dealer 
will not hold an overnight position. It is quite helpful for the monetary authorities of 
some emerging markets to restrain excessive currency speculation, especially in 
China. Furthermore, the Chinese foreign exchange markets study and copy the 
advanced markets for the purpose of renminbi internationalization. With the rapid 
growth of the transaction volume of the Chinese foreign exchange market, it will 
become more mature and closer to those of the developed countries. Hence this model 
provides a theoretical tool to study the Chinese foreign exchange market. 
With regard to the relationship between order flow and exchange rate movement in 
China, as far as I can discover there remains a gap in the empirical research of order 
flow model on CNY/USD in ultra-high frequency. Our results confirm that order flow 
plays an important role in determining exchange rate dynamics in ultra-high 
frequency. The influence of order flow is greater when the market is volatile and lacks 
liquidity. According to our model, the number of dealers in the market reduces when 
the market is illiquid. Therefore, the impact of order flow increases. 
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Given that order flow captures a relatively smaller part of exchange rate movement in 
the emerging markets than it does in the developed market, we consider trading 
duration as a further potential factor to capture the process of price discovery, in 
addition to order flow.  
Although it has been argued that the time between two consecutive transactions 
contains information, the information content of trading duration is usually detected 
by its significant relationship with asset price movement and volatility. With the help 
of the PIN model and the ACD model, we are able to provide a picture on intraday 
pattern of information-based trading and trading duration. Then, it becomes possible 
to study directly the information content of both expected and unexpected 
components of trading duration. In our sample period, the probability of information-
based trading is highest around the beginning and end of trading hours, and lowest 
during lunch time. This is consistent with the intraday pattern of trading duration, 
which exhibits a distinctive inverted U-shape with relatively long trading duration 
during lunch time. Our empirical investigation shows that both components of trading 
duration are relevant to the arrival rate of informed traders, but not to the probability 
of information occurring. 
Incorporating two components of trading duration in the order flow model, our results 
suggest that trading duration does contain additional information besides order flow, 
and enhances the explanatory power of our model. The impact of trading duration on 
exchange rate movement is not induced simply by active informed traders or inactive 
uninformed traders. Instead, it is a composite result reflecting complicate behaviours 
of both informed traders and uninformed traders. When the market is placid, little 
evidence can be found that informed traders are active. Uninformed traders will trade 
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as they plan to. Short expected trading duration is mainly associated with the high 
trading intensity of existing informed traders, leading to large exchange rate 
movement and increased volatility. The activity of existing informed traders will 
increase the probability of transition from a small exchange rate change with low 
volatility (SL) regime to a large exchange rate change with high volatility (LH) 
regime. When the market is volatile with large exchange rate movements, it is evident 
that informed traders are active. This expels existing liquidity providers, and long 
expected trading duration implies a high proportion of informed traders, thus 
associating with large exchange rate movement and high volatility. The probability of 
the market staying in a LH regime will increase. The unexpected component of 
trading duration indicates an increase in both informed traders and uninformed traders. 
Due to the membership system of the Chinese foreign exchange market, the possible 
growth in the number of informed traders is limited, and discretionary uninformed 
traders dominate the signed unexpected trading duration. The impacts of signed 
unexpected trading duration are positive in both market regimes. 
We further examine the relation between trading duration and conditional volatility in 
the framework of the ACD-GARCH model. Our results confirm the positive 
correlation between the expected arrival rate and conditional volatility. Expected 
arrival rate plays a more important role than the unexpected arrival rate in capturing 
conditional volatility.  
Finally, we extend our microstructure analysis to official foreign exchange 
intervention in China. In total, we examine seven factors with ten variables as 
potential determinants in the intervention reaction function. The Chinese government 
is found to follow a ‘lean-against-the-wind’ policy with 150-day moving average in 
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the foreign exchange market. It prefers to achieve the target exchange rate gradually 
and the target rate of appreciation is significant in two types of intervention. However, 
the effects of the driving forces are asymmetric. After the government announcement 
that the Chinese yuan has reached equilibrium, the target appreciation rate ceases to 
be a significant driving force for both CBT intervention and CPR intervention. 
Appreciation-target CBT intervention undertakes more tasks and has a more wide-
ranging purpose than the depreciation-target CBT intervention. Appreciation-target 
CBT intervention is found to be conducted to remove excess volatility, counter the 
influence of QEⅢ and provide liquidity when necessary. In addition, the driving 
forces of CBT intervention and CPR intervention are different. CBT intervention is 
more responsive to the interest rate differential, while CPR intervention is more 
concerned with the condition of the national economy. CPR intervention is easier and 
less costly to implement than CBT intervention, since the range of neutral band for 
CPR intervention is narrower than that for CBT intervention; correspondingly, CPR 
intervention is more persistent and more frequently conducted than CBT intervention. 
The Chinese government shows more tolerance of USD appreciation (CNY 
depreciation) than USD depreciation (CNY appreciation). One exception is when the 
government actively speeds up the appreciation of CNY in order to counter a high rate 
of inflation. In that situation the government shows more tolerance towards USD 
depreciation (CNY appreciation) than USD appreciation (CNY depreciation).  
With the inclusion of intervention determinants specific to the Chinese market, the 
forecasting ability of our model improves. Our model correctly predicts above 70% of 
intervention indicators in total, based on the category with maximum predicted 
probability. Following the central bank announcement of its intention to reduce the 
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frequency and improve the method of intervention, China’s intervention strategy does 
change: CBT intervention becomes more flexible, the intervention persistence 
disappears, and the neutral band of CBT intervention is no longer significant.  
While CBT intervention is less predictable, the Chinese CPR intervention becomes a 
relatively more frequently used tool and more predictable. Although the central bank 
has stated its intention to allow market forces to play a greater role in determining the 
exchange rate than was previously the case, the neutral band of CPR intervention tells 
us that the government is still more tolerant of USD appreciation (CNY depreciation) 
than USD depreciation (CNY appreciation). 
6.2 Implications and Future Research 
This thesis provides a microstructure analysis of price discovery, trading duration and 
official intervention to better our understanding of the working of the foreign 
exchange market in emerging market economies, with specific reference to China. 
Important implications can be drawn for both market participants and policy makers. 
First, given the fact that it is not straightforward to influence macro variables, 
overnight market risk, parameters of the utility function and risk-bearing capacity, a 
more effective way to improve market efficiency is to increase the number of dealers 
and market capacity. This could increase the market liquidity and decrease the trading 
cost of market participants, improving the process of price discovery. 
Second, since trading duration is proved to be an important factor in affecting 
exchange rate movement, consideration of this factor will help us understand the 
process of price discovery and asset pricing. With a better understanding of the 
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trading behaviours behind trading duration, we suggest that uninformed traders should 
trade carefully in the market if expected trading duration is short and unexpected 
trading duration is long, even if the market looks calm. That situation probably 
implies high activity of existing informed traders and high proportion of newly 
arrived informed traders.  
Third, we suggest that secret CBT intervention should be implemented when the 
market is liquid. This could make it harder for the market to discover the intervention, 
and on average make it easier to intervene to influence the exchange rate. According 
to the evidence uncovered by our empirical investigation, the Chinese government 
tends to engage in CBT intervention around the beginning and end of trading hours. 
These are the critical times for the market participants to anticipate market changes. 
Fourth, our results confirm that the Chinese central bank has changed its intervention 
regime since June 2012. After that date, CBT intervention becomes more flexible. 
While this represents a positive step in the right direction, the central bank still 
intervenes extensively, especially through the setting of the CPR to manage the 
exchange rate. Problems may appear, for example, when the market anticipates that 
the true value of the exchange rate will move outside the fluctuation band around the 
CPR, leading to large exchange rate movements. Government intervention may 
mitigate the situation, but the exchange rate might remain for a long time around the 
edge of the band. In response, liquidity providers will postpone their transactions and 
the market will become illiquid, with only informed traders left. Unless market 
expectation changes, market liquidity would be in a better situation if the central bank 
were to cease its CPR intervention to let the market find the appropriate level of the 
exchange rate at which the market could become liquid by itself. Alternatively, the 
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central bank would have to re-engage in CBT intervention to provide liquidity, which 
would run contrary to reform intentions. 
Despite the extensive research carried out for this thesis, there is scope for further 
exploration of the foreign exchange market in emerging economies like China from a 
microstructure perspective. 
First, the calculation of order flow is borrowed from the equity market and has been 
used for more than a decade. Although the current formation of order flow has 
performed fairly well until now, it will be useful to develop a new construction of 
order flow based on the features of the foreign exchange market. 
Second, the theoretical model developed in this thesis sheds new light on the price 
discovery in the order flow model. However, this raises the challenge of discovering 
to what extent empirical evidence can be found to support the theoretical insights. 
Furthermore, in order to estimate the specific parameters of such a theoretical model, 
it is necessary to find an appropriate methodology that is able to construct a variable 
that summarizes the effects of several parameters. Also, while the research reported in 
this thesis considers emerging foreign exchange markets, it would be interesting to 
see whether it could be applied to developed markets, or whether new insights can be 
drawn from comparing these research findings with results from studies on developed 
markets.  
Third, due to data availability, this research adopts a static PIN model. Important 
information may be lost in such a static setting since the model assumes constant 
probability of information happening, constant probability of good news and bad 
news, and the constant arrival rate of informed traders and uninformed traders within 
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the estimation period. Once data availability is considerably improved such that a 
large enough data sample may be gathered, the model may perform well in a dynamic 
setting, which may significantly enhance our understanding of the working of the 
foreign exchange market in China, including the information content of trading 
duration in high frequency data. 
Fourth, our intervention data are collected from media reports. However, it is 
debatable whether these media reports can accurately indicate the actual intervention 
operations in China. A proper measure of China’s intervention operations would 
represent a great improvement to the calibration of the research in this area, allowing 
us to study more accurately the driving forces of intervention and intervention effects. 
A promising avenue for such improvement will be to decipher the intervention 
information from changes in the official holdings of foreign reserves. This will 
involve transformation of low frequency foreign reserves data into high frequency. 
The mission is challenging, but the reward could be great.   
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